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The evaluation of the Canadian Mine Action Programme in the Balkans (Balkans CMAP) 
was focused on the key results achieved and lessons learned, with particular emphasis on 
validating the design, implementation and effectiveness of the numerous projects that 
comprised the programme. The lessons derived from the evaluation are intended to improve 
programme development, and project selection, design and implementation. To this end, the 
evaluation has defined a number of principles’ that can be used as the basis for the 
development of a formal programming framework. The purpose of this framework would be 
to provide strategic orientation and design guidance for future CIDA MAP initiatives in the 
Balkans or in other mine affected regions of the world. 
 
Overall, the evaluation has shown that the CIDA Balkans CMAP must be viewed as a 
significant success. The programme began in response to a push of funding furnished by 
the Canadian Landmine Fund (CLF) in 1998. It was initially confined to Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and was designed to support or complement ongoing CIDA development 
assistance initiatives in the country. From a few initial projects, the programme was quickly 
expanded a year later in response to the cessation of hostilities in Kosovo and again in 2000 
with the change of regime in Croatia. It therefore evolved over a very short period into a 
significant regional programme, totaling some $20m (CAD) and included a large number 
and variety of projects covering all of the key areas of mine action. 
 
While it was a difficult programme to manage, it did represent successful collaboration 
between CIDA and DFAIT in all its stages. As well, it involved beneficial support by the 
Canadian Forces and included innovative use of Canadian expertise and capabilities in 
institutional support, mine clearance, victim assistance and MDD training. The programme 
was responsive to political and local developments, and was consistent with the Canadian 
foreign policy goal in the Balkans to promote regional stability after years of strife. The 
CMAP raised Canada’s profile and credibility in Europe, promoted Canadian values and 
reinforced the Ottawa Convention to Ban Landmines by linkage to Canada’s aggressive 
support of mine action in the Balkans. 
 
The CMAP was also supportive of CIDA’s development assistance strategy to secure peace 
and prosperity in the region, as well as its related development priorities and crosscutting 
  
themes. The mine action initiatives were undertaken to protect vulnerable populations and 
communities, and to facilitate humanitarian action, peace building, reconstruction and socio-
economic development. The programme achieved particular success in the area of 
institution building and in the development of sustainable, indigenous mine/UXO clearance 
capacity. The CMAP mine awareness and victim assistance projects achieved varied results 
although these projects standout for their ultimate success in the areas of reach and 
sustainability. The programme’s innovative attempts to employ Canadian demining and 
MDD training capabilities also received mixed reviews. Nonetheless, the Balkans CMAP 
was widely applauded for its focus, reliability and achievements. The review of the 
programme results and key success factors was also very favourable and a number of 
important lessons have been derived from this evaluation that will greatly assist in the 
design of future programmes of its type. 
 
The design of future CMAPs must first and foremost be informed by a clear understanding 
of Canadian foreign policy goals and development assistance strategy in the region 
concerned. The value-added dimension is also an important consideration and in most 
cases this will lead to a focus on institution building. The creation of an effective mine action 
coordination centre is vital to the development and coordination of a successful and 
sustainable national mine action programme. This is an area where Canada has achieved a 
particular impact and has much to offer. Next in importance is the building of sustainable 
indigenous mine/UXO clearance capacity. The use of international NGOs or contractors 
should not subordinate the goal of sustainability unless there are emergency requirements 
for which they are best suited. Mine awareness and victim assistance initiatives should 
normally be considered but should always be coordinated with lead agencies such as 
UNICEF and the ICRC, and must be consistent with MAC priorities, themes and standards 
as applicable.  
 
There are many lessons learned from this evaluation that bear repeating. Mine action 
programming in general benefits from close collaboration and sharing of programme 
information between CIDA, DFAIT and DND. Any new CIDA programme initiatives must 
include input from DFAIT (foreign policy) and DND/MIC (mine situation assessments) as 
well as key international organizations such as UNMAS, UNDP, UNICEF, ICRC, engaged 
NGOs such as NPA, and UN or national MACs. Project selection, design and 
implementation must include reliable local partners, and programmes must be regionalized 
to the extent possible to reduce the span of control and ease the task of programme 
management. Project design and contracts/donor agreements must include precise 
milestones, deliverables (outputs) and reporting requirements with tied funding in the form of 
progress payments and holdbacks. As well, every project must have a well-defined exit 
strategy. Finally, programmes with the magnitude and impact of the Balkans CMAP must 
include a clearly defined communication strategy, with a plan that provides guidance for 
both reactive and proactive communication. This would greatly assist managers in 
responding to incidents or queries, and facilitate international and domestic awareness of 
Canada’s contribution in this highly topical area.  
 
Note to Reader: This report was prepared in accordance with the “CIDA Evaluation Guide, 
January 2000”. As a result, it includes a project-level review for each of Croatia, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, and Kosovo, as well as a regional programme-level review. Unfortunately, 
project similarities lead to unavoidable repetition in the presentation of results. To avoid this 
repetition, the reader may wish to focus attention at the outset on the individual 
country/province or mine action area of particular interest using the index for Part II as a 
guide.
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We envision a world free of the threat of land mines and unexploded ordnance, where 
individuals and communities live in a safe environment conducive to development, and 













The Central and Eastern Europe Branch (CEEB) of CIDA is responsible for Canada’s Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) programme in Central and Eastern Europe. A key element 
within this area of responsibility has been CIDA’s Canadian Mine Action Programme (CMAP) 
in the Balkans. The 1997 Ottawa Landmine Treaty and the resultant government created 
$100m Landmine Fund to address mine contamination in affected countries throughout the 
world, precipitated this unique five-year programme. The five-year Balkans CMAP (1998-03) 
comprised 37 individual projects plus nine sub projects, with a level of investment totaling 
some $20m (CAD). The projects were located primarily in Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo with 
some residual programming support undertaken in Slovenia. The Balkans CMAP was 
principally focused on: the provision of direct humanitarian assistance; the enhancement of 
peace, security and stability; the building of institutional mine action capacity; and the 
creation of indigenous mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) clearance capabilities. 
Accordingly, the programme covered the key mine action areas including:  mine/UXO survey, 
marking and clearance; mine awareness/mine risk education (MRE); institutional capacity 
building; and mine victim assistance.
                                                 
1  A/56/448/Add.1 United Nations Mine Action: A Strategy for 2001-2005 Report of the Secretary-General. 
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LINKAGES – CIDA MANDATE AND PRIORITIES 
 
As outlined in the Balkans Memorandum to Cabinet approved 15 March 2001, Canadian 
development programming is to be conducted along three strategic axes: peace building and 
security; economic cooperation and reconstruction; and social sustainability. The overall 
focus of CIDA's CMAP in the Balkans was to reduce the threat of injury and death posed by 
mines and UXO in order to:  permit the return of refugees and displaced persons, enable 
rebuilding and economic recovery to take place, and result in the development of sustainable 
indigenous institutions and capacity. By virtue of this approach, the CMAP contributed to all 
three Balkans programme priorities (see figure 14). Indeed, the broad objectives of the 
Balkans MAP were in keeping with CIDA’s mandate to support sustainable development in 
order to reduce poverty and contribute to a more secure, equitable and prosperous world. 
The primary aim of the programme was focused on improving the safety and security of 
vulnerable populations. This was accomplished by projects designed to identify and mark 
dangerous areas, create awareness of the threat and directly clear critical areas of mines 
and UXO. CIDA’s corporate priorities were adhered to in the development of the Balkans 
MAP and were addressed to the extent possible in all of the individual projects. To this end, 
the objectives of the programme were identified as: 
 
a. Enhance the physical security of vulnerable populations and aid workers by 
reducing the threat posed by mines and UXO (survey, mark, educate, clear); 
b. Address basic human needs and well-being by ensuring that shelter areas, 
utilities and social infrastructure are safe and cleared of mines/UXO; 
c. Contribute to sustainable development and growth by ensuring that 
transportation, systems, utilities, private sector and public infrastructure, and 
agricultural and forestry land are safe and cleared of mines/UXO; 
d. Enable the protection of the environment by addressing the issue of mine/UXO 
contamination;  
e. Provide assistance to the victims of landmines/UXO by the direct support of 
physical and socio-economic rehabilitation and reintegration projects; and 
f. Contribute to sustainable mine action capacity by supporting MAP institution 
building and the development of indigenous mine action/clearance capacity in 
both the public and private sectors. 
 
These objectives included numerous supporting or enabling objectives such as: the 
enhancement of Canadian private sector capacity in the area of mine action; increasing 
public awareness of Canada’s international profile in the area of humanitarian mine action, 
the Ottawa treaty and the Canadian Landmine Fund; and the development of Canadian 





The Balkans MAP involved numerous stakeholders and partnership organizations. These 
organizations include: 
 
a. International organizations such as NATO, the UNDP, UNICEF, UNMAS, the 
World Bank and UN Mine Action Coordination offices in the affected countries;  
b. Local and international NGOs such as CARE Canada, Norwegian Peoples’ Aid 
(NPA), Handicap International (HI) and Akcija Protiv Mina (APM);  
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c. Other Government of Canada Departments such as DFAIT and DND; 
d. Canadian partners such as Queen’s University, International Centre for the 
Advancement of Community-Based Rehabilitation (ICACBR), International 
Children’s Institute (ICI), Canadian International Demining Centre (CIDC), the 
International Demining Alliance of Canada (IDAC), NOTRA Environmental Inc. 
and Wolf’s Flat Ordnance Disposal Corp; and 
e. Local government institutions such as the Croatian Mine Action Centre 
(CROMAC), the Bosnian Demining Commission and the Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Mine Action Centre (BHMAC). 
 
 
REACH AND EXPECTED RESULTS 
 
The participation of these stakeholder organizations covered the full spectrum of involvement 
from advisory and coordination status to full project implementation, and responsibility for 
results/outputs and reporting. The reach of the Balkans CMAP has been equally diverse, 
ranging from involvement in the area of institution building to hands on mine/UXO clearance 
and victim assistance with the resultant ability to identify immediate beneficiaries in the target 
population. Consequently, the expected results of the Balkans CMAP in terms of impact, 
outcomes and outputs also vary considerably. In the case of institution building, the results 
are difficult to quantify and must be viewed in terms of increased organizational 
effectiveness. Actual mine/UXO clearance projects, on the other hand, are quite easy to 
quantify in terms of lethal devices found and destroyed or area cleared. These statistics, 
however, must be evaluated with caution, as there are numerous factors that impinge on 
demining operations that can render normal comparative analysis invalid. These factors 
include; weather, topography, soil conditions, vegetation, type of equipment, and proximity to 
worksite, as well as the length and type of conflict, sophistication and lethality of ordnance 
and the prevailing political/security situation. Nonetheless, outputs can be quantified and the 








THE DEVELOPMENT CONTEXT 
 
Transition and conflict are the two main forces that have characterized the development 
environment in the Balkans. With the decline of the Soviet Union, countries throughout 
Eastern Europe faced the challenge of updating corrupt and inefficient state institutions and 
faltering economies. In the Balkans, these economic processes were complicated and 
disrupted by a number of conflicts revolving around the break-up of the area’s largest state, 
the former Yugoslavia. The tumultuous events during this period have had a significant 
impact on the economic, political and social contexts, all of which influenced Canadian mine 
action interventions in the region. 
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Recent Balkan Conflicts 
 
The former Yugoslavia, which existed as a federation of six republics from 1945 to 1990, 
largely disintegrated into its constituent parts in 1991. The non-aligned Socialist government, 
sometimes through the use of force, suppressed minorities within Yugoslavia’s republics. 
After free parliamentary elections held throughout the federation in 1990, nationalism flared 
and wars erupted along ethnic and religious lines throughout the 1990s. The most significant 
of wars occurred in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo, a province of Serbia. 
However, the war also spilled over the borders into Montenegro, Slovenia and Macedonia, 
and NATO conducted bombing on Serbia to stop its role in the Kosovo war. 
 
Croatia was the first country to suffer through significant military conflicts. In 1990, a 
parliamentary election in the republic resulted in a large number of Croat nationalists entering 
parliament, perhaps as a response to the hard-line tactics being promoted by the Serbian 
president Slobodan Milosevic. They pushed nationalist policies that angered the Serb 
minority. As a response, the Serbs declared autonomy from Croatia around the same time 
that Croatia was declaring independence from Yugoslavia. The result was confrontation 
between Croat forces and Croatian Serb rebels.   
 
The sympathetic Serbian government took political and then military actions to aid the Serb 
fighters in Croatia. The conflicts resulted in 20,000 deaths. By 1992, approximately one third 
of the country lay outside of the Croatian government’s control. At the beginning of that year, 
a UN brokered ceasefire resulted in the deployment of an international force on the borders 
of Serb-controlled areas, the withdrawal of Serbian troops and the beginning of a fragile 
peace. This peace was broken in 1995 when the Croatian government launched assaults on 
the Croatian Serb controlled areas of western Slavonia and Krajina. The assaults led to the 
displacement of most of the 200,000 Croatian Serbs, amongst allegations that Croat forces 
committed widespread atrocities. The country has been fully under the Croatian 
government’s control since 1998.   
 
The first Croatian conflict was shortly followed by conflicts in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). 
Like Croatia, Bosnia’s 1990 parliamentary elections were won by ethnically based parties 
representing the Muslims, Serbs and Croats. Bosnian Serbs declared they would remain with 
Yugoslavia in response to the Croatian and Slovenian independence motions passed in 
1991. They formed autonomous areas to distance themselves from the Bosnian government 
and boycotted a 1992 referendum on independence. A declaration of independence made by 
the Bosnian Croatian and Muslim parties in 1992 was followed directly by war. 
 
The war lasted for four years, from 1992 to 1995. Armies from Croatia and Serbia attempted 
to annex parts of BiH. Bosnian Serbs and Croats, attempting to secede from a greater 
Bosnian state, changed the nature of the conflict from a war of aggression to a civil war. 
Muslims and Croats fought together against Serbs until 1993, when Bosnian Croats 
proclaimed an independent state. This resulted in Muslims and Croat forces turning against 
each other until a 1994 US-brokered peace agreement. This peace resulted in Muslims and 
Croats again joining forces to fight the Serbs. In total, more than a million people were 
displaced across borders and 845,000 were internally displaced. There are allegations that 
all sides committed atrocities. In 1995, the three sides agreed to the Dayton Accord, a peace 
agreement implemented with the military and institutional support of the international 
community. The presence of a NATO-led stabilization force (SFOR) has prevented any 
resumption of conflict. 
CIDA/CEE Canadian Mine Action Programme in the Balkans Evaluation Report 1998-2003 5
  
 
Kosovo broke into war in 1998. Serbian nationalism had been growing in Yugoslavia since 
the middle of the 1980s, and manifested itself in the election of a nationalistic leader, 
Slobodan Milosevic. Milosevic prompted nationalist policies such as resuming Serbian 
control of Kosovo, a province that had been relatively autonomous since 1945 and whose 
majority population were ethnic Albanians. A Serbian crackdown of Albanian protest forced 
Kosovo to concede loss of its autonomy in 1989. 
 
The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) emerged in 1996 and was determined to gain 
independence for Kosovo through war. Serbia refused to agree to an internationally brokered 
peace plan, which provided for NATO forces entering Kosovo and Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia 
intensified its activities in Kosovo and around the same time, NATO conducted bombing 
strikes on Serbia. Up to 900,000 Albanians were displaced from Kosovo, hundreds of 
civilians died from the bombing and thousands of Serbs and Albanians died in Kosovo. The 
bombing ended after 78 days with the acceptance of a G8 plan that included the withdrawal 
of Serbian forces from Kosovo and the introduction of the NATO Kosovo force (KFOR). 
Kosovo is currently under the administration of the UN (UNMIK) although from a legal 
standpoint, it is still a province of Yugoslavia (recently renamed as Serbia-Montenegro).  
 
 
Transition in the Region 
 
Even before the Balkan wars of the 1990s, Yugoslavia’s government and economy were 
facing serious troubles. The country went into a difficult recession during the 1980s. While 
Yugoslavia was more economically open and liberalized than the soviet-aligned eastern 
European states, it failed to approach the economic development of most of its western 
neighbours. Also, the country’s national and federal leaders avoided democratic and 
governance reforms, with the first multi-party elections not occurring until 1990.  
 
Political and economic transition from centrally planned economies and socialism to 
democracy and liberal economies has proven costly throughout Eastern Europe. In the 
Balkans, elections have often resulted in ethnic and nationalist parties gaining power, which 
usually exacerbated inter-ethnic tensions. The closure of inefficient industries has increased 
unemployment and poverty, at least temporarily. The nationalization of state-run industries 
has often led to punitive rents that are not economically sustainable. Transition and conflict 
have provoked rapid economic, political and social changes with all of the associated 
challenges.  
 
Due to the costs of transition and their participation in wars, Balkan governments were often 
reluctant or unable to implement the necessary elements of transition during the 1990s. As a 
result, the former Yugoslav states are in various stages of transition.    
 
 
Economy of the Region 
 
Transition and conflict have extracted a high cost in the Balkans. This is illustrated by the fact 
that economies in the region are significantly weaker than they were in 1990. Gross 
Domestic Products are a fraction of what they were in the late 1980’s. For example, in the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, the most severely affected 
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states, it is estimated that 2000 Gross Domestic Products were only 47 percent of their 1990 
level.2  All statistics fail to include activity in the grey economy, which may be significant. 
 
Kosovo is one of the poorest regions of Europe. Its infrastructure, and economic and political 
institutions are severely underdeveloped. These problems were exacerbated by the 1999 
conflict that destroyed much of what infrastructure the province did have. The province is 
now highly aid dependent. While its GDP has grown at a rate of 16 percent a year, much of 
this is dependent on international aid. The large number of refugees and displaced people 
also provides a large economic drain. 
 
BiH is also dependent on aid, but to a lesser extent than Kosovo. The result of compromises 
made to end the BiH conflicts was a complicated, disjointed political system. The wars also 
damaged the country’s physical infrastructure. Both of these factors create significant 
economic challenges. Basic government financing functions, such as taxation, are weak and 
the lack of infrastructure impedes economic development. Unemployment in 2001 was 
approximately 38 percent.3 
 
Croatia, in contrast, is second only to Slovenia among the former Yugoslav states in terms of 
its economic progress. The country has had a coherent political centre since 1998. Since the 
2000 election, a moderate political party has been in power, and has shown the will to 
accelerate transition. Elections at the end of 2002 resulted in more nationalistic parties being 
re-elected, however, they do not have the same hard-line character as the parties of the 
1990s. Development in the country is uneven. Lack of physical infrastructure, partially due to 
damage caused in the country’s military conflicts, remains a problem. Continued insistence 
on the part of the government to take a strong role in the economy, has prompted members 
of the international community to insist that it speed up the process of privatization.4 





Transition and conflict have resulted in different political and institutional frameworks 
throughout the former Yugoslav states. Each country’s unique situation created different 
development needs. 
 
In the case of Croatia, the 1995 offensive against Serbs resulted in a strong, coherent central 
state. This state played an activist role in the economy and remained highly nationalistic until 
1999. The death of the country’s president during that year precipitated elections in 2000. As 
a result of those elections, a more moderate coalition came into power that pursued 
international, especially EU, norms of good governance and economic management. The 
new government has made significant progress towards those goals. 
 
The Dayton Peace agreement, which hallmarked the end of the conflict in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, involved a number of compromises that led to a complicated political structure.  
The country is comprised of two entities, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the 
Republica Srpska, and direct international involvement in the administration of the country in 
                                                 
2 Interview with David Mueller, CEE Mine Action Programme Officer 1996-99. 
3 BiH IPRSP  
4 Economist 2001 
5 Economist, 2002 
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the form of the Office of the High Representative (OHR). Further complicating this political 
structure, the Federation contains eleven regional governments. The division of 
responsibilities among these governments results in institutions that remain weak and in 
need of reform. 
 
Indigenous institutions in Kosovo are even weaker than they are in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
In the case of Kosovo, no such institutions existed prior to the 1999 conflict. Their 
development was stymied by the fact that the province had never been an independent state, 
was not a republic within the former Yugoslav federation and was integrated into Serbia 
through most of the 1990s. As a result of the lack of indigenous institutions, the international 
community has taken a significant role in the operation of Kosovo and is represented by two 
primary institutions, UNMIK and the OSCE, plus the military presence of NATO in the form of 
the KFOR.   
 
 
Social Issues  
 
The economic, political and military turmoil of the 1990s left behind significant social 
problems in Kosovo, BiH and Croatia. Unemployment and displacement have contributed to 
poverty, growth in social dislocation and other social problems. However, the extent and 
nature of these problems is different in each area. 
 
Kosovo is one of the poorest regions in Europe with some of the lowest indicators of human 
development, including a 50% poverty rate, low attendance of women in schools and high 
levels of corruption. Kosovo’s most immediate problem following the war was resolving the 
needs of a massive displaced population. According to the Norwegian Refugee Council, 
approximately 288,000 people displaced from Kosovo during the war still live in Serbia and 
Montenegro. The majority of these are Serbs that are blocked from returning by ethnic 
tensions between them and the Kosovo Albanians. In order for Kosovo’s social infrastructure 
to recover and improve, it also needs rebuilt physical infrastructure and developed 
institutions.6 
 
Bosnia and Herzegovina suffered through the longest war in the 1990s. Consequently, its 
infrastructure was significantly damaged and a large portion of its population was internally 
and externally displaced. The BiH PRSP estimates 281,652 internally displaced persons and 
624,250 BiH refugees still living abroad, almost half of whom have no permanent solution to 
their status. The Poverty Paper concludes that this displaced population is particularly 
vulnerable to poverty and low standards of living. In BiH, nineteen percent of the total 
population lives below the poverty line, while 30 percent live just above it.   
 
During the 1990’s, Croatia’s social development reflected large disparity between the capital, 
Zagreb, and the countryside. Zagreb enjoys a developed infrastructure and government 
institutions while the country is less developed. In terms of basic human development, the 
country is doing significantly better than the other former Yugoslav states except, Slovenia. 
In April of 2002, the Croatian government reported that only 22,000 people from a high of 
220,000 remain internally displaced. The majority of the returnees are Croats, while much of 
the Croatian Serb population remains outside of Croatia’s borders.7 
 
                                                 
6www.db.idpproject.org/Sites/idpProjectDb/idpSurvey.nsf/wCountries/Yugoslavia+[Federal+Republic+of] 
7 www.db.idpproject.org/Sites/idpSurvey.nsf/wViewSingleEnv/CroatiaProfile+Summary  





As outlined in the introduction to this evaluation, the CMAP can be viewed as complementary 
and enabling in terms of CIDA’s development priorities in the region. The expected results for 
the programme vary based on the differing situations in each country. Within Kosovo, the 
primary goal was to remove the threat of mine contamination completely. In BiH, mine 
contamination is significant and may take decades to clear. Therefore, the priority was to 
clear the highest priority areas for refugee returns and local populations, while building a 
sustainable capacity to manage and conduct a long-term mine clearance programme. 
Although more advanced, there was a similar need for the building of a sustainable national 
institution to manage mine action in Croatia. 
 
 
ACHIEVEMENTS AND MILESTONES 
 
Balkan countries each have a unique mine contamination and development context. As a 
result, the activities undertaken by the CMAP have taken a different character in each 
country. Also, many of these activities have been collaborative in nature and the CMAP has 
contributed a portion of the mine action efforts of the international community. Therefore, the 
milestones of the Balkan CMAP are area specific and often cannot be separated from the 
achievements of the entire community. The following are the noteworthy 
achievements/milestones that the Balkans CMAP has contributed to: 
 
Kosovo:  
· 1999 - The UNMACC was established. 
· 1999 - Rapid clearance of priority areas for returning refugees.  
· 2001 - Effective removal of the mine threat. 
 
Croatia:  
· 2000 – 2001 - Development of the legal background, technical knowledge and 
physical infrastructure for the CROMAC to operate as a fully indigenous 
organization. 
· 2000 – 2001 - Accurate mine surveys significantly reduced the suspected mine 
contaminated areas. 
· 2001 – A completed mine awareness needs report provided coherent priorities 
and implementation strategies.  
· 2002 - Law on Demining. 
 
Bosnia and Herzegovina: 
· 1998 – 2001 - Establish and consolidated the legal, technical and physical 
infrastructure for a BHMAC. The BHMAC replaced the UN and entity MACs to 
become the sole body responsible for mine action coordination.  
· 2002 - Establishment of a State of Law on Demining. 
· 2002 – Transfer of the responsibility for payment of MAC staff to the Bosnian 
government, reflecting an increased level of indigenous ownership over mine 
action. 
· 1998 – 2002 – Increase in the indigenous mine clearance capacity. 
· 1998 – 2002 – Clearance of many priority areas for the return of refugees 
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PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT INFORMATION 
 
Monitoring and evaluations have played a key part in the Balkan CMAP. CIDA project 
officers and management have provided the resources to conduct initial needs assessments 
and to undertake periodic evaluations to test the progress, draw lessons learned and 
incorporate those lessons into future programming. Field visits have been conducted at 
almost every phase of the CMAP and in every area. The CIDA programme officer 
responsible carried out these visits for the CMAP along with contracted technical experts.   
 
The process of incorporating the lessons learned into ongoing programme decisions may 
have been partially hindered by staff turnover among the CIDA programme officers. During 
the five-year course of the programme to date, three individuals have been responsible for 
managing the programme, two of which only did so for one year. However, the staff turnover 
rate at CIDA was balanced by continuity in senior CIDA management and by technical 
experts taking a long-term role in the programme. There have been two such experts, Roger 
St. John, the primary author of this evaluation, and George Focsaneanu. Mr. St. John has 
played a role in evaluation and monitoring of the CMAP since 2000, while Mr. Focsaneanu 
conducted an evaluation of the demining projects undertaken during the emergency phase in 
Kosovo in 1999.   
 
Monitoring, needs assessment and evaluation missions were: 
 
· March 1998 - Feasibility Mission to BiH by Stephen Wallace, Director General. 
· June 1998 - Needs Assessment and Project Design Mission to BiH by David 
Mueller, Programme Officer. 
· May 1999 - Monitoring Mission to BiH by David Mueller. 
· November 1999 - Evaluation of Mine and UXO Clearance Projects in Kosovo by 
George Focsaneanu, Technical Advisor. 
· July 2000 - Monitoring and Needs Assessment Mission to Kosovo, BiH and 
Croatia by Lisanne Garceau-Bednar, Senior Programme Officer, and Roger St. 
John, Technical Advisor. 
· November 2000 - Evaluation of IDAC Demining Project in Kosovo by Roger St. 
John, Technical Advisor. 
· September 2001 - Monitoring mission by Roger St. John, Technical Advisor and 
Darcy Demarsico, Programme Officer. 
· November 2002 - Field Mission for the CIDA/ CEE Balkans CMAP 1998-2003 - 
Evaluation by Lisanne Garceau-Bednar, Senior Programme Officer and Roger St. 
John, Technical Advisor. 
 
In addition to these official monitoring, needs assessment and evaluation missions, CEE 
Branch senior management conducted numerous visits to evaluate progress, identify 
concerns and convey information back to Branch Staff.  Hélène Corneau, Director, Stephen 





As stated in the introduction to this evaluation, approximately $20m (CAD) was spent on the 
CMAP over its first five years of operation. Approximately half of this was spent in Bosnia 
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and Herzegovina, 8 million in Kosovo and 2 million in Croatia.  A brief break down of the 
areas of spending by country is illustrated below in Table 1 and the allocation of spending is 
detailed in Part II - Evaluation Findings. 
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As noted above, the Ottawa Convention and the creation of the CLF precipitated the Balkans 
CMAP. This unique and multi-faceted programme consolidated ongoing CEE MAP initiatives 
in the Balkans in response to significant additional funding from the CLF and the emergence 
of compelling needs in the region as the political and security situations stabilized. As a 
consequence, the development of the programme was largely responsive in nature, 
particularly in Kosovo, and many valuable lessons have been learned. 
 
These lessons resulted in the gradual refinement of the programme and concomitant 
increases in effectiveness. Clearly these were hard-won lessons that should be captured 
from a corporate perspective. This is particularly important with the recently announced 
extension of the CLF beginning in 2003 and in terms of Canada’s current ODA policy focus 
on Africa, with its many mine-affected countries. Accordingly, the evaluation of the Balkans 
CMAP focused on the key results achieved. The emphasis was on validating the design, 
implementation and effectiveness of the numerous projects that comprised the programme. 
The lessons derived from the evaluation have been focused on improving programme 
development, and project selection and design for similar MAP initiatives in the future. The 
aim was to produce programming principles that will provide strategic orientation for future 
mine action decisions, including the definition of preferred areas for Canadian intervention, 
i.e. Canada’s mine action ‘niche’. Refining project design parameters, monitoring 
requirements, reporting protocols and the type of results that should be expected will further 
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enhance programme effectiveness. A flow chart depicting the key activities included in the 
evaluation process is shown at Figure 1. 
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The objectives of the evaluation were to assess the performance of the CMAP in the Balkans 
(both in terms of development and operations) and to identify lessons learned challenges 
and opportunities for future programming. The work focused on the assessment of the 
programme as a whole. A review of the 37 individual projects that comprise the Balkans 
CMAP was a relevant part of the work, as they represent the building blocks of the 
programme. However, a detailed review of each project at this stage would have been 
counter productive, time consuming and expensive. The evaluation was conducted using 
CIDA’s Evaluation Guide, 2000, and the Framework of Results and Key Success Factors, as 




The first was a review of the projects and their progress towards results consisting of a brief 
analysis of the 37 projects, grouped by country and type of programme (including MAC’s, 
mine awareness, victim assistance and demining). Their results were then assessed, taking 
into consideration the following: 
 
a. consistency with CEE’s programme objectives and with crosscutting themes;  
b. consistency with CIDA’s priorities of individual security, economic and social 
development, and sustainability; and 
c. what worked and what didn’t work in terms of project design, planning, 
implementation and reporting (management factors and design factors), along 
with an assessment of the capacity of the executing agencies, the synergies and 
partnerships. 
 
The findings in each country are presented separately, as each country presents different 
issues to be addressed and a different context for programme and project design, 
management and implementation. 
 
An assessment of the overall programme performance was also conducted consisting of a 
review of the programme implemented in each country with comparisons among the types of 
programmes across the target countries. The programme review focused on: 
 
a. development results (focusing on the achievement of results, cost-effectiveness, 
relevance and the degree of sustainability achieved) and the success factors 
(including appropriateness of design, resource utilization, and informed and timely 
action); 
b. strengths and weaknesses, focusing on what worked and what didn’t work in 
terms of programme design, planning, implementation, management and 
reporting; and, 
c. challenges and lessons learned, focusing on programme-level development and 
implementation with a view to recommending a framework for future 
programming.  
CIDA/CEE Canadian Mine Action Programme in the Balkans Evaluation Report 1998-2003 13
  
 
The background and context, in which the CMAP has been developed, along with key 
aspects of demining operations, were also taken into consideration as these had implications 
in terms of the design and implementation of a responsive programme. Kosovo, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, and Croatia have significant differences in the nature and extent of mine/UXO 
contamination, political and legal structures, military/security situations, MAP structures and 
international involvement.  
 
Due to the nature of the projects in the programme, non-statistical analysis was used to 
assess the projects’ progress towards results. This involved subjective assessments based 
on both qualitative and quantitative information, and the use of informed judgment and expert 
opinion where available. Also, because the CMAP focused on results achieved at the 
outcome and impact level, the analyses and comparisons will take into consideration the 
various stages of project implementation.  
 
To simplify information presentation requirements, evaluation results matrixes were 
prepared, based on information contained in the Annual Project Performance Reviews 
(APPRs) (complemented with other reports such as end-of-project-reports, annual progress 
reports and work plans, project evaluations, etc.). These result matrixes provide summarized 
information regarding the expected results performance indicators, actual results and a 
performance assessment for each project. These are included in Part II and are intended to 
provide a simple and effective illustration of project results.   
 
The sources of information, method of collection and basis of analysis remained relatively 
consistent throughout. The sources of information principally included a detailed review of 
corporate and related external documentation, as well as site observations and interviews 
during afield visit to the programme area. Brief consultations were undertaken with CIDA 
personnel, DFAIT, UNDP and UNMAS while more detailed consultations were undertaken 
during the field visit with post personnel, beneficiaries, local authorities, project partners and 
executing agencies. Information collection methods include:  literature searches and file 
reviews, consultation, site observations and expert opinion, as well as a survey questionnaire 
that was completed by executing agencies and beneficiaries.  
 
 
THE EVALUATION TEAM 
 
The evaluation team was comprised of the Evaluation Manager, Lisanne Garceau-Bednar, 
Senior Programme Officer, Peace and Security, Eastern Adriatic Division, Central and 
Eastern Europe Branch; Evaluator/Technical Advisor, Roger St. John from St. John & 
Associates Projects Inc; Performance Review Advisor, Claudia Marcondes; plus a Research 
Assistant, Jeff Naylor. The evaluation included a thorough review of CIDA project 
documentation as well as direct consultation with CIDA HQ and post personnel, 
beneficiaries, local authorities, executing agency personnel and other stakeholders. The 
detailed responsibilities of the team members were as follows: 
 
a. Lisanne Garceau-Bednar, CIDA Evaluation Manager, has overall responsibility 
and accountability for the evaluation. She was responsible for overseeing and 
controlling the evaluation process, providing guidance and direction throughout all 
phases of its execution and approving all deliverables. She conducted an 
evaluation visit to the Balkans to collect information (Croatia and Bosnia-
Herzegovina). 
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b. Roger St. John, CIDA Demining Technical Advisor, was responsible for 
conducting the evaluation, including the day-to-day management of operations, 
review of programme documentation, development of the work plan, regular 
progress reporting to CIDA's evaluation manager, and the preparation of the 
evaluation report. As well, he participated in the evaluation site visit to the Balkans 
to collect information and provide evaluation technical support (Croatia, Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Kosovo). The work plan elaborated on the broad parameters 
initially set out in the evaluation, by adding precision, scope and refinements to 
the operational planning. 
c. Claudia Marcondes, Performance Review Advisor, was responsible for providing 
expert programme evaluation advice to the team in the areas of results 
measurement and professional evaluation methodologies. She reviewed relevant 
programme documentation to extract key elements such as expectations, results, 
issues and lessons learned. She also provided input to the evaluation work plan 
and was responsible for the development of a comprehensive evaluation 
questionnaire for key project partners in the Balkans, in order to confirm project 
results and obtain critical follow up information regarding the impact of the 
programme on the defined beneficiary population (See Annexes F). 
d. Jeff Naylor, Research Assistant, was responsible for assisting in the review of all 
documentation related to projects that comprised the Balkans CMAP, with a view 
to providing a comprehensive summary including key project parameters, results 
achieved, issues and lessons learned. This review has been reflected in a set of 
key results tables that provide a comprehensive summary of results by country 
and mine action programme area (see Annex E). 
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PART II - EVALUATION FINDINGS 
 
 





The purpose of this section of the report is to relate the evaluation findings regarding the 
performance of the CMAP in the Balkans through a review of its 37 projects. The findings have 
been derived from an assessment of the achievements, challenges, opportunities and lessons 
learned from a detailed review of the information contained in CIDA files and related 
correspondence. Corporate memory was tapped through a series of interviews with key 
personnel. As well, external sources such as post personnel, partner organizations and 
implementing agencies were surveyed by direct interviews during the evaluation field mission 
and, where necessary, by an electronic questionnaire. 
 
The file review consisted of an analysis of the Annual Project Progress Reports (APPR’s) for 
each of the 37 projects involved in the programme. End-of-project reports and the most recent 
annual report prepared by the executing agencies were consulted in specific cases where it 
was necessary to collect more in-depth information. This was augmented by a review of all 
programme/project monitoring and assessment reports as well as a review of reports prepared 
by related external agencies. Following this research phase, a series of information matrixes 
were developed to assemble project information and key results into a manageable framework 
for analysis and presentation. Ultimately, results matrixes were designed for each of the 
Balkans CMAP countries and these were further broken down by the key areas of mine action 
(Annex E). A survey questionnaire was then developed to guide the interview process with key 
CIDA personnel and those visited during the field mission. As noted above, this questionnaire 
was also used in electronic format to access important respondents who could not be 
interviewed in person (Annex F). Finally, the information from all sources was synthesized to 
complete the results matrixes, and form the basis of the following discussion and findings. 
 
The bulk of the work focused on: 
 
a. assessing the performance of CMAP in the Balkans as a whole (both in terms of 
development and operations);  
b.  identification of the lessons learned, challenges and underlying principles that 
should guide future programming; and 
c. CIDA’s Framework of Results and Key Success Factors was employed as a tool for 
the assessment of results. 
 
The background and context in which the CMAP has been developed along with key aspects 
of demining operations are important to consider as they have significant implications in terms 
of the design and implementation of a responsive programme. Things to consider include: the 
nature and extent of mine/UXO contamination; political and legal structures; the 
military/security situation; existing MAP structures; and other international involvement. 
Accordingly, a brief historical perspective has been provided in the Investment Profile, Part I 
that describes the development context in terms of the origin of the various conflicts and the 
resulting political, economic and social conditions that defined the investment profile of the 
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Balkans region. From the standpoint of the CMAP, it is also necessary to understand the mine 
action context that existed in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and Kosovo. This information is 





In order to evaluate the Balkans CMAP, it is essential to understand the nature and extent of 
the mine contamination problem. Indeed, the various Balkan regions exhibit great diversity in 
terms of ethnicity, culture, religion and geography as well as in the areas of political, economic 
and social development. The conflicts that resulted in the widespread and severe landmine 
and UXO contamination of the CMAP countries within the region were also extremely different 
in terms of their origins, intensity and duration, as well as the source, extent and the very 
nature of the contamination. Accordingly, considerable care was required in the design and 
development of the individual CMAP projects. In this context, it is important to remember that 
a template approach to project design and implementation is not at all appropriate in this or 
other mine affected regions. 
 
While there is reported to be residual landmine contamination in Yugoslavia (Serbia-
Montenegro), Macedonia and Albania, the 1998-2003 Balkans CMAP focused on those 
countries that emerged from conflict in the 1990s with extensive contamination problems; 
Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo. Prior to 1998, the UN established mine action 
coordination offices in Croatia and in Bosnia. The development of these organizations was 
supported by DFAIT, CIDA and DND, particularly in the area of institution building by the 
provision of technical expertise, hardware and database development. The five-year Balkans 
CMAP originated with the establishment of the CLF in 1998 and began as a modest package 
of projects designed to address pressing needs in Bosnia. Bosnia was identified as the most 
critical mine affected country and the most suitable for Canadian development investment 
given the intransigence of the regime in Croatia at the time. A feasibility mission was 
undertaken in March 1998 and this was followed in June 1998 by a needs assessment and 
project design mission. This process resulted in the funding and implementation of several 
projects covering the full spectrum of mine action with particular focus on demining, and 
institution and capacity building. The Balkans CMAP was rapidly expanded at the end of the 
Kosovo crisis in 1999 and further expanded in 2000 to include several projects in Croatia in 
response to the 2000 elections and the installation of a more moderate government.  
 
 
THE MINE/UXO CONTAMINATION PROBLEM 
 
As noted above, the mine/UXO contamination in Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo varied 
dramatically. Table 2 provides comparative information related to the nature and extent of the 
problem. In terms of land area, Croatia and Bosnia are comparable with over 50,000 square 
kilometres each, while Kosovo is just over 10,000 square kilometres. Compared to Croatia, the 
terrain of both Bosnia and Kosovo is extremely rugged with corresponding extremes of 
climate, particularly in the higher elevations and mountainous areas. The conflicts that 
produced the mine/UXO contamination were also very different in nature:  
 
Croatia.  The fighting in Croatia broke out in July 1991 and ended at the beginning of 
1992 with an UN-brokered ceasefire. The fighting was concentrated in and around four 
Serb-dominated areas in the southern and eastern border regions of Croatia and 
consequently, most of the resulting contamination was concentrated in these areas. 
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UN protection areas were established and while some clearance took place, another 
brief round of fighting occurred in 1995 when the Croats conducted offensive military 
operations to restore their borders. During the initial conflict, the Croat forces consisted 
mostly of irregulars called into service with a small cadre of ex-JNA professionals. The 
Serbs also consisted of irregulars but were backed by professional military units of the 
JNA. Extensive mine laying was undertaken by each side in the conflict, however, a 
great number of mines were laid in haste by untrained personnel and record keeping 
was erratic at best. Some 14,000 records were initially retrieved reflecting a modest 
132,000 AP and 79,408 AT mines, and an initial suspected mined area of roughly 4000 
square kilometres. A large number of the records were discounted as unreliable and 
CROMAC now has 8,300 records on file. Obviously there are still many more mines 
than reflected in the records and this is complicated by concentrations of UXO, 
particularly in siege areas such as Vukovar. The current suspected mined area in 
Croatia is approximately 1,700 square kilometres and with an estimated 500,000 mines 
and an unknown amount of UXO. 
 
Bosnia and Herzegovina.  The fighting in 
Bosnia lasted much longer, 1992-95, and took 
on the nature of an all-out civil war with three 
ethnic groups, shifting alliances and extensive 
outside involvement by both Yugoslavia and 
Croatia as well as a number of Islamic factions. 
The fighting raged along a front that snaked 
some 1,600 kilometres through central Bosnia 
dividing Serb from Muslim and Croat areas of 
the country. The front divided the capital of 
Sarajevo that was under siege and surged 
back and forth with various offensives leaving 
extensive mine/UXO contamination in their 
wake. Minefields were laid, lifted, re-laid and 
sometimes overlaid. Nuisance or random 
mining was widespread and mines were also used to support ethnic cleansing, for 
intimidation or to prevent refugee returns. This extensive minefield contamination was 
exacerbated by heavy concentrations of UXO resulting from heavy bombardments, 
particularly in locations such as Sarajevo and Goradze. The war ended in December 
1995 with the implementation of the Dayton Accord and the deployment of a large 
NATO-led stabilization force (SFOR). Some 17,500-minefield records were retrieved 
and initial estimates indicated approximately 4,000 square kilometres of suspected 
mined area containing over one million landmines. More recent estimates indicate 
about 10,000 contaminated sites totaling about 2,100 square kilometres involving 
some 670,000 mines and 650,000 UXOs.8 
                                                 
8 Mine Action Plan of Bosnia and Herzegovina for the Year 2003. Note: The reduction in suspected mined area in 
both Croatia and Bosnia reflects ongoing analyses and the discounting of suspected areas by the review of 
documents for duplication, field investigation and technical survey. It is estimated that the current suspected area 
could be reduced by as much as an additional 50-75% by the use of methodical technical surveys thereby greatly 
increasing the efficiency of clearance operations and reducing the overall cost.   
Figure 2. Outskirts of Sarajevo (CIDA file 
photo) 
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Kosovo.  The conflict in Kosovo initially consisted of insurgency operations undertaken 
by the so-called Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) beginning in 1996. In response, the 
Serbian forces laid mines on border infiltration routes, lines of communication, critical 
infrastructure, military installations and domestic infrastructure for the purposes of 
denial and intimidation. For the most part, they used a doctrinaire approach and the 
majority of these minefields were well recorded. Some random or nuisance mining was 
carried out by both sides, thereby increasing the threat and complicating subsequent 
clearance operations. The refusal of Serbia to agree to an internationally brokered 
peace plan in 1998 resulted in an intensive 78-day NATO bombing campaign intended 
to force Serbia to withdraw from Kosovo. This resulted in widespread strike area UXO 
contamination throughout Kosovo from Cluster Bomb Units (CBUs). The UNMACC that 
was established in mid-1999 obtained a total of 620 Serb minefield records and 
recorded some 333 NATO CBU strike areas. In all, approximately 4,000 reported 
dangerous areas were investigated and either discounted by survey or cleared 
accordingly. All known minefields and strike areas, totaling 32 square kilometres, were 
cleared during the period July/August 1999 to December 2001. The total ordnance 
found and destroyed included 8,485 CBU bomblets (an additional 7,455 were cleared 
by KFOR troops in the same period), 19,457 AP mines 5,515 AT mines and 13,896 
items of other UXO.9 
 
Clearly, Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo varied dramatically in the nature and extent of their mine 
contamination problem. Kosovo presented a unique and manageable situation that was largely 
addressed in a mere 2.5 years by amassing significant international and local resources under 
a very effective UNMACC. Without local government institutions, the clearance programme 
was able to proceed under the auspices of the UN (UNMIK) and KFOR. This was a significant 
and highly successful operation, however, the number of mines/UXO, the nature of 
contamination and the size of the area amounted to only a fraction of that faced in Croatia and 
Bosnia. There are significant differences as well between Croatia and Bosnia. The 
contamination in Croatia affects approximately one-third of the country but is largely 
concentrated in defined border areas permitting relative freedom of movement in large areas 
including the capital, Zagreb, and along the Dalmatian coast thereby allowing revitalization of 
the lucrative tourist trade. On the other hand, the contamination in Bosnia is widespread and 
affects a very large proportion of the population including those living in the capital, Sarajevo. 
Unlike Croatia, infrastructure throughout the country was heavily damaged or destroyed 
because of the protracted and intensive nature of the conflict, and many developed areas 
were mined to facilitate ethnic cleansing. As well, the effectiveness of the entire mine action 
programme in Bosnia has been badly hampered by the complexity of government and public 
institutions trying to function in an ethnically divided country. These dramatic differences must 
be taken into account when reading the findings, lessons learned and recommendations 
contained in this evaluation as well as in the application of lessons learned or ‘principles’ in the 
design of future programmes.  
 
                                                 
9 Willing to Listen – An Evaluation of UN MAP in Kosovo 1999 – 2001, The Praxis Group, Riverside, Geneva, 12 
February 2002. 
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Table 2. Comparative Landmine Contamination - Balkans Region (2002) 
 
 BiH Croatia Kosovo* 
Land Area 
 
56,610,000 km 2 51,129,000 km 2 10,080 km 2 
Population  
 
4,381,000 4,400,000 2,100,000 
Minefield Records/ Dangerous 
Areas 
 
10,000 8,300 Mine fields: 620 
CBU Strikes: 333 




Estimated Number of UXOs 
 
650,000 (No Estimate) 15,940 CBU (bomblets) 
13,845 Other UXOs 
 
Initial Suspected Mined Area 
(at end of conflict) 
 
4,000 km 2 4,000 km 2 361 km 2 
 
Current Suspected Mined 
Area (end 2002) 
 
2,100 km 2 1,700 km 2 32 km2 were cleared (only residual 
contamination remains)  
Mine/ UXO Incidents (total to 
2001) 
 
4,764 1,360 456 
Mine/ UXO Victims Killed and 
Injured 
 
1,385 ~1,818** 95 
 
*Kosovo data is from end of the conflict (1999) to the completion of the UNMACC mine action program in 
December 2001.  Some residual mine/UXO contamination remains and there were a few incidents in 2003 resulting 
in 10 casualties mostly from M75 grenades but including one death from a CBU bomblet. 





The rest of Part II is structured as follows: 
 
a. Balkans CMAP Project Reviews. A detailed review is provided for projects in each 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Croatia. In each case, the CMAP projects 
are reviewed by area of mine action (MAC/institutional support, mine awareness, 
victim assistance and demining) including a general description of the project, an 
assessment of progress towards results and a check of consistency with 
established goals. This is followed by a discussion of findings and lessons learned 
based on a brief review of the key aspects of project design, implementation and 
reporting, focusing on what worked and what didn’t work. 
b. Balkans CMAP Programme Review. A brief review of the Balkans CMAP is 
provided at the programme level. The discussion includes an assessment of the 
programme’s consistency with its stated goals, adherence to CIDA/CEE’s 
objectives and priorities, and its consistency with the crosscutting themes of gender 
and the environment. This includes findings and lessons learned based on a brief 
review of the key aspects of programme design, implementation and reporting, 
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again focusing on what worked and what didn’t work. Finally, a review of the CMAP 
is provided based in the Framework of Results and Key Success Factors. 
 
The assessment of the 37 projects (see CMAP Project List, Table 3) was conducted taking 
into consideration that the projects are in different stages of implementation. The discussion 
also takes into consideration the methodologies used in project implementation, including:  
 
a. expertise transfer and training, 
b. demining operations,  
c. provision of equipment, and 
d. core contributions.  
 
 
Table 3. List of all Balkans CMAP Projects 
 
Bosnia – Herzegovina 
 Project No.  Project Title  
Z-011297 1. Institutional Support to MACs I  
Z-011303 2.  Institutional Support to MACs II  
Z-020160 3.  UNDP Task Manager for Demining  
Z-020216 4.  Institutional Support to MACs III  
Z-020353 5.  Institutional Support to MACs IV  
MACs  
Z-020519 6.  Institutional Support to MACs V  
Mine Awareness Z-010437 7. Mine Awareness  
Z-011414-001 8.  ITF Landmine Victim Assistance  
Z-011464 9.  Support to Children Victims of Landmines  
M-010054 10. Emergency Assistance to Disabled population/Landmine Victims Peer Group 
Victim Assistance 
Z-020336 11. Landmine Victims Peer Counselling Group II  
Z-011295 12. Mine Detection Dog Training I 
Z-020339-001 13. Mine Detection Dog Training II  
Z-020520 14. Mine Detection Dog Training III  
Z-011296 15. Akcija Protiv Mina (APM) Demining I  
Z-020217 16. Akcija Protiv Mina (APM) Demining II  
Z-020340 17. Akcija Protiv Mina (APM) Demining III  
Z-011298 18. Sarajevo Canton Mine Clearance I 
Z-020341 19. Sarajevo Canton Mine Clearance II 
Z-011299 20. Entity Armed forces Demining I 
Z-020342 21. Entity Armed Forces Demining II  
Demining 
Z-020521 22. Entity Armed Forces Demining III  
Z-011414-002 23. International Trust Fund for Demining (ITF) – Channelling of Funds II  
Z-020232 24. International Trust Fund for Demining (ITF) – Channelling of Funds III 
Z-020351 25. International Trust Fund for Demining (ITF) – Channelling of Funds IV  
Other: Int’l Donor 
Coop/ Leveraging 
of Funds 
Z-020518 26. International Trust Fund for Demining (ITF) – Channelling of Funds V 
Croatia 
 Project No.  Project Title  
Z-020337-001 27. Cdn Mine Action Progr/Support to UN-CROMAC Transition Program 
Z-020337-002 28. Cdn Mine Action Progr / CROMAC National Managers & Middle Managers 
Training & Development  
Z-020337-003 29. Cdn Mine Action Progr / CROMAC Communications, Database & 
Management Coordination  
MACs 
Z-020337-004 30. Cdn Mine Action Progr / Support to CROMAC Survey & QA Depts . 
Mine Awareness Z-020337-005 31. Cdn-Mine Action Progr / Mine Awareness Program 
Victim Assistance Z-020337-006 32. CMAP-CMAV Mine Victim Assistance Program 
Demining Z-020337-007 33. Cdn Mine Action Progr / Modest CROMAC Survey & Verification Projects 
 Z-020337-008 34. Cdn Mine Action Progr/ Support to NPA’s Demining Program 
 Z-020339-002 35. Mine Detection Dog Training II (HR)  
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Kosovo 
 Project No. Project Title  
  36. Canada / Belgium / UNMAS Assessment Mission 
Z-020066 37. Support to MACC in Kosovo- Data Entry Clerks MACC 
Z-020091  38. Institutional Support to MACC in Kosovo  
Mine Awareness M-0  39. UNICEF Balkans Regional Program  
Victim Assistance  M-010054 40. Emergency Assistance to Disabled Population/Landmine Victims Peer Group 
Z-020013 41. Rapid Response Demining in Kosovo Y1999 
Z-020027 42. Rapid Response Demining in Kosovo Y1999 
M-0 43. Emergency Shelter & Related Demining Y1999  
Z-020200 44. Canadian Mine/UXO Clearance Project in Kosovo Y2000  
Demining 
Z-020350 45. Canadian Support to the Mine Action Program in Kosovo Y2001 
Other: Int’l. Donor 
Coop/ Leveraging 
of Funds 




THE CMAP PROJECTS IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 
 
 
OVERVIEW OF BIH PROJECTS AND RESULTS 
 
 
General Description of Programme  
 
Bosnia and Herzegovina is described as one of the most heavily mined countries in Europe. 
According to the Landmine Monitor Report 2002, the BHMAC has described the situation as a 
threat which is generally low density and random in nature. The total area potentially affected 
is in the order of 2,100 square kilometres and the bulk of it still requires survey in order to 
determine the finite extent of the problem. Current estimates indicate there are approximately 
10,000 dangerous (mined) areas containing about 670,000 mines and 650,000 items of 
UXO10. Casualties from mine/UXO incidents have leveled-off since 2000 at some 50 to 60 per 
year.  
 
The UNDP and the International Trust Fund for Demining and Mine Victim Assistance (ITF) 
are the institutions that receive most contributions directed to the overall funding of mine 
action in BiH11. Most of these contributions are geared towards mine action operations such as 
demining but there is also considerable support provided for mine action centre capacity 
development by the UNDP. Table 4 below provides an illustration of the amount of overall 
funding for mine action in BiH. 
 
                                                 
10 BHMAC Demining Strategy for Bosnia and Herzegovina by the year of 2010 (Draft). 
11 Landmine Monitor Report 2002. International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL).  
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Table 4. CIDA Canadian Mine Action Program Contributions in Bosnia-Herzegovina   
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The CMAP in BiH is a peace building and security initiative that provides support to the four 
areas of mine action in the country12. This five-year, $11m (CAD) programme, initiated in 1998 
constitutes a significant contribution13 and places Canada as one of the key donor countries in 
this field (see Table 4). In 2002, “the UNDP estimated that approximately $23m (USD) per 
year was needed for demining activities in BiH and an additional $3m (USD) to maintain the 
Mine Action Centres”14. Interestingly however, the latest BHMAC estimates call for 
approximately $60m (USD) per year to tackle the mine contamination problem by the year 
201015.  Table 4 provides the total funding provided by the CMAP in BiH for each year of the 
programme since 1998. The CMAP in BiH has been a very balanced programme covering all 
four areas of mine action with emphasis on demining and institutional support (see CMAP – 
BiH Project List, Table 5). 
 
 
















       
  Institutional Support to MACs      
       
1 Z-011297 Institutional Support to MACs I  $ 650,000 UNDP   
2 Z-011303 Institutional Support to MACs II  $ 720,100 UNDP 98.12.15 01.12.31 
3 Z-020160 UNDP Task Manager for Demining  $     75,000 UNDP 00.01.11 01.01.31 
4 Z-020216 Institutional Support to MACs III  $ 500,000 UNDP 00.03.31 01.06.29 
5 Z-020353 Institutional Support to MACs IV  $ 400,000 UNDP 01.04.02 02.03.28 
6 Z-020519 Institutional Support to MACs V  $ 290,000 UNDP 02.11.28 04.02.28  
       
  Sub-Total “Institutional Support to MACs” 
 
$2,635,100    
 
                                                 
12 Canada’s assistance to Bosnia-Herzegovina is broader and concentrates on economic and institutional transition 
with several areas of emphasis including health, policing, human rights, government administration and the 
development of non-governmental organizations. 
13 The Canadian Mine Action Programme in Bosnia-Herzegovina is one component of the $100m (CAD) CLF.  
14 Landmine Monitor Report 2002. International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL).  
15 BHMAC Mine Action Plan for the Year 2003, and BHMAC Strategy to the Year 2010. 
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  Mine Awareness     
       
7 Z-010437 Mine Awareness ($580,000 non CLF)  $                0 IBRD 96.04.05 98.09.30 
  Adjustment (CIDA Multilateral Branch) $ 26,020    
       
  Sub-Total “Mine Awareness”  $ 26,020    
       
  Victim Assistance      
       
8 Z-011414-
001 
ITF Landmine Victim Assistance  $ 70,000 ITF 99.04.23 00.03.31 
9 Z-011464 Support to Children Victims of Landmines  $ 450,000 ICI 01.05.25 03.04.15 
10 M-010054 Emergency Assistance to Disabled Population/ 
Landmine Victims Peer Group ($300,000 non 
CLF)  
$                0 Queens 
U.  
99.07.01 99.12.31 
11 Z-020336 Landmine Victims Peer Counselling Group II  $ 270,000 Queens 
U.  
01.03.07 02.07.31 
       
  Sub-Total “Victim Assistance”  $ 790,000    
       
  Demining     
       
12 Z-011295 Mine Detection Dog Training I $ 540,000 CIDC   
13 Z-020339-
001 
Mine Detection Dog Training II  $ 700,000 CIDC 01.03.01 02.05.31 
14 Z-020520 Mine Detection Dog Training III  $ 402,000 CIDC 02.08.01 03.05.31 
15 Z-011296 Akcija Protiv Mina Demining I  $ 840,000 HI   
16 Z-020217 Akcija Protiv Mina Demining II  $ 400,000 HI 00.03.31 01.06.30 
17 Z-020340 Akcija Protiv Mina Demining III  $ 422,000 HI 00.11.06 02.03.28 
18 Z-011298 Sarajevo Canton Mine Clearance I $ 710,000 NPA   
19 Z-020341 Sarajevo Canton Mine Clearance II $ 500,000 NPA 01.02.16 02.02.15 
20 Z-011299 Entity Armed Forces Demining I $  1,430,000 SFOR    
21 Z-020342 Entity Armed Forces Demining II  $ 450,000 SFOR  01.03.29 02.12.31 
22 Z-020521 Entity Armed Forces Demining III  $ 172,500 SFOR 02.07.19 03.12.31 
       
  Sub-Total “Demining” $  6,566,500    
       
  Other:  Int’l. Donor Cooperation / 
Leveraging of Funds  
    
       
23 Z-011414-
002 
Int’l Trust Fund for Deming (ITF) – Channelling 
of Funds I 
$               0 ITF 99.04.23  
24 Z-020232 Int’l Trust Fund for Deming (ITF) – Channelling 
of Funds II 
$  19,500 ITF 00.03.31  
25 Z-020351 Int’l Trust Fund for Deming (ITF) – Channelling 
of Funds IV  
$  91,410 ITF 01.03.31  
26 Z-020518 Int’l Trust Fund for Deming (ITF) – Channelling 
of Funds V 
$  21,470 ITF 02.07.19  
       
  Sub-Total “Int’l. Donor Cooperation / 
Leveraging of Funds” 
 
$ 132,380 
   
       
  GRAND TOTAL - Canadian Landmine Fund  $10,150,000    
       
  OTHER FUNDING SOURCES  
(CIDA, CEE Branch, Balkans Program) 
    
7 Z-010437 Mine Awareness ($580,000 non CLF)  $ 580,000 IBRD 96.04.05 98.09.30 
10 M-010054 Emergency Assistance to Disabled Population/ 
Landmine Victims Peer Group ($300,000 non 
CLF)  
$ 300,000 Queens 
U.  
99.07.01 00.03.31 
       
  Sub-Total  
“Other Funding Sources w ithin CIDA” 
 
$ 880,000  
   
       
  GRAND TOTAL 
CIDA Canadian Mine Action Program  
 
$11,030,000 
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Institutional/MAC Support Projects 
 
The BHMAC was instituted at the national level in 
1998 and has been the central policy-making and 
coordinating body for all mine action in the country 
along with so-called Entity Mine Action Centres 
(EMACs) located in each of the Republica Srpska 
(RSMAC) and the Federation (FMAC). This mine 
action coordination structure functioned under the 
direction of a Demining Commission consisting of 
senior entity representatives and proved exceedingly 
cumbersome. Allegations of corruption and fraud in 
the BiH mine action programme at large erupted in the autumn of 2000 followed by a one-year 
inquiry conducted by the Office of the High Representative (OHR). The most disturbing finding 
of the inquiry was that the three demining commissioners were directly implicated in the 
fraudulent activity. It is important to note that Canadian funding contributions were not 
involved. As a result of the inquiry, however, Canada and several other donor countries 
suspended funding support for almost a year pending the results that were finally published in 
the spring/summer 2001. This action and increasing dissatisfaction with the MAC structure led 
to a new law on demining in Bosnia and Herzegovina16 published in February 2002. The 
former demining commissioners were removed, a new Demining Commission was created, 
and the MAC structure was rationalized to include regional instead of entity MACs with key 
mine action authority vested in the BHMAC. This restructured organization includes new 
demining commissioners as well as a new manager for the BHMAC, and it is already showing 
dramatic signs of improvement over the previous organization. Of the $11m (CAD) contributed 
to mine action in Bosnia-Herzegovina, $2.64m (CAD) was spent to improve the capacity of the 
MACs through six institutional support projects managed by the UNDP. The first project was a 
contribution of $650,000 (CAD) in 1998 which included $500,000 (CAD) to pay for UNDP 
expenses and $150,000 (CAD) earmarked to cover incremental costs of deploying five 
Canadian Forces17 (CF) technical experts for a 12-month period. 
 
Following that project, the largest single contribution was made through MAC II - a three-year, 
$720,000 (CAD) project initiated in December 1998 which provided a $400,000 (CAD) 
contribution to the BHMAC Information Department and $150,000 (CAD) to cover the 
deployment costs of the Canadian technical experts. The contribution was used to maintain 
and upgrade the national mine information database and minefield mapping systems. The 
Canadians provided technical advice and training of local nationals within the BiH and entity 
MACs in areas such as management, database development and maintenance, prioritization 
of tasks, quality control, certification of cleared sites, development of standard operating 
procedures and accreditation of demining organizations. MAC III, MAC IV and MAC V were 
subsequently approved, providing UNDP with 1 to 1.5 year contributions at decreasing levels 
from $500,000 to $290,000 (CAD)18. 
                                                 
16 Law on Demining in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sarajevo, February 2002. 
17 These were Canadian Forces (CF) Military Engineers from the Department of National Defence (DND) whose 
salaries were covered by DND 
18 MAC III’s contribution of $500,000 (CAD) was split into the BHMAC Department of Coordination ($390,000) and 
the Information Department ($110,000), the latter being used for the purchase of additional hardware to resolve 
serious  problems of the network systems. MAC IV’s contribution ($400 000) to BHMAC and the two entity MACs 
was channelled through the (ITF).  
 
Figure 3.  BHMAC Headquarters – 
Sarajevo (DFAIT/ILX file 
photo) 
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In addition to the contributions to build the capacity of the MACs, there was also a contribution 
of $150,000 (CAD) to pay for the salary of a demining Task Manager, Mirgo Saltmiras, for one 
year who played a key role in establishing a good working relationship between the UN and 
the BiH government (governmental interrelations experience, consensus building) and was 
instrumental in bringing about the reform of the Demining Commission. CIDA also funded a 
UNDP Chief Technical Advisor (CTA), Mr David Rowe who was instrumental in the creation of 
the new Law on Demining that included the rationalization of the MAC structure. He was also 
heavily involved in the development of the comprehensive ‘BiH Mine Action Plan for 2003’ and 
a ‘Demining Strategy to the Year 2010’, as well as the promotion of a comprehensive socio-
economic impact survey planned and funded (USA/Italy) for 2003. 
 
 
Institutional Support Results - Consistency with Goals  
 
The results achieved by the projects in institutional support have been consistent with the goal 
of “improving indigenous demining and institutional capacity”. Indeed, taken together the 
projects resulted in significant and progressive improvements in capacity that have been 
described as vital in terms of creating the competent national structure that exists today. To 
assess the magnitude of the results achieved, it is important to have some contextual 
information. In the first couple of years after the conflict ended, there was no functioning state 
in Bosnia and UNMACC was set up to coordinate demining operations in the country.  As 
noted above, in 1998 a decentralized national model was created with a BHMAC and two 
entity MACs. Besides the challenges of creating institutions from scratch, there were many 
other difficulties and issues to be dealt with. These included; the difficulty of operating between 
the entities, the testing and accreditation of the organizations performing demining operations, 
as well as the certification and quality assurance of the clearance work being performed. The 
lack of regulations and the absence of a framework for quality assurance were central to many 
problems (including corruption/conflict of interest) and contributed to overall poor quality of 
services provided by the MAC structure in this critical development area and time frame.   
 
Canadian support was key for the development of the MACs as local institutions to coordinate 
the national mine action programme. The placement of Canadian technical experts provided 
not only for necessary technical advice but also for on-job training and building local capacity 
in key areas. Canadian support in the area of database development, mapping and the 
provision of hardware was also crucial. The ongoing support provided by CMAP has been 
widely applauded for its consistency and reliability throughout the period, permitting a degree 
of confidence and stability vital to such organizations. With the continuous support provided by 
the CMAP in Bosnia, the capacity of the BHMAC has been greatly enhanced and it has 
matured into a sound and effective national structure. Indeed, Canadian pressure related to 
ongoing funding contributed in a significant way to the reform of the Demining Commission, 
the new Demining Law and the rationalization of the MAC structure. The Demining Law, which 
passed in February 2002, mandated centralization of responsibility for mine action with the 
BHMAC thereby ending the competition for areas of responsibility between the BHMAC and 
the entity MACs.  
 
The capacity of the BHMAC has significantly improved in two key areas: the planning and 
coordination of mine action, and the development of a regulatory framework. The 
improvements made in coordination range from the development and implementation of key 
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information tools (such as plans, detailed maps, task dossiers, survey reports, incident data 
reports, data collection, existing minefield data updates, clearance completion reports, task 
threat assessments, etc.)19, and the creation of operational systems and procedures 
necessary to identify, prioritize, execute and monitor action in the sector. Some examples of 
the latter include: higher efficiency of communication and network systems allowing for an 
increased level of operations; a management system to simplify accounting and reporting 
processes; and the consolidation of a system of priority setting based on identified needs and 
broad national objectives that are endorsed by cantonal, regional and entity governments. 
 
In terms of the development of a regulatory framework, BiH national mine action standards 
were developed based on an examination of recognized international standards and the 
experience of various practitioners in the field. These are being used as the basis for standard 
operating procedures, quality control and certification of cleared areas to guide the work of all 
NGO/commercial demining organizations operating in the country. 
 
The level of improvement is such that the BHMAC is now fully recognized and has been able 
to establish good levels of contact with appropriate government bodies, and interested 
national and international organizations. As noted above, the new Demining Law vested 
responsibility for all demining operations (including UXO clearance) in the BHMAC and the 
salaries of the BHMAC personnel are now to be paid by the BiH government as employees of 
the Ministry of Civil Affairs and Communication. This is a major milestone in terms of 
ownership and the building of long-term sustainability. The BHMAC is also “responsible for 
formulating and proposing the national mine action plan, which must be approved by the 
Council of Ministers” and “will accredit deminers, who must be trained in accordance with BiH 
standards”20. As noted above, this plan, which is now in place for 2003, is being supplemented 
by a strategic demining strategy to the year 2010. This is an important development and 
reflects a substantial improvement in the management, planning and operations capacity of 
the MAC, and will serve to reinforce its importance as a vital government institution in the 
ongoing process of national reconstruction. 
 
Another key result of the institutional support projects is in the important area of achieving 
long-term sustainability. The structure is now almost entirely comprised of local staff. Initially 
the BHMAC had 40 foreign advisers and by the end of 2001 there were only six. Locals who 
were trained by the Canadians and other donors gradually replaced the international advisors. 
They are now highly competent and have produced professional and comprehensive planning 
documents with hopes of realizing an ambitious strategy for largely removing the effects of 
mines in BiH by 2010. This dramatic reduction in the number of foreign advisers and the 
acceptance of responsibility for the pay and allowances of BHMAC personnel by the 
government are strong indicators of long-term sustainability for the institution. These are also 
good indicators of the cost-effectiveness and the relevance of the improvements made by the 
CMAP through its consistent support of MAC institution building projects in Bosnia, in spite of 
a difficult development investment environment. Indeed, the UNDP Resident Representative in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina cited Canada’s long-standing support as key to the successful 
evolution of this country’s mine action work. This was considered instrumental both in 
leveraging contributions from other donors and in bringing the demining institutions to the point 
whereby UNDP has a plan in place to transfer control and funding support for the BHMAC and 
                                                 
19 The number and quality of plans and reports produced by the MACs is a good indicator of the improvements 
made in their planning, management and coordination capacity. 
20 Landmine Monitor Report 2002. ICBL. 
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the Demining Commission to the Bosnian government.21 Notwithstanding the foregoing, it 
should be noted that at the time of writing this report, the BiH government was unable to meet 
its salary obligations for the BHMAC and had to be assisted by Canada and other donors. This 
situation is a result of difficult macro-economic issues and is not a reflection on the BHMAC or 
indeed on the motivation or commitment of the government.   
 
 
Mine Clearance Projects  
 
Since 1998, the CMAP in Bosnia has included funding support for the implementation of 
mine/UXO clearance projects. The goals were to “bring stability and normalcy to peoples’ daily 
lives, permit safe development, encourage the safe return of refugees and facilitate the 
development of a sustainable indigenous mine clearance capacity”. The total Canadian 
contribution in this area to date has been $6.57m (CAD), disbursed through 11 projects that 
were managed by four different partners and executing agencies, including Handicap 
International (HI)/Akcija Protiv Mina (APM), Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), the SFOR 
Engineer Branch/Entity Armed Forces (EAF) and the Canadian International Demining Corps 
(CIDC). All of the projects involved three phases except for NPA, which only had two.  
 
The contributions varied from a one-year period to 21 months. The largest single contribution 
was of $1.43m (CAD) to SFOR. The other contributions were somewhat less, ranging from 
$400,000 to $840,000 (CAD) for the training of mine detection dogs (MDDs), the purchase and 
operation of mechanical mine clearance equipment, and the provision of specialized 




Mine Clearance Results - Consistency with Goals 
 
The results achieved by the Bosnian CMAP projects in 
mine clearance have been consistent with their goals 
of “increasing security for the people of Bosnia, 
providing safe conditions for development and the 
return of refugees, and building sustainable 
indigenous capacity”. These results are somewhat 
easier to measure than those related to institutional 
capacity building, because it is possible to quantify the 
amount of land area that has been cleared22. According 
to the Landmine Monitor Report (2002), in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, during 200023 a total of 5,545,005 square 
metres of land were cleared, and 3,113 mines and 
2,675 items of UXO were found and destroyed, and in 
2001, a total of 7,111,000 square metres of land was cleared, with 5,797 mines and 3,408 
UXO found and destroyed.24  
                                                 
21 DFAIT Report on the Canadian Landmine Fund, “Making a Difference”, 2001-02. 
22 Even though it would be possible to also measure the number of mines/UXO cleared, this is not an accurate 
measurement of the landmine problem, as even the “perception” of mines still constitutes an impediment/ problem.  
23 Housing accounted for the greatest proportion of land cleared in 2001 (51 percent compared with 47 percent in 
2000), agriculture for a smaller proportion (15 percent compared with 20 percent in 2000) and electric power for a 
lower proportion (7 percent compared with 17 percent in 2000). 
24 According to BHMAC database. 
Figure 4. CIDC MDD Team (CIDA file 
photo). 
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Canadian funding support contributed directly to the amount of area cleared through dedicated 
contributions to demining organizations such as NPA and APM as well as by the employment 
of assets made available by Canadian funding support such as MDD teams and mechanical 
clearance equipment. Indirect contributions include the funding of insurance premiums for EAF 
deminers operating under the auspices of SFOR and the donation of MDD teams, vehicles 
and mechanical clearance equipment to the EAF, the BiH Civil Protection Organization, APM 
and NPA. These contributions enabled demining operations to take place and the funding of 
insurance for the EAF deminers permitted SFOR to pressure the EAF to also undertake 
demining operations in accordance with the Dayton Peace Accord. In this project, CIDA 
contributions support demining operations that are carried out by demining teams from the 
entity armies of the Federation and the Republika Srpska. The mechanical clearance 
equipment and MDD teams are important centralized assets for rapid ground preparation, 
quality assurance and technical survey; however, some problems have been experienced by 
the EAF in the area of refresher training, maintenance and effective employment of these 
resources. Nonetheless, these assets greatly 
accelerate the work, and mechanical 
preparation reduces the danger of manual mine 
clearance by removing vegetation and tripwires, 
and by detonating some mines. Solutions 
currently being investigated include contracting 
mechanical and MDD services thereby 
concentrating the EAF effort exclusively in the 
area of manual demining. 
 
In some projects, the Canadian contribution in 
terms of area cleared has been quantified.25 
Approximately 106,909 and 110,670 square 
metres of land have been cleared in 2000 and 
2001 respectively by a local NGO, APM 
(Demining II & III), funded through HI. 26 In 
addition, the EAF Demining II project27 reported 
896,000 square metres of land cleared in 200028. 
NPA also contributed with 437,568 and 73,450 
square metres of land cleared in two phases of 
the Sarajevo Canton mine clearance project. As well, 187,000 square metres were cleared 
directly by contracted CIDC MDD teams. As can easily be seen, these direct and indirect 
Canadian contributions comprised a significant proportion of the total area cleared in 2000 and 
2001, and the outputs were very comparable to BiH norms. 
 
A more significant measure of impact is the clearance of high-priority land that was not being 
used because of the risk or perceived risk posed by mines. This is land that is economically 
                                                 
25 See note 17.  
26 Besides demining, project activities included training of demining teams, community liaison work, mine 
awareness and administrative capacity building.  
27 The project activities included: (a) mobilization of EAF deminers; (b) a 10-12 month insurance package for all 550 
EAF deminers throughout Bosnia; (c) procurement of 3 MDD team vehicles; and, (d) training of an additional six (6) 
MDD teams for the EAF demining Programme. 
28 This project also contributed to the preparation of 187,226 square metres, which was done by the Bozena fleet 
donated by Canada. 
Figure 5. SFOR/EAF Bozena Donated by 
Canada (CIDA file photo) 
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and/or socially valuable, or essential to the local residents for access.29. In these terms, the 
results reported by one of the projects (APM, Demining III) included 6,568 square metres 
cleared along a road serving a school, 13,425 square metres cleared for agricultural purposes, 
and 52,746 square metres cleared around 22 houses, power lines and water supply systems 
in 2001. Another project (NPA, Sarajevo Canton Mine Clearance II) reported land cleared for 
35 houses and a local electrical installation. This project alone accounted for 175 direct 
beneficiaries, and contributed to the return of many more refugees. 
 
The objective of developing a sustainable local capacity for demining has been well served by 
the CMAP BiH demining projects. The SFOR EAF project is having an increasing impact in 
terms of the total BiH clearance capacity and in spite of issues such as entity intransigence 
regarding supplemental (danger) pay, the EAF will no doubt have long-term responsibilities for 
mine clearance within the state. With the approval of the new demining law, the role of the 
EAF as BiH’s principal long-term demining resource is likely to be consolidated, and should 
provide for an increase in national ownership and hopefully, a proper funding level by the state 
and the respective entities. Under SFOR guidance, the EAF demining programme that CIDA 
has supported since 1999, now represents almost 50 percent of the indigenous BiH mine 
clearance capacity and last year accounted for a significant part of the clearance output. HI’s 
local partner, APM, is also taking steps to become self-sufficient. After several phases of 
CMAP funding, it is actively engaged in seeking other donor support and has competed 
successfully for demining contracts with larger commercial demining firms. Although HI 
representatives have expressed some concern over management problems and the risks 
posed by bidding too low for commercial contracts, APM cannot depend indefinitely on 
Canadian and other donor contributions, and is to be commended for its willingness to 
become self-sustaining. The HI partnership with APM was terminated in March 2002. 
 
The CIDC project has also made significant progress toward the creation of a sustainable, 
indigenous MDD training centre. All but one of the training centre’s staff are local nationals 
and the increasing awareness of the value of MDDs has created revenue opportunities that 
include; contracting-out of MDD team services, the payment of fees by clients for refresher 
training and re-accreditation, and the lease of facilities for the training and exercising of other 
canine organizations.30 The Civil Protection Organization (HELP/EC representative) expressed 
dissatisfaction with CIDC; however, this was discounted by the BHMAC as the result of a 
misunderstanding. In all, the CIDC MDD training facility in Trebinje has made significant 
progress, particularly in recent months, and many of the problems previously reported have 
largely been overcome. The CIDC MDD teams enjoy one of the best accreditation pass rates 
in the country. As well, the Trebinje area offers a virtually unbroken training season, the 
training facilities have been expanded and improved, and the operation enjoys a relatively low 
overhead. The project addresses gender requirements by the unique inclusion of several 
women as MDD handlers, and excellent project visibility has been achieved including a 
National Geographic film segment and project exposure during the Queen’s Golden Jubilee 
visit to Canada. Additionally, the UN and SFOR have recognized the project for breaking new 
ground by uniting the different ethnicities as students, living and working together on the same 
course.  
 
                                                 
29 Data from Safe Lane. http://www.mines.gc.ca/IV-en.asp 
33 Mine Action Plan of Bosnia and Herzegovina for the year 2003, BHMAC, Sarajevo.  
30 It should be noted that information has recently come to light that CIDC has a significant current operating deficit 
and this should be taken into account in future MAP programming. 
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Unfortunately, issues have emerged recently that threaten the long-term viability of the project. 
SFOR has concerns regarding the willingness and ability of the EAF demining units to 
maintain and effectively employ their MDD teams, particularly in the Republika Srpska. Part of 
this problem stems from the reluctance or inability of the entity armies to fund the EAF 
demining teams to the required level. The impact of the MDD teams has been significant, 
however, and a suitable solution to the problem is currently being investigated by SFOR and 
the BHMAC. An even greater issue is a recently announced initiative by the US Department of 
State in conjunction with the Bosnian Government to build and operate a regional canine 
training centre (including MDDs) in the area of Konjic in southwest Bosnia.31 This is apparently 
planned to be a major initiative costing in the order of $2m (USD). Construction is planned to 
begin in early 2003 and the US has committed to fund the first three years of the operation 
after which responsibility will revert to the BiH Government, Council of Ministers. Interestingly, 
a Texas-based US company, Global Solutions, is involved as the prime contractor for the 
Department of State and a suggestion of a collaborative effort with the Canadian CIDC 
initiative was quickly rebuffed.32   Clearly this initiative, if it is successful, will seriously threaten 
the sustainability of the CIDC project. This is unfortunate considering the progress that has 
been made, the experience that has been gained and the possible benefits of collaboration. 
 
Regarding the future of the CIDC project, MDD training methodologies vary significantly and, 
in the short term, there will be a continuing need for refresher training and re-accreditation of 
the existing teams. The BHMAC strongly 
supports the CIDC project and indeed have 
questioned the long-term need and viability 
of the proposed, US -backed regional MDD 
training facility. In the short term, it would be 
prudent to continue residual support for the 
CIDC project pending an evaluation of the 
impact of the new regional training centre. 
In the longer term, CIDC must be 
encouraged to seek other sources of 
funding/revenue if they wish to continue 
their current operation.     
 
An important consideration in measuring 
the overall success of the above group of 
demining projects is the excellent safety 
record they have enjoyed and the low 
number of incidents that have occurred. Also very relevant is the degree of difficulty in the 
projects that have been undertaken. Many of the clearance sites have been in extremely 
rugged terrain or around badly damaged infrastructure requiring such a labour intensive 
approach that it becomes unaffordable from the standpoint of commercial companies. This 
was the case with many of the NPA projects in the Sarajevo Canton and its surrounding 
villages. 
 
Cost-effectiveness is difficult to assess in these types of projects. Outputs are a function of 
many factors such as; the degree of difficulty in terms of vegetation, soil type, terrain, debris, 
                                                 
31 Mine Action Plan of Bosnia and Herzegovina for the year 2003, BHMAC, Sarajevo.  
32 CMAP Evaluation Mission meeting with Mr. John Cohen, US Embassy, Sarajevo, November 21, 2003 and 
meeting Roger St. John with Mr. Pat Patierno, Director, Office of Humanitarian Demining Programmes, US 
Department of State, Washington, DC, February 2002. 
Figure 6.  NPA Deminer Clearing Land Near 
Sarajevo (Credit: NPA/Damir Atikovic) 
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access, weather and the like, as well as the type of ordnance involved and the mine clearance 
techniques and equipment being employed. As noted above, NPA working in the Sarajevo 
Canton encountered very arduous conditions and comparisons from the standpoint of cost-
effectiveness would be problematic. In any case, NPA is viewed as a highly effective mine 
clearance organization that uses an integrated demining approach to increase outputs. 
Indeed, cost effectiveness can be significantly enhanced by using mechanical systems for 
ground preparation to ease the task of manual deminers as well as MDDs to complement 
clearance, survey and quality assurance. The EAF demining units, for example, experienced a 
33 percent increase in productivity in 2000 compared to 1999 and similar increases since then 
due to improved administrative capacity and the use of MDD teams and mechanical clearance 
equipment. From this, it is obvious that the CMAP-funded provision of MDD teams and 
mechanical systems to the BiH EAF demining organizations was an effective way to increase 
mine clearance outputs and provide a concomitant increase in cost effectiveness as well as 
increasing the safety of individual deminers. While the benefits of these additional resources 
are well known and have been demonstrated in this project, recent reports from SFOR 
indicate the EAF are having difficulty maintaining the MDD and mechanical systems due to 
limited funding, the lack of qualified personnel and the heavy training requirement. 
Accordingly, full consideration must be given to the high costs of maintenance and ongoing 
training associated with both MDD teams and mechanical clearance systems, especially for 
organizations that lack funding and technical expertise. Contracting-in and/or providing these 
assets from centralized holdings are possible solutions that could be explored.   
 
 
Mine Awareness Projects 
 
CIDA’s involvement in mine awareness in Bosnia-Herzegovina was through a contribution of 
$580,000 (CAD) made to the World Bank mine awareness programme. The contribution was 
made in 1996, prior to the launching of the CLF and the initiation of the Balkans CMAP. The 
project funds, however, were not disbursed to UNICEF, the implementing agency, until 1999. 
The project supported the delivery of 600 mine awareness education sessions and the 
provision of 6,000 posters, 32,000 booklets, 2,000 notebooks, and 1,000 T-shirts in 100 
municipalities throughout all parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina reaching a total population of 
40,000 including; 18,000 pupils, 800 teachers and 400 refugees. 
 
 
Mine Awareness Results - Consistency with Goals  
 
The mine awareness education sessions along with the distribution of posters and other 
informative materials reached a sizable population, and no doubt contributed to the saving of 
lives and the prevention of injury. As well, a formal mechanism was used to obtain valuable 
participant feedback that assisted in the identification of mine contaminated areas. UNICEF is 
an acknowledged lead agency in the area of mine awareness and the results are consistent 
with the goals of “individual security and the provision of safer conditions for returnees”. The 
unresponsiveness of the World Bank as a funding partner, however, is something that must be 
borne in mind for future programme/project development.  
 
 
Victim Assistance Projects  
 
The CMAP contribution in the area of victim assistance in Bosnia and Herzegovina was 
initiated with a contribution of $70,000 (CAD) to the ITF, for an 18-month project for the 
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medical rehabilitation of landmine victims initiated in 1998. A subsequent contribution of 
$300,000 (CAD) non-CLF money was made to Queen’s University for the development of a 
landmine victims peer-counseling group, including the practical training of technicians in the 
field. In addition, Queen’s University received $270,000 (CAD) for a subsequent phase of the 
landmine victims peer counseling for the training of group leaders and local health 
professionals on issues such as post amputation care, orthotics and prosthetics, psycho-social 
issues, community and family interaction, job creation (small business training) and the 
reintegration of landmine victims and other persons with disabilities (PWDs) as productive 
members of society and the economy. The largest CMAP victim assistance contribution in 
Bosnia was $450,000 (CAD) in 2001-2002 to the International Children’s Institute (ICI) for its 
‘Support to Children Victims of Landmines’ project. This two-year project aims to identify best 
practices for improving the physical and psychological care of children who have undergone 
major medical interventions, such as amputations in the case of landmine victims.  
 
 
Victim Assistance Results - Consistency with Goals 
 
The results of the victim assistance projects are consistent with their goals of “reintegration of 
PWDs into the community” and “increasing access for victims to medical and psychological 
support”. The projects also aimed at achieving “greater understanding and support amongst 
medical staff, family members and/or policy makers regarding disability issues” and increasing 
“local capacity to deliver psycho-social services to victims”.  
 
The ITF project (Z-011414) for the medical rehabilitation of 12 landmine victims was relatively 
minor at a cost of only $70,000 (CAD). While the patients received excellent care, the project 
did not contribute to local capacity development since the patients were treated in Slovenia, 
not Bosnia. The project did, however, strengthen the collaboration between CIDA and the ITF 
and had the associated benefit of leveraging additional funding.  
 
Both the Queen’s University and ICI projects suffered from growing pains and required careful 
attention in the early stages to identify and correct some project design problems and other 
issues such as reporting, management difficulties and insufficient impact. In spite of some 
resistance by the partners, however, this early intervention by the CIDA team led to significant 
improvements and ultimately to a very successful outcome for both projects.   
 
The ICI project has gained significant momentum during the past year and appears to have 
enjoyed remarkable success in recent months. Consultative committees have been 
established involving representatives from the BiH Ministries of Health and Education. 
Psychosocial rehabilitation programmes were developed with input from child victims and 
teachers and health professionals received training in how to deal with children who have 
been traumatized as victims of landmines or other serious accidents. Some 150 children, who 
have undergone a major medical intervention, as well as their parents and teachers, have 
received psychosocial support and relevant training. Facilities have been developed and 
discussions are underway to provide teachers who can cater to children who are hospitalized 
for extended periods. This approach has not only helped the children cope but also increased 
awareness in the community regarding the needs of all children with disabilities. A key 
measure of the success of this project is its ongoing integration into the existing health care 
system, and the widespread recognition and support that it is currently receiving in 
government circles and within the local community as well as from further afield. In this regard, 
there is now an active interest in initiating similar programmes in Tusla and Banja Luka, both 
within the Republica Srpska, and health professionals from Zagreb visited Sarajevo on 
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November 29th to learn more about the programme. This project has taken on a life of it’s own 
and should prosper.    
 
Another good example of relevance and sustainability of results achieved is demonstrated by 
the peer-counseling programme for victims of landmines undertaken by Queen’s University. 
The programmed trained local group leaders and expanded its capacity to serve all PWDs. 
Ten groups have been established throughout Bosnia – with an average of 179 people 
reached per month through more than 100 peer-counseling meetings based on one-to-one 
contact and some 81 PWDs active in the rehabilitation process. Recent activities have 
expanded to include women’s groups, job workshops, a fashion show to raise funds and a 
small business project focused on mothers of children with disabilities, to make them more 
self-sufficient and better able to cope. It is also important to highlight that this project managed 
to achieve significant results related to changing attitudes towards PWDs. Public figures, 
health professionals and policy makers have been positively influenced resulting in enhanced 
understanding of disability issues33 and support for the equal rights of PWDs including 
employment and the establishment of a law regarding accessibility. While these latter goals 
will be very difficult to achieve in the short term, awareness is increasing and progress is being 
made. In any case, it appears certain that the peer-counseling groups will continue to evolve, 
facilitating change in society at large and providing support for many more PWDs in Bosnia 
(estimated at some 10 percent of the population - approximately 250,000 people). Notably, 
this project involves many PWDs/victims in the areas of leadership, counseling, training and 
management, including a significant proportion of women. 
 
 
FINDINGS - PROJECT DESIGN, IMPLEMENTATION AND REPORTING 
 
Canadian involvement in mine action activities in Bosnia and Herzegovina predates the 
Ottawa Mine Ban Convention and the launching of the CLF. In fact, the crisis in Bosnia was 
one of the key factors that brought the mine contamination issue to centre stage and 
accelerated Canada’s involvement.  As noted previously, the advent of the CLF in 1998 
precipitated the evolution of the CMAP in the Balkans into a coherent programme, beginning 
with Bosnia and Herzegovina. See Annex E for a summary of key results presented in matrix 





The CMAP in Bosnia was established as a responsive programme, based on a balanced 
approach, that initially emphasized mine clearance operations while still allocating some 
resources for institutional support, mine awareness and victim assistance. It was a five-year 
programme with planned disbursement totaling 60 percent of the funds in the first and second 
year of operations, including immediate support for mine clearance.34  The programme and 
project design process was somewhat compressed, due to the need to act quickly because of 
substantial funding that became available with the announcement of the five-year, $100 million 
CLF in early 1998. 
 
                                                 
33 The Deputy Minister of Health and Social Affairs of the Republica Srpska stressed the importance for the ministry 
to participate in the process of policy change to meet the needs of PWDs. Media coverage through television, 
newspapers and radio has also enhanced awareness and influenced the attitudes of the public. 
34 Interview conducted with David Mueller, November 2002. 
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As noted, the initial phase of the Balkans CMAP concentrated exclusively on Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. The process began in early March 1998, with a CIDA/CEE Branch high-level 
feasibility mission that assessed needs, identified potential partners and projects, and defined 
the probable scope of a mine action intervention in BiH. A subsequent project-planning 
mission, led by the CEE programme officer, was conducted in June and focused on direct 
liaison with key partners and executing agencies, the definition of likely projects, and the 
establishment of planning and design parameters including project goals, duration and funding 
lines. This was followed by a few months of detailed project design, planning and approvals 
and the results were quite good in spite of the crisis-nature of the compressed planning and 
programming process. 
 
In order to accommodate the short planning window, the initial CMAP projects in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina resulted from proposals put forward by organizations active on the ground in 
1998. Fortunately, these included partner organizations with extensive experience in the 
region and a solid background in mine action such as the UNDP, ITF, CARE Canada and 
SFOR, and executing agencies with a proven capacity in specific areas of mine action such as 
HI, Queen’s University, ICI and NPA35. All of these organizations had been operating in the 
region for some time and possessed a sound understanding of the local environment and the 
most pressing needs. The design process certainly benefited from the experience of these 
organizations in establishing realistic project goals and objectives (achievable within the 
project timeframe) and, particularly, in setting up monitoring mechanisms to identify risks and 
quickly respond to problems. This early design support no doubt contributed to the success of 
the individual projects.  
 
The CIDC MDD training initiative was perhaps the only example of a project designed by an 
organization with limited experience in the field.36 Despite some significant early problems in 
getting established, the results achieved by this project indicate growing competence and 
ultimately the appropriateness of its design. Another anomaly was the mine awareness project 
funded through the World Bank. As noted in the previous discussion, this project was 
conceived in 1996 and was later included under the umbrella of the Balkans CMAP. 
Accordingly, it was not designed as part of the package of projects initially included in the 
Balkans CMAP but was subsequently implemented by UNICEF and managed as part of the 
same programme.    
 
The design approach used in the first round of projects was successfully replicated by CIDA 
and the executing agencies in subsequent phases of the projects, as well as for new projects. 
This flexibility at the programme level allowed for these agencies to build on their own 
experience, maintain necessary momentum in their operations on the ground and mature their 
projects to achieve the intended results. 
 
Finding 1.  Mine action is a specialized area of expertise and the process of project 
selection, design and planning, especially on short-notice, would have benefited 
from guidance in the form of basic planning principles or a framework for mine 
action programming. 
 
                                                 
35 The NPA is a good example of a world-class organization. It consistently trains well qualified demining personnel, 
uses an integrated approach for mine clearance (manual, dogs, and mechanical), has a very strong safety record 
and apart from the management team, is entirely staffed with Bosnians. 
36 CIDC’s experience included involvement in a mine survey project in Mozambique. 
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Finding 2.  The selection of experienced and competent partners and executing agencies 
was a major factor in the success of the CMAP in BiH. 
 
Finding 3.  To be successful in project selection and design, the programme officer must be 
familiar with the area of operations, understand the local issues and have the 
opportunity for direct personal contact with the intended partners and executing 





For the purposes of this discussion, project implementation covers the full spectrum of project 
execution including planning, day-to-day management, monitoring and accountability. In 
general terms, the BiH CMAP was very well managed by CIDA, its partners and executing 
agencies. Canadian efforts have been universally applauded and the vast majority of recipient 
organizations have praised the consistency, reliability and flexibility associated with CIDA’s 
CMAP funding contributions. Particularly appreciated is the relative lack of strings or caveats 
that are associated with many donor contributions. This aspect was applauded by several of 
the organizations that were visited during the evaluation. 
 
Project implementation and management are directly impacted by project selection and 
design. The selection of experienced, competent and committed partners, and executing 
agencies as noted above, was a major factor in the largely successful implementation and 
management of the CMAP projects in Bosnia. With a few exceptions, the projects have 
progressed smoothly and good results have been achieved. 
 
Institutional Support.  There were several BiH institutional support projects that benefited 
from a strong partner relationship and were coordinated on CIDA’s behalf by UNDP. On a 
cumulative basis, these projects had an enormous impact and were virtually problem-free from 
the standpoint of implementation. The funding of key technical personnel such as the current 
Chief Technical Advisor (CTA), David Rowe, produces results out of all proportion to the 
investment. The provision of Canadian Forces technical experts, and hardware for mapping 
and database development were also particularly useful. This approach takes advantage of a 
unique Canadian competency, is very cost-effective and quickly builds sustainable indigenous 
capacity in the critical area of mine action coordination, management and planning. This is an 
area where Canadian CF and private sector expertise could be tapped by CIDA in terms of in-
kind contributions. Indeed, the institutional strengthening of the BHMAC that was supported by 
CIDA created marked improvements in local staff capacity that has allowed the reduction of 
foreign technical advisors from initially around 40 to six at the end of 2001 and only one by the 
end of 2002. The formal and on-the-job training brought local staff to the point whereby they 
have articulated a realistic strategic plan supported by the government and donor community 
that aims to rid the country from the effect of mines by 2010  
 
Finding 4.  In the Balkans, the UNDP is a proven partner in the area of Institutional/MAC 
support. 
 
Finding 5.  While not as visible as mine/UXO clearance or victim assistance, institutional 
support builds local capacity and will probably have a more important and far-
reaching impact in ridding the country of mines/UXO. Canada didn’t shy away 
from supporting this area, as other donors did, and its consistent investment is 
now paying off. 
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Finding 6. Certain development areas such as institution building may require the 
commitment of consistent funding over a significant period of time to achieve 
effective and sustainable results. Canada has been applauded for its reliability 
and consistency of support in this key area and it is widely agreed that this has 
been a major factor in the emergence of the CROMAC, BHMAC and the 
UNMACC (Kosovo) as sound institutions.   
 
Finding 7.  Partnering with the DND/CF is a cost-effective and constructive approach that 
CIDA used to good effect in the Balkans CMAP to tap vital technical expertise in 
mine action, including the CF Mine Information Centre. This expertise should be 
exploited more formally in terms of CIDA and DFAIT development-related mine 
action programming. 
 
Finding 8.  Canadian niche expertise in the development and implementation of mine action 
programmes should be utilized by way of in-kind contributions. This can take the 
form of CF technical experts or private sector resources that are retained on 
standing offer agreements for emergency situations or through normal 
contracting procedures when sufficient time is available. 
 
Mine Clearance.  In the area of demining, both the NPA and HI/APM projects were relatively 
problem-free in terms of implementation. Some management problems within APM caused 
concerns in 2001/02 but these were resolved without significant project disruption. In previous 
assessments, APM was criticized for being unable/unwilling to become more self-sufficient, 
however, since its partnership with HI terminated, APM has managed quite well as a self-
sufficient NGO, having acquired some key 
contracts and additional international donor 
funding. This project served Canadian interests 
by promoting mine clearance in the SFOR/CF 
contingent area of operations and by the 
development of local, indigenous mine 
clearance capacity. NPA has consistently 
produced good results: it has outstanding 
management, the Norwegian government 
funds its overhead, and all but one of its BiH 
employees are local nationals, including 
several women. Accordingly, both of these 
projects made a valuable contribution to  
BiH mine action sustainability and achieved the 
goal of providing safer conditions for locals, 
returnees and future development. 
 
The SFOR/EAF projects were instrumental in pressing the BiH and entity governments to 
become more proactive in the development of a significant national mine/UXO clearance 
capacity within Bosnia and Herzegovina. This effort, however, has not been without difficulties. 
In fact, at the outset, the EAF participated only under duress. It is noteworthy that the payment 
by Canada and Norway of the insurance for deminers eliminated their only reason for not 
complying with the Dayton Agreement. With the CIDA-funded provision of mechanical 
equipment and MDDs, and the perseverance of SFOR, the outputs have increased 
dramatically. Problems that have been experienced include: short staff rotations in SFOR (six-
month duty tours), non-payment of danger pay by the entities causing low morale, and 
Figure 7. APM Mine Clearance - Sarajevo (CIDA 
file photo) 
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difficulties in the maintenance and effective utilization of mechanical and MDD assets. On the 
plus side, the new law on demining formalized the role of the EAF deminers and the BHMAC 
views this as an important national resource that will become key to the sustainability of the 
new strategic demining plan. Furthermore, the EAF demining was viewed as, “among the most 
successful, as this contributed directly to CIDA and DFAIT goals such as supporting SFOR, 
providing alternative skills to former combatants, democratization of armed forces, peace 
building, and confidence and security building. It also contributed to progress in the field of 
mine action by showing that former militaries can work to the highest (humanitarian) standards 
and be competitive in the mine clearance business.”37 
 
Most problematic in terms of implementation has been the CIDC MDD Training Project. MDD 
training is a complex business that requires good training facilities, reasonable weather and 
strong staff, not to mention the need to select good quality dogs and handlers. The project was 
initially established in northwest Bosnia in the area of Bihac but training site problems and 
weather dictated a move to the southwest in the area of Trebinje. This move caused 
considerable disruption and delayed the production of MDDs and handlers. Inadequate 
management, poor productivity, high staff turnover and poor communications exacerbated this 
disruption. Recently, however, the organization has stabilized and shown marked 
improvement in all areas. Locals have virtually taken over the operation in BiH. In fact, there is 
now only one Canadian in the project, the Chief Instructor, who is running the Croatia project 
and only visits Trebinje periodically. Although some challenges remain, communications and 
reporting have improved, and the organization is now generating revenue through MDD (Blue 
Team) contract work, facility rentals, and refresher training/re-accreditation fees. Also, 
according to the BHMAC, the CIDC MDD teams currently have the highest MDD accreditation 
rate in the country and they strongly endorse the CIDC organization. Indeed, the project has 
resulted in the development of significant local expertise and is close to being self-sufficient. 
Unfortunately, the USA-BiH regional dog training centre initiative poses a distinct threat to the 
continued viability of the CIDC project. Notwithstanding this, however, there will be an ongoing 
need for the CIDC MDD Training Centre to provide services for the refresher training and re-
accreditation of the EAF/Civil Protection MDD teams and nominal support should be provided 
to ensure this capacity continues to exist. In the meantime, CIDC project staff needs to 
consider all options available to build self-sufficiency; for example, focus on contracted MDD 
services to the BHMAC, EAF, CROMAC and other mine clearance organizations. 
 
Finding 9.  Proven partner organizations like NPA should be selected for funding dedicated 
to mine/UXO clearance. NPA in particular, has vast and proven experience in 
mine action, a positive policy on gender issues, a strong record of sustainable 
capacity building and no overhead funding component.  
 
Finding 10.  Care must be exercised in the selection of projects to develop local mine 
clearance NGOs. A plan to develop self-sufficiency and well-defined exit strategy 
must be included at the front end to prevent creating an all-or-nothing funding 
dependency. 
 
Finding 11. Supporting the development of humanitarian demining capacity of national 
military elements can be tricky from philosophical, security and practical 
perspectives. It must be considered on a case-by-case basis and not be 
                                                 
37 CMAP Evaluation, Questionnaire Response, DFAIT Mine Action Team – Alison Clement, Programme 
Coordinator, et al Mine Action Team, DFAIT-MAECI. 
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discounted out-of-hand. With the proper conditions in place, it can constitute a 
major contribution in capacity building.  
 
Finding 12.  Canadian-based mine action organizations such as CIDC, will invariably 
experience difficulties establishing complex projects in remote or far-away 
locations. Careful project planning, clear output goals, constant monitoring and 
timely interventions are the keys to successful development of Canadian ‘niche’ 
expertise and the related local indigenous capacity. If the development of 
Canadian capacity is a complementary goal, then the additional investment in 
project design and management effort may well be worthwhile. It must be 
remembered, however, that sufficient lead time must be allowed, a clear exit 
strategy must be defined, risks such as the proposed regional MDD training 
facility must be thoroughly assessed, and the balance between achieving the 
most cost-effective results and developing Canadian capacity must be carefully 
weighed. 
 
Mine Awareness. The mine awareness component of the BiH CMAP was a carry-over from a 
project initiated in 1996 through the World Bank. While reasonable results were ultimately 
realized through UNICEF, the project was flawed from a design and implementation 
standpoint. As a CIDA partner, the World Bank was unresponsive and considerable delay was 
experienced in initiating the funding for UNICEF and the achievement of results. Accountability 
problems were also experienced in terms of identifying the total disbursements. UNICEF is a 
recognized leader in mine awareness/MRE, and a direct partnership and funding arrangement 
would have been more suitable. In terms of mine awareness project selection and design, 
however, it is advisable to confer directly with UNMAS/UNDP and the responsible MAC, to 
ensure that any proposed project is valid, coordinated with other initiatives, properly targeted, 
consistent and conforms with established priorities. Finally, mine awareness is a normal 
component of demining and should be included as an output goal for reporting purposes for all 
CIDA – funded mine/UXO clearance projects. This would help to identify the true extent of 
CIDA’s contribution in this important area. It is noted that NPA, CIDC and APM have routinely 
conducted mine awareness training as part of their demining operations. 
 
Finding 13.  The selection and design of mine awareness projects should be informed by 
advice from UNMAS/UNDP, UNICEF and the responsible MAC. 
 
Finding 14.  Funding for mine awareness should be direct to a major partner such as UNICEF 
or ICRC for a clearly defined project including identification of the executing 
agency (e.g. local NGO) and the expected results or output goals. 
 
Finding 15.  The complementary mine awareness activities undertaken by demining 
organizations funded by CIDA, should be clearly identified as output goals and 
included in project reporting. 
 
Mine Victim Assistance. The Balkans CMAP victim assistance projects in BiH took 
considerable perseverance to overcome slow start-ups and other difficulties, but have 
generated excellent results. A nine-month funding delay in Z-020036, Queens’ Peer 
Counseling project threatened successful implementation. This resulted from key issues 
identified in an evaluation of the first phase that needed to be addressed prior to moving 
forward on phase II. In any case, the ICI Support to Child Victims and the Queen’s Peer 
Counseling projects have matured to achieve a high degree of sustainability, excellent reach 
and quality outputs. They have strongly addressed the crosscutting gender theme, heightened 
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public awareness of the needs and rights of PWDs, and tapped resident Canadian niche 
competencies. As noted previously, the ITF project was relatively minor in scope and did not 
improve local capacity although it did serve to strengthen collaboration with CIDA and the 
associated leveraging of funds.  
 
Finding 16.  Victim assistance is an area where it appears Canada can make a valuable 
contribution. A comprehensive listing of Canadian institutions with niche 
competencies in psychosocial and physical rehabilitation should be maintained 
and considered when planning future mine action development initiatives. 
 
Finding 17. The benefit of leveraged funding through the ITF must be weighed against project 
management requirements; however, in most cases process was efficient and 
resulted in significant matching contributions that often augmented specific CIDA 
initiatives. 
 
International Donor Cooperation / Leveraging of Funds.  " Canada has enjoyed close 
cooperation with the Slovenia-based International Trust Fund (ITF) for Demining and Victim 
Assistance. The ITF was announced in March 1998 at the “Workshop on Mine Action 
Coordination’ held in Ottawa. While the ITF undertakes its own mine action programming, it 
also acts as a flow-through mechanism to allow donors to double their contribution through a 
matching fund. This fund established by the United States totaled $14M (USD) in FY 2002/03. 
The matching funds may not often be directed to the project in question, but to other mine 
action projects that are selected according to ITF criteria. 
 
The ITF has an executive office based in Ig, Slovenia and is run by a Management Board 
comprised of seven members (three from Slovenia, three from BiH and one from Croatia). It 
also has a 22 member Board of Advisors made up of 19 donor and 3 SEE states. This Board 
meets semi-annually and Canada’s representative is the DFAIT Ambassador for mine action, 
presently Mr. Ross Hynes.      
 
The ITF organizes and finances demining activities and the rehabilitation of mine victims in 
South East Europe. Initially established to support programming in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
the ITF has since expanded its operations to include Kosovo, Croatia, Albania, Macedonia and 
Serbia-Montenegro. The ITF’s programming activities for 2002 included: demining (76%), 
mine victim assistance (4%), support to MAC’s (7%), regional activities (8%) and landmine 
impact surveys (2%). In 2002, the key ITF programme country recipients were Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (39%) and Croatia (40%).  
 
Following the creation of the ITF, Canada and Norway were the lead countries to indicate their 
support for the ITF by the commitment of important donor contributions. Of the $20M (CAD) 
disbursed over the past five years by CIDA’s Balkans CMAP, five contributions have been 
channeled through the ITF totaling $7.5M (CAD), thereby activating dollar-for-dollar matching 
contributions. Of that amount, over half of the CMAP Bosnia amount ($6M) was channeled via 
the ITF. The ITF charges a three percent administrative fee for donor’s flow through 
contributions.  
 
For Canada, there are three compelling reasons to make a contribution to the 
ITF: (1) it provides the opportunity to double the size of financial contributions to mine action in 
South East Europe; (2) it encourages incremental progress in the area of regional cooperation 
on mine action in the Balkans; and (3) it helps to further integrate Slovenia into the global mine 
action community. 
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Canada, along with other donors, has sought to have the matching funds that are released by 
its flow through contributions earmarked to related Canadian projects. Until recently, this has 
met with little success; however, this initiative is welcomed by CIDA’s key partners in the 
region such as UNDP and should continue to be pursued as an objective of the programme. 
Notwithstanding this, Canada has enjoyed a very cooperative relationship with the ITF and 
recently it was learned that $2M (CAD) worth of matching funds was utilized in 2001 and 2002 
to support mine action projects also supported by the CMAP.  As well, efforts are currently 
underway to formalize this collaboration by including a written clause in future flow through 
funding agreements with the ITF that will stipulate that a portion of the matched funds will be 
directed towards projects supported by CIDA’s Balkans CMAP. 
 
Finding 18.  A sizable proportion of the total CMAP contributions in the Balkans have been 
matched by the ITF resulting in a significant increase in the development 
assistance benefit for the people of the region. This and other forms of donor 
assistance collaboration are valuable mechanisms for realizing greater results 






Results are important but it is also necessary to have a reliable monitoring and reporting 
system to capture and document not only the quantity but also the quality of results. The 
reporting found in the CMAP in Bosnia varies from well established reporting frameworks and 
high quality reports to an obvious lack of knowledge of Results Based Management (RBM) 
and cases in which the partners have not been able to set up effective management and 
reporting systems. Examples of the first include NPA and HI, whose quality of reporting was 
consistently excellent. The quality of reporting by the UNDP has been variable at times but 
overall has been good to excellent. The reporting by CIDC, however, was sub-standard, and 
reflected a general lack of attention and poor administration. This deficiency was brought to 
the attention of CIDC on several occasions, including during annual monitoring missions and 
lately CIDC reporting has improved. 
 
In any case, project reporting is the one area where there is room for improvement. It is 
necessary to fine tune aspects related to establishing appropriate goals and indicators related 
to those goals. For example, in cases where a project involves training (e.g. training of MDD), 
it is important to make a distinction between primary and secondary objectives. While training 
of MDD teams will ultimately have an impact in terms of area cleared of mines, the primary 
objective is enhancing the capacity of the teams. Therefore, it is more important to collect 
indicators directly related to the capacity that is to be developed such as recruitment, failure 
rate, number of dogs trained and certified and the like. Also, in cases where the objective of 
the project is related to capacity building, measuring the results would also be enhanced if the 
stages of development (knowledge-systems, policy development, organizational change, local 
improvement) were captured and translated into a results-chain. 
 
It is also important to acknowledge that some indicators are going to be difficult to obtain and 
special effort will be required during the project design phase to develop clear and concise 
output goals with unambiguous reporting indicators. A good example relates to victim 
assistance programmes and the difficulty of acquiring information disaggregated into victims in 
general versus mine victims. This further applies if information is required to indicate the 
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impact broken down by age and gender in terms of all aspects of mine action and the 
reporting of outputs that include discrete information in these key areas.38  
 
Finally, some frustration was expressed by a few BiH CMAP partners with the amount and 
complexity of reporting required for CIDA-funded projects. While the flexibility of the funding 
was applauded, organizations such as UNDP, UNMACC and NPA complained about the time 
required to complete the required reports. Efforts should perhaps be made in the project 
design phase to streamline MAP project reporting.  
 
Finding 19.  CIDA MAP project reporting should be simplified and key information 
requirements need to be clearly indicated. It is important to identify at the outset 
what information must be reported as well as the required format and frequency. 
Key information like gender statistics, quantified outputs or impact areas such as 
refugee returns or restored land use, need to be clearly specified.  
 
 
FINAL CONSIDERATIONS – BiH CMAP 
 
Overall, the CMAP in BiH must be considered as a qualified success. The programme was 
developed quickly in response to a key government policy and funding initiative, and 
succeeded due to the careful selection of partners, deliberate planning and consistent 
monitoring. Some components of the programme, however, suffered growing pains and other 
projects have a doubtful future related to issues beyond the control of CIDA. 
 
Setting realistic project goals and development objectives was an important element of 
success in the projects assessed. The establishment of goals and appropriate implementation 
mechanisms required a sound understanding of the local environment. The project design 
used in most cases allowed for flexibility and for accommodating necessary revisions. This 
was an important factor in responding quickly to emerging needs and changing contexts in 
Bosnia.  
 
Canada’s goal was to develop the capacity of national institutions, to coordinate mine action 
and to encourage the Bosnian state government to take greater ownership of its mine action 
programme.39 To that end, Canada made its assistance conditional on evidence of increased 
BiH ownership and this approach proved successful, although BiH macro-economic difficulties 
must be addressed to minimize threats to increased local responsibility for mine action.  
 
The landmine contamination problem remains a challenge. Continuation of mine clearance 
efforts is crucial in a country with such a high level of contamination. In this context, Canada’s 
priority support of institution building and the clearance of high-risk areas combined with some 
support of mine awareness and victim assistance was appropriate. At this point, effort needs 
to shift to the socio-economic impact survey and area reduction through technical survey. This 
will optimize the clearance effort and allow permanent marking of low-risk areas for clearance 
in the future, with the concomitant and necessary reduction in risk and increase in 
                                                 
38 In terms of the crosscutting themes impact on gender and the environment, very little information was available in 
the CIDA CMAP files. 
39 CIDA Memorandum  to the Minister CEE Garceau-Bednar, May 31, 2002. 
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effectiveness. Canada has made a significant impact and the CMAP projects accounted for a 




THE CMAP PROJECTS IN KOSOVO 
 
 
OVERVIEW OF KOSOVO PROJECTS AND RESULTS 
 
 
General Description of Programme  
 
The UNMACC was established in Pristina, Kosovo on June 17, 1999, and undertook an 
ambitious and very successful mine action programme that relied on a combination of 
bilaterally funded and UN-contracted mine action assets. “On December 15, 2001, the UNMIK 
mine action programme in Kosovo was completed and the MAC that operated as the focal 
point for all mine action activities in Kosovo since June 1999 was closed.” 41. According to the 
UNMACC final report, all known minefields and Cluster Bomb Unit (CBU) strike areas had 
been cleared42 and the overall responsibility for mine action was handed over to the UNMIK - 
managed Department for Civil Security and Emergency Preparedness (DCSEP), Directorate 
for Civil Protection (DCP). The DCP is now the coordination body for all mine action activities 
in cooperation with the Public Health Institute (incident data collection), Ministry of Education 
(mine awareness in schools), Social Welfare (support to mine victims) and the Cadastral 
Agency (land status mapping). The task of implementing the clearance of any residual 
mine/UXO contamination was assigned to the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) utilizing mine 
action teams that were trained by and continue to operate under the tutelage of HI.   
 
The UNMACC demining operations in Kosovo cost approximately $85m (USD) for the 
clearance of “more than 32 million square metres of land and the destruction of more than 
50,000 mines, CBU bomblets and other unexploded ordnance”. Canada’s contribution to 
address the problem included $1,571,761 (USD) via the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for 
Assistance in Mine Action (VTF) between 1999 and 2001.43  In addition, Canada contributed 
$3,200,000 (USD) in bilateral support.44 Table 6 provides a breakdown of CMAP funding for 
the projects in Kosovo from 1999 to 2001. 
 
Canadian mine action support in Kosovo began as an emergency programme designed at the 
end of the conflict in June 1999. When a UN Resolution called for the help of the international 
community, “Canada was one of the first nations to respond to the declared need for rapid-
response mine clearance in Kosovo.”45  Quick response was required to enable the return of 
900,000 Kosovar refugees to their homes. This need for action was made more urgent 
                                                 
40  Canada’s ranking as a donor in UN reports and the Landmine Monitor is derived from limited sources and 
doesn’t account for related contributions in all mine action programme areas. Consequently, these l istings must be 
viewed with caution. This is a problem that CIDA has attempted to address but has met with little success.   
41 Landmine Monitor Report 2002. International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL). 
42 UNMIK, Mine Action Programme, Final Report 2001 
43 According to the Landmine Monitor Report 2002 “The VTF is described as the MACC’s “financial backbone;” 
funds channeled through the VTF totaled US$9,967,135. The total for 2001 was $1.18 million. Over half the VTF 
funding came from donations by European Union countries and Canada. 
44 Landmine Monitor Report 2002.  
45 www.acdi-cida.gc.ca 
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because the onset of winter would restrict demining operations and greatly increase the 
misery of the refugees if they could not safely return.  
 
Table 6. CIDA – Canadian Mine Action Program Contributions in Kosovo, by Project 
 










       
  Institutional Support to MACs      
1 M-0 Canada-Belgium UNMAS Assessment 
Mission 
$   75,000 UNMAS 99.06.07 99.11.30 
2 Z-020066 Supp. to UNMACC in Kosovo - Data Entry 
Clerks 
$   65,000 DND 99.07.30 00.01.31 
3 Z-020091  Institutional Support to UNMACC in Kosovo  $ 500,000 UNMAS 00.01.04 01.01.04 
4 Z-020350-
001 
Canadian Support to the MAP in Kosovo 
(Institutional Support)  
$ 120,000 UNMAS / 
UNMACC 
01.03.30 02.03.31 
  Sub-Total “Institutional Support to MACs” $ 760,000    
       
  Mine Awareness     
5 M-0 UNICEF Balkans Regional Program  $ 200,000 UNICEF 99.06.16 99.11.30 
  Sub-Total “Mine Awareness”  $ 200,000    
       
  Victim Assistance      
6 M-010054 Disabled Pop / Landmine Victims Peer 
Group  
$ 500,000 Queens U. 99.07.15 00.03.31 
  Sub-Total “Victim Assistance”  $ 500,000    
       
  Demining     
7 Z-020013 Rapid Response Demining in Kosovo  $ 530,000 CIDC/ Wolf’s 
Flats 
99.07.22 00.01.31 
8 Z-020027 Rapid Response Demining in Kosovo  $ 1,290,000 IDAC 99.07.30 99.12.10 
9 M-0 Emergency Shelter & Related Demining  $ 300,000 CARE 99.08.06 99.11.30 
10 Z-020200 CDN. Mine/UXO Clearance Project in 
Kosovo  
$ 2,200,000 IDAC/NOTRA  00.06.15 00.12.20 
11 Z-020350-
002 
Canadian Support to the MAP in Kosovo  
(Mine/UXO Clearance, Survey, QA)  
$ 1,680,000 UNMAS/ 
UNMACC 
01.03.30 02.02.28 
  Other:  Int’l. Donor Cooperation/ 
Leveraging of Funds  
    
12 Z-020233 Int’l Trust Fund for Demining (ITF) – 
Channelling of Funds II 
$   15,230  99-12-09  
  Sub-Total “Demining” $ 6,015,230    
       
  GRAND TOTAL  $7,475,230    
       
 
 
Similar to the CMAP in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Kosovo programme also focused on all 
four areas of mine action, including institutional support, demining activities, victim assistance 
and mine awareness. This project initiated in 1999 provided a significant contribution to 
address the mine/UXO contamination problem in Kosovo.  All of the projects of the CMAP in 
Kosovo are now completed and are discussed below. 
 
 
Institutional/MAC Support Projects 
 
As noted above, the UNMACC in Kosovo was established at the end of the crisis in June 1999 
as the focal point for all mine action activities in the province. Its responsibilities included the 
accreditation of all mine clearance and awareness organizations operating in the province, 
along with the planning and assignment of clearance tasks, and quality assurance over all 
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operations 46. The MACC also had responsibilities related to the coordination of mine 
awareness and victim assistance programmes including the collection of mine incident and 
victim statistics. 
 
The institutional capacity building projects of the CMAP began in 1999, with a very early 
contribution ($75,000) to UNMAS to help underwrite an assessment mission to define the 
scope of the mine problem in Kosovo, identify priority areas for mine action and initiate the 
establishment of the UNMACC. This was followed by a project ($76,000) to support the 
secondment of a CF Military Engineer LCol to provide a critical liaison function between KFOR 
and the MACC and another project $65,000, to support the provision of CF technical experts 
to assist in the development of a mine action database and to train local staff. In 1999, a two-
year contribution of $500,000 (CAD) was provided to enable the UNMACC to conduct surveys 
in Kosovo to determine the extent of remaining contamination and to conduct quality 
assurance to verify that clearance operations were undertaken in accordance with established 
UN international standards 47. This contribution was channeled through the ITF.48 Also, a sum of  
$1.8m (CAD) was contributed in 2001 to significantly increase the operational capacity of the 
UNMACC. This funding permitted the UNMACC to contract important specialized centralized 
assets (MDD, mechanical, manual and EOD) and support specific clearance projects that 
required additional funding to achieve success.49  
 
 
Institutional Support Results - Consistency with Goals 
 
The results achieved by the institutional support projects were consistent with the goal of 
“enhancing the capacity of the UNMACC.” The contributions in 1999 helped facilitate the early 
definition of the contamination problem, the development of a plan of action and the actual 
establishment of the UNMACC. Critical UNMACC liaison with KFOR was catered for and 
resources were provided to establish an effective database and trained staff. The subsequent 
Canadian contributions provided key resources for technical survey and quality assurance that 
were greatly appreciated for their certainty and the stability afforded in these important areas. 
Finally, the operational capacity of the MACC was greatly enhanced in 2001 by the acquisition 
of Canadian-funded centralized mine/UXO clearance and survey assets that were 
instrumental in achieving the target of December 2001 for the completion of the UNMIK mine 
action programme. These centralized assets were described as critical to the ability of the 
MACC to accelerate the clearance efforts and contend with a broad range of survey, 
verification, quality assurance and other support tasks that otherwise would likely have 
delayed the completion or the thoroughness of the mission.  
 
The Canadian institutional support projects played a significant part in the overall success of 
the UNMACC. The early contributions helped to develop the capacity of the MAC as a 
professionally competent organization. With only eight UN internationals, seven in-kind 
internationals and 33 locals, the UNMACC coordinated 1,000 personnel in 17 mine awareness 
organizations, and mine clearance activities involving an investment of approximately $85m 
(USD) by the donor community over three years. This amounts to excellent value for the 
                                                 
46UNMACC. 2001. Final Report on the Z-020350 CMAP in Kosovo Y 2001. 
47 www.acdi-cida.gc.ca 
48 The ITF, established by the government of Slovenia, acted as a channel for international funding in the region, 
with the benefit that matching funding from the US effectively doubles most donations. 
49 While classified as institutional support, this project was essentially a mine/UXO clearance activity through the 
provision of centralized assets to the UNMACC to permit flexibility by reinforcing priority tasks. This was similar to 
the 1999 project Z-20091 Provision of UNMACC Centralized Assets.  
CIDA/CEE Canadian Mine Action Programme in the Balkans Evaluation Report 1998-2003 45
donors and the Canadian contribution was praised for its reliability, lack of caveats and 
timeliness. 
 
Mine Clearance Projects 
 
The CMAP contribution for mine clearance in Kosovo involved approximately $6m (CAD) for 
five projects beginning in 1999, implemented by several different executing agencies. The goal 
was “to contribute to the removal of a key impediment to the return of refugees and displaced 
persons by clearing priority areas of landmines and UXO” and “to reduce the threat to life and 
loss of limb.” The projects began with the rapid contracting and deployment of Canadian 
companies with expertise in ordnance disposal, mine clearance and surveying to assist in the 
emergency phase in 1999. This was followed in 2000 with the deliberate contracting of a 
Canadian company to provide an integrated demining capacity and ultimately in 2001 by the 
contribution of funding to enable the UNMACC to contract specialized centralized assets and 
reinforce funding of critical clearance projects.  
 
The projects undertaken in 1999 were developed at very short notice in response to a UN 
appeal for assistance. Only a few weeks were available to assess the requirement, complete 
project design and contract the necessary resources. In fact, two projects were undertaken 
simultaneously: Rapid Response Demining in Kosovo I and II. CIDC and the Wolf’s Flat 
Ordnance Disposal Corp implemented the Rapid Response I project. This project involved 
funding contributions from CIDA ($528,000) and DFAIT ($200,000), and saw the deployment 
of a mixed, five-person demining/EOD team. In Rapid Response II, CIDA funded ($1,290,000) 
the International Demining Alliance of Canada (IDAC) to provide two EOD teams of two 
persons each, and three demining teams of three persons each plus locally hired and trained 
deminers. Both projects involved the provision of support teams in the field as well as the 
acquisition of mine clearance, EOD and other 
support equipment. While some success was 
achieved, these projects both encountered 
numerous problems in the areas of management 
technical qualifications, partnerships and reporting. 
These projects were ultimately subject to a detailed 
evaluation. 
 
Consequently, in 2000 CIDA undertook a deliberate 
and rigorous Request for Proposal (RFP) process to 
select and contract a Canadian company to provide 
a fully integrated, self-sufficient mine/UXO clearance 
organization to be employed by the UNMACC. This 
process of project design was very inclusive and 
input was sought from the UNMAS, the Kosovo UNMAC and from senior partner 
organizations.  
 
A consortium led by IDAC won this $2.2m (CAD) contract.50  The organization was comprised 
of a management team, two manual teams, two MDD teams and a mechanical (Bozena) 
clearance team.  The project involved nearly 50 personnel, including nine Canadians and 24 
Kosovar deminers.51 The EOD team operated under direct control of the UNMACC and the 
                                                 
50 The consortium also included NOTRA Environmental Services, Pearson Peacekeeping Centre and Hyaton. 
51 This project has been the subject of much discussion and the difficulties experienced during the implementation 
phase provided many lessons for CIDA that will be referred to later in this report. 
Figure 8. CIDC/Wolf’s Flat EOD, 
Operator - RogerGumbrill 
(CIDA file photo) 
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rest of the organization was employed under the designated UN senior partner, Defence 
Systems Limited (DSL), in the Multi-National Brigade (MNB) South sector in the area of 
Prizren. Overall, a reasonable degree of success was achieved in terms of outputs but 
numerous problems were experienced, once again resulting in a detailed evaluation that led to 
a modified approach to the funding of mine/UXO clearance in 2001.     
 
The Canadian contribution in 2001 consisted of $1.8m (CAD) to fund the acquisition by 
UNMACC of specialized centralized assets to enhance its operational capability. This 
contribution was supplemented by the donation of mine/UXO clearance equipment ($536,411) 
that was procured as a part of the previous CIDA projects in 1999 and 2000. This project 
involved a wide range of support activities including the provision of MDD teams, level I/II 
survey, EOD teams, and a joint manual/mechanical team for survey, verification, quality 
assurance and clearance operations as well as the provision of critical institutional support to 
the UNMACC.52  
 
Finally, it must be noted that mine/UXO clearance and survey/verification capacity was a key 
component of the Y1999-2000 institutional support project Z-020091 that also provided 
centralized assets to the UNMACC. Outputs for those projects are detailed at Annex E. 
 
 
Mine Clearance Results - Consistency with Goals 
 
The results achieved by the CMAP mine clearance projects in Kosovo were consistent with 
their defined goals of “increasing cleared land for refugee resettlement” and  “reducing the 
threat to life and loss of limb.” As noted above, however, the earlier projects were not without 
difficulties. 
 
In the first two projects in 1999, it took the contracted organizations considerable time to fully 
deploy their personnel and equipment, conduct necessary training and prepare for operations. 
As a consequence, they only became effective late into the demining season and although 
they achieved reasonable results in the time available, there were enough problems that a 
technical consultant was engaged to undertake an evaluation of the projects. The evaluation 
revealed problems in the areas of management, technical qualifications, improper procedures, 
inadequate reporting and difficulties in partnership cooperation. No doubt, the crisis 
environment faced by the donors and programmers caused some of the problems. Indeed, the 
very short lead time led to an ‘emergency’ contracting process that only included very broad 
terms of reference and resulted in three companies providing two disparate Canadian 
mine/UXO clearance organizations without a clear reporting relationship or common command 
structure. This was exacerbated by the difficulty of assembling and deploying the necessary 
personnel and equipment on short notice into such a far-off location and the general confusion 
encountered during the initial stages of the UNMACC operation. It is also worth noting that the 
CIDA programme officer changed just as the emergency phase in Kosovo was beginning. 
While ultimately a good deal was achieved, the results were not considered adequate and the 
numerous problems that were identified led to a detailed evaluation and a more holistic 
planning approach for the CIDA mine clearance contribution in 2000.  
 
                                                 
52 The donation of Canadian mine/UXO clearance equipm ent, valued at $536,411 (CAD) included: a mechanical 
clearance system (Bozena mini-flail); 8 vehicles; a 10-ton truck w/ trailer; a generator; protective mine/UXO 
clearance suits; detectors; tools; MDD equipment; as well as office, communications, medical and camping 
equipment. 
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The RFP development referred to above began in earnest in January 2000, after detailed 
consultation with the UNMAS and the Manager of the Kosovo UNMACC. The RFP was aimed 
at selecting a suitable Canadian company to provide an integrated demining capability to be 
employed by the UNMACC consisting of manual clearance, MDD and mechanical teams as 
well as a rapid response EOD capability. The objective was to deploy the organization to begin 
work at the beginning of the demining season in April; however, delays in the tendering and 
contracting process (including appeals) delayed the contract award until mid-June. 
Consequently, the selected organization, IDAC, was not deployed until the end of June. While 
the EOD team commenced operations almost immediately, the manual teams had to be 
locally hired, trained and accredited, and did not begin operations until the beginning of 
August. The mechanical clearance equipment (Bozena) needed even longer for delivery, 
testing and accreditation, and was not operational until mid-August. The MDD teams 
experienced similar problems and were not operational until the end of August. Once fully 
established, however, the organization proved to be very effective. The EOD team worked 
directly for the MACC, and the mechanical and MDD capacity was employed for the most part 
by DSL in areas of suitable terrain. In the meantime, the manual teams tackled minefields in 
some of the most difficult terrain in Kosovo and to increase their effectiveness, they employed 
field camps to support remote sites in order to reduce the amount of time required for travel 
each day. In the end, the IDAC organization produced very good output results; however, 
once again the operation experienced problems.  
 
The most serious problems involved leadership, 
technical standards and safety, and could be 
traced to one individual, the Deputy Project 
Manager. His unorthodox approach is cited as a 
factor in two ‘preventable’ accidents and the 
MACC’s refusal to certify some of the project’s 
clearance results. Interestingly, the UNMACC 
stressed that the difficulties created by this 
individual did not overshadow the excellent 
achievements and contributions of the project. 
While this did not make the deficiencies more 
palatable, it did offer some assurance that the 
overall project design and execution were sound, 
and underlined the likelihood that the results could 
have been outstanding if the contracting process had not been held up awaiting the results of 
the formal evaluation of the 1999 projects. Indeed, it has been suggested that the lateness of 
the deployment may have caused some haste on the part of the organization to ‘catch up’ with 
their counterparts. It has also been noted that the results achieved by the technical teams in 
spite of the situation was a strong endorsement of the leadership, professionalism and 
technical skills of the individual team leaders, most of whom were Canadian. Other problems 
were experienced including communications, reporting and finances, but these were dealt with 
promptly and aggressively by the CIDA programme officer, and brought to timely resolution 
underlining the effectiveness of the project management that was in place at the time.  
 
The problems experienced and lessons learned in the execution of the CMAP Y2000 Kosovo 
mine/UXO clearance project led to a different funding strategy for 2001. In consultation with 
UNMAS and the UNMACC, it was decided that all of the specialized demining equipment, 
vehicles and other equipment amassed by CIDA in the previous two years would be offered as 
a donation to the MAP in Kosovo This was to be accompanied by sufficient funding to facilitate 
the contracting of established mine clearance organizations to employ the equipment as 
Figure 9. IDAC Minefield Sites in 
Mountainous Area Near Brod, 
Kosovo (CIDA / IDAC file photo) 
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UNMACC centralized assets. Ultimately, this permitted the MACC to greatly accelerate the 
final phase of clearance by supporting various organizations with specialized assets, 
increasing survey and verification capacity and facilitating innumerable small clearance tasks. 
This Canadian donation is cited as “the decisive factor in enabling the MACC to complete the 
objectives in 2001, in that it was the funding source for the majority of MACC centralized 
assets. In fact, the ability of the MACC to directly control the centralized assets through 
UNOPS contracts versus the situation that exists when the organizations are bilaterally funded 
was a significant contributing factor in the success that was achieved.”53 It is also worth noting 
that part of the Canadian contribution was channeled through the ITF. Significantly, the 
matching funds were used to contract additional assets that enabled clearance of an additional 
527,394 square metres and destroyed a total of 1,699 mines. This represents 28 percent of 
the mined area cleared and 22 percent of the mines 
found and destroyed during 2001.54  In all, the 2001 
project has been hailed as a resounding success 
and a very important contribution by Canada. While 
some problems were cited, such as delays in 
finalizing the donation of the Canadian equipment, 
these are overshadowed by the good results. 
Another beneficial result cited on behalf of the 
Canadian contribution is the fact that the equipment 
donation was multiplied in effect by its further 
donation: the mechanical clearance equipment was 
passed on to the Albanian MAP; some equipment 
was passed on to the South Lebanon MACC; and 
the bulk of the assets were passed to the DCP for 
subsequent use by the KPC mine action teams throughout Kosovo. This can be viewed as an 
important contribution in terms of the development of sustainable indigenous capacity as well 
as improving the capacity in other mine-affected areas. 
 
As noted above, results in mine clearance were also achieved with the 1999-2000 institutional 
support project Z-020091, contribution provided to the UNMACC that was in turn used to fund 
a company called Mine Tech. This funding enabled the company to provide MDD teams as a 
MACC centralized asset to support a number of organizations including NPA, Danish Church 
Aid (DCA), HI, DSL and the HALO Trust. This resulted in a total of 101 hectares of land 
cleared of 768 mines and 6 items of UXO. Mine Tech also cleared 61 minefields and 
conducted survey tasks on a further 76 areas to verify or discredit the presence of mines.  The 
land cleared through this contribution provided access to prime agricultural and grazing land 
along with access to the main water reservoirs for two towns.  
 
 
Victim Assistance Projects  
 
The CMAP in Kosovo provided a victim assistance contribution of $500,000 (CAD) to Queen’s 
University for the implementation of the ‘Disabled Population and Landmine Victim Assistance 
Project’. Similar to the BiH CBR initiative, this project involved expanding the capacity of 10 
existing community-based rehabilitation centres operated by the ‘Association of Disabled 
People in Kosovo’ (HANDIKOS). Also, a number of activities were conducted to strengthen the 
                                                 
53  UNMACC Final Report on the Z-020350 CMAP, Y2001, December 12, 2001. 
54 Ibid …. 
Figure 10. Bozena Donated by Canada.   
(CIDA file photo) 
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capacity of existing centres including the provision of several educational sessions55 in Kosovo 
and Albania, client assistance and educational sessions in south-western Kosovo56 along with 
activities related to health care policy development and advocacy.  
 
 
Victim Assistance Results - Consistency with Goals 
 
The project results are consistent with the stated goal of “strengthening the quality and scope 
of existing services for the disabled.” The project contributed to the well being of persons with 
disabilities at the community level. These people realized an improvement in their mental and 
physical health as well as a marked improvement in their overall quality of life. This was 
achieved through improving the skills of rehabilitation workers and increasing the scope of 
services available. The enhanced capacity of HANDIKOS enabled participation of the disabled 
in all levels of the development and implementation of activities promoting the rights of 
disabled persons. The profile of disability issues and public awareness has also been raised 
with input being provided by Queen’s ICACBR to assist in the drafting of a world Health 
Organization (WHO), Health Care Policy. The actual impact of this project on the disabled 
population, however, was very difficult to quantify. The bulk of information available was from 
project performance reports and previous interviews with project partners. The project has 
since terminated and no one was available to seek input from during the recent field mission. 
One should be able to assume, however, based on positive results of the Queen’s ICACBR 





Canada supported various projects in south 
eastern Europe that were intended to broaden 
the awareness of the general population and 
refugees in target areas including Kosovo, 
regarding the dangers posed by landmines and 
UXO. These regional programmes were 
generally coordinated by UNICEF and involved 
local NGOs. The aim in Kosovo was to sensitize 
local populations by supporting information 
sessions in schools, refugee camps, villages 
and community centres. In Kosovo, the project 
produced 400,000 mine/UXO warning posters 
and leaflets that were distributed through local 
NGOs and government institutions, and three 
TV/radio spots. As well, UNICEF conducted a 
study to better understand the attitudes and behaviour that resulted in mine/UXO accidents. 
 
                                                 
55 This included:  three 5-week educational Programmes delivered to 50 HANDIKOS personnel;  3 seminars for 
rehabilitation professionals from Pristina Hospital and various community clinics (50 participants); and 16 classes 
focusing on care of war and landmine victims taught to 100 physiotherapy students at Pristina Medical Secondary 
School. It also included activities in Albania; a 3-day education seminar for rehabilitation staff held on CBR 
principles and clinical physiotherapy techniques. 
56 ICACBR staff worked in southwestern Kosovo with caseworkers from ICRC and other NGOs. Activities included, 
15 seminars with NGO CBR workers (241 participants), 62 client site visits and 48 case conferences to review 
challenging cases (240 participants). 
Figure 11.  Primary School Mine Awareness 
Training, Sojeva, Kosovo (Credit: 
ICRC/Diffidenti) 
CIDA/CEE Canadian Mine Action Programme in the Balkans Evaluation Report 1998-2003 50
Mine Awareness Results - Consistency with Goals 
 
As this was a multilateral, regional programme, no detailed results were available to the 
evaluation team. In general terms, however, UNICEF was the lead agency for the mine 
awareness effort in Kosovo and the overall results were rated as excellent. Mine awareness 
was a component of all clearance operations and UNICEF assisted the efforts of 17 different 
organizations operating in support of mine/UXO clearance activities.  
UNICEF also supported the Department of Education with the delivery of school programmes, 
as well as assisting in the implementation of a UNMACC exit strategy programme known as 
operation ‘Normal Life’. This programme was undertaken to ensure that local communities 
were aware of and satisfied with the clearance work completed in their areas, to advise on 
residual dangers, reinforce awareness and indicate how to obtain assistance after the 
departure of the MACC. Notwithstanding the lack of details, Canada’s contribution was no 
doubt instrumental in terms of facilitating the very effective mine awareness programme that 
was undertaken in Kosovo. 
 
 
FINDINGS - PROJECT DESIGN, IMPLEMENTATION AND REPORTING 
 
Because of the need to respond quickly with a programme in response to the UN Resolution 
and request for mine action assistance, the CMAP in Kosovo was somewhat unique. The 
project definition and design phase was quite compressed and consequently was very reactive 
in nature. See Annex E for a summary of key results presented in matrix form for all the 





It must be noted that the initial Kosovo CMAP project design was undertaken in a crisis 
environment. Consequently, it was significantly abbreviated and was further complicated by 
external requests and the Canadian Government’s position regarding the utilization of 
Canadian resources. UN requests precipitated support for a mission to define mine action 
requirements that ultimately led to the establishment of the Kosovo UNMACC. Follow-on 
institutional support was approved in the form of CF technical experts for database 
development and an in-kind CF contribution to provide for critical UNMACC liaison with KFOR. 
Emergency demining support was accomplished by the selection of Canadian companies in 
an abbreviated contracting process that provided only broad terms of reference. Finally, mine 
awareness was supported through funding of UNICEF on a regional basis and victim 
assistance was addressed through a Queen’s CBR project that was split between BiH and 
Kosovo, and built on previous success. It is also noteworthy that the CIDA programme officer 
changed in June 1999 and the new programme officer was faced with a very steep learning 
curve as a result of the emergency response requirement and had no opportunity to visit the 
area or meet with potential project partners. However, a humanitarian assistance officer was 
deployed in 1999 and did work on behalf of the bilateral programme. 
 
Because of numerous problems with the rapid response demining projects in 1999, a more 
deliberate project design process was adopted to provide an integrated mine clearance 
capability to support the UNMACC in 2000, and take advantage of CIDA purchased mine 
clearance equipment, vehicles and supplies from the 1999 projects. A comprehensive RFP 
was developed in consultation with UNMAS and the UNMACC in Kosovo. As described 
earlier, however, although considerable success was achieved, the contract was late being 
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awarded because of unavoidable delays and the project experienced several problems. 
Consequently, a new design approach was adopted for 2001, which entailed the provision of 
critical centralized mine clearance assets for the UNMACC. This project included the donation 
of CIDA-purchased mine clearance vehicles, specialized equipment and supplies. The design 
of this project was customized to satisfy critical UNMACC requirements and achieved 
outstanding results57. 
 
Institutional support to the UNMACC was also provided in 1999-2000 with a significant project 
that included a major funding component for the provision of specialized mine clearance 
assets. The design of this project was driven by the UNMACC and significant success was 
reported. 
 
Finding 20.  Institutional support is a niche area where Canada through the use of CF or 
private sector technical experts and organizations with niche capabilities, can 
make an important contribution. Mechanisms should be established to monitor 
these resources, coordinate short-notice availability (e.g. through MOU’s or 
standing offer agreements) and facilitate ongoing mine action liaison between 
CIDA, DND and DFAIT.  
 
Finding 21.  Normal Canadian government contracting processes are not suitable for rapid 
response or emergency mine action situations. As well, CIDA programme officers 
have limited capacity beyond their normal workload to handle rapid project 
design, contracting, implementation and the demands of hands-on contract 
management. For emergency situations, CIDA should focus on institution building 
and any support of mine/UXO clearance; mine awareness or victim assistance 
should be through established organizations. As noted above, however, the 
provision of Canadian resources in niche areas could be facilitated by the use of 
Standing Offer Agreements to achieve timely, cost-effective and efficient 
response.  
 
Finding 22. While Canadian private sector mine/UXO clearance capabilities do exist, they are 
somewhat limited and should not be contracted without special care in the 
definition of the scope, terms of reference and deliverables in the tendering 
process. It is also important to obtain the input of a mine action technical expert 
to assist in the development of RFP and contract documentation.  
 
 Finding 23.  Deliberate contracting utilizing a comprehensive RFP requires sufficient lead-time. 
Experience has shown that at least six months is required from the start of project 
design/RFP preparation to contract award including the possibility of appeals. It 
should be noted, however, that the timeliness of contracting certain niche 
capabilities could be facilitated by the use of Standing Offer Agreements. 
 
Finding 24. For larger, more complex projects involving Canadian resources, as was done 
with the 2000 IDAC demining contract, a careful needs assessment and detailed 
input into project design is required at the outset from the supported agency– in 
this case UNMAS and the UNMACC. 
 
Finding 25.  Direct, untied funding of the UNMACC in Kosovo to acquire critical centralized 
assets by in-theatre contracts was very effective, however, this approach may not 
                                                 
57  UNMIK – Final Report on the Z-020350 CMAP in Kosovo Y2001 dated 12 December 2001. 
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be transferable to other situations based on the capabilities of the MAC to let and 
oversee contracts, availability of suitable resources, local laws and the like. Direct 
funding contributions for national MACs to let contracts for centralized resources 
or demining activities must be very carefully considered due to often questionable 
or non-existent contracting regulations, the likelihood of preferential selection and 
the lack of management control. 
 
Finding 26.  The extension of existing projects such as UNICEF mine awareness and Queen’s 
Victim Assistance was an effective way to cover these important areas of mine 
action on short-notice, with experienced and effective partners. 
 
Finding 27.  Changing of key CIDA management personnel should be avoided during periods 
of heightened/emergency response. If unavoidable, however, MAP planning 





During the emergency phase, CMAP project implementation in Kosovo was impacted by the 
general confusion that marked the first six months of the UNMACC mine action efforts. The 
early institutional support projects were timely and very effective in helping the UNMACC get 
established, define a mine action plan and coordinate the activities of numerous clearance and 
awareness agencies in the midst of a tight security situation and a crush of returning refugees. 
The later institutional support projects in 2000 and 2001 were well-contrived and managed 
throughout their implementation with UNMACC as the partner and solid executing agencies 
like Mine Tech and DSL. 
 
The mine awareness project coordinated by UNICEF was regionally based, well-managed and 
produced reasonable results as far as can be determined. The mine victim assistance project, 
likewise produced fair results that mirrored its parallel project in BiH and did not present any 
management or reporting problems to speak of. 
 
The greatest project implementation problems for the Kosovo CMAP were generated by the 
emergency demining projects in 1999 and the integrated mine/UXO project that was planned 
and implemented in 2000. The problems are discussed above, however, the two projects in 
1999 suffered from short-notice and poorly defined contracts resulting from urgency of the 
situation and the crisis nature of the programming and project development process. The 
contracted personnel and equipment were late in arriving, and poor leadership, a flawed 
organization, poor technical skills and faulty management exacerbated this. The 2000 project 
was much better designed but suffered from unavoidable contracting delays, late deployment, 
poor leadership and on-site management, and a poor safety record. Some of the problems 
such as late contracting and deployment were beyond the control of the executing agency but 
the overall implementation of these projects was poor. 
 
In the end, reasonable results were achieved58 and many valuable lessons were learned. 
Indeed, the 2000 Kosovo mine/UXO clearance project was an ambitious undertaking and 
despite the problems, the outputs were credible, cost-effective and beneficial. The project 
paved the way for the UNMACC centralized assets project in 2001, demonstrated the effective 
                                                 
58 Willing to Listen: An Evaluation of the UN Mine Action Programme in Kosovo 1999-2001, the Praxis Group Ltd, 
Riverside, Geneva, 12 Feb 2002. 
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use of remote support camps and provided a set of environmental guidelines (SOPs) for 
mine/UXO clearance operations. Also on the positive side, it demonstrated Canadian 
capabilities in the mine/UXO clearance arena such as, rapid response EOD, MDDs, 
mechanical mine clearance, and the training of deminers, that should be considered in future 
programming. Finally, the CIDA management of these projects was diligent including 
aggressive and timely trouble shooting, and problem resolution. CIDA’s project management 
involved monitoring missions to the field as well as detailed project evaluations by technical 
experts59. CIDA post personnel in Pristina provided invaluable support in the management, 
coordination and evaluation of these projects.  
 
Finding 28.  Early familiarity with the area of operations, frequent monitoring, annual field 
visits and ongoing close scrutiny by CIDA post personnel are indispensable 
elements of successful project implementation. 
 
Finding 29.  The Y2000 Kosovo CMAP integrated mine clearance project demonstrated 
significant Canadian niche mine action capabilities such as rapid response EOD, 
MDDs, mechanical clearance, QA and the training/supervision of deminers, that 
should be surveyed by CIDA and considered for future interventions. 
 
Finding 30.  The RFP format used for the 2000 Kosovo mine clearance project should be 
considered as a draft model for future niche programming of this type. 
 
Finding 31.  The mine action ‘development’ approach currently used by Norway, the United 
Kingdom and the USA, should be reviewed by CIDA for methodologies that may 
be suitable to the Canadian context, such as streamlined contracting or 
government funding through an implementing agency or NGO such as NPA. 
 
Finding 32. The ‘environmental SOPs’ developed for the Y2000 Kosovo CMAP mine 
clearance project have been adopted by UNMAS as a technical note to the 
International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) to define environmental protection 
protocols for all mine/UXO clearance operations. This beneficial result follows 
from Canada’s leadership in the area of environmental protection and the need to 
undertake impact assessments for Canadian overseas development projects. 
 
 
Project Reporting  
 
As for Bosnia, the Kosovo CMAP projects varied significantly in the quality of reporting. The 
UNICEF mine awareness project was regionally based and only reported outputs in terms of 
products produced and distributed. The Queen’s victim assistance project, likewise reported 
on programme services delivered but did not provide statistics on total beneficiaries let alone 
any disaggregation by gender or other categories. 
 
The projects in direct support of the UNMACC were very well reported on and the MACC also 
supplemented reporting by the Canadian demining organizations that were generally deficient 
in this area. Reporting during the emergency phase was difficult but the 2000 project had well 
defined reporting requirements that were not adhered to. 
 
                                                 
59  CIDA RZE Kosovo Y2000 Mine/UXO Clearance Project – Evaluation, November 5 to 20, 2000. 
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Finding 33. Partners and executing agencies expressed frustration with CIDA’s complex and 
demanding project reporting requirements. Accordingly, CIDA reporting 
requirements should be reviewed and streamlined in the context of exceptional 
working conditions. 
 
FINAL CONSIDERATIONS – KOSOVO CMAP  
 
Considering the emergency nature of the project development for the CMAP in Kosovo, the 
results achieved are very reasonable and the lessons learned are invaluable. CIDA’s response 
to institutional support requests was timely and effective, reflecting a useful partnership with 
DND that should be maintained. The un-tied funding of the UNMACC permitted strong 
centralized assets to be acquired that greatly accelerated the overall mine clearance effort, 
well beyond the outputs that would have been achieved through direct funding of a mine 
clearance NGO or contractor; indeed, the $1.8M (CAD) funding in 2001 was viewed as a 
lifeline that facilitated the successful completion of the mine/UXO clearance in the province. 
The extension of regional projects to provide specialized mine action support in Kosovo was 
also an innovative and effective approach to a short-notice requirement. Finally, important 
lessons were learned from CIDA’s foray into contracting Canadian mine/UXO clearance 
capabilities. CIDA should review the approach to mine action programming used by key allies 
such as the United Kingdom, USA and Norway with a view to defining a Canadian approach 
that builds on key areas of expertise and a resource base of niche competencies. Again, these 
are countries that have innovative approaches that are worth examining such as crisis 




THE CMAP PROJECTS IN CROATIA 
 
 
OVERVIEW OF CROATIA PROJECTS AND RESULTS  
 
 
General Description of Programme 
 
According to the Landmine Monitor Report, 2002 “during the conflict in Croatia, mines were 
laid mainly to protect defensive positions on the lines of confrontation, which changed 
frequently, and also in areas of strategic importance, for example, along railway lines, and 
around utility installations such as power stations, and pipelines”.60 Minefields and areas 
suspected of being contaminated with mines and UXO are located in 14 of the 21 counties of 
Croatia”, totals an estimated 1,700 square kilometres61 of suspected mined area in 2001, of 
which “it is thought that only a percentage is actually contaminated” by some 500,000 mines.62 
The affected area potentially consists of: “infrastructure, 236 square kilometres (14 percent); 
agricultural areas, 566 square kilometres (33 percent); houses and yards, 87 square 
                                                 
60 Landmine Monitor Report 2002. International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL). 
61 According to the Landmine Monitor Report 2002, the affected area was estimated at 4,000 square kilometres in 
2000. “It has been explained that the reduction resulted from general survey activities, systematic and more precise 
development of the County Mine Action Plans and multi-criteria analysis.... Technical survey was conducted on 
82,078,884 square meters.... The area has been further reduced as a result of continued and intense general 
survey activities, additional information submitted by the Croatian Armed Forces, Special Police and county 
administrators.” 
62 Landmine Monitor Report 2002. International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL). 
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kilometres (5 percent); economic infrastructure, 82 square kilometres (5 percent), and 
pastures, meadows, and forests, 29 square kilometres (3 percent)63. When compared to 
Bosnia, the situation is considerably better because all of the 14 mine affected counties have 
been provided with precise danger area maps and as noted previously, the worst 
contamination is confined to the four former Serb enclaves (UNPAs). Approximately $26.4m 
(USD) was spent to fund mine action activities in 2001.64  It is noteworthy that 78 percent 
came from Croatian State funding with the bulk of the remaining amount (approximately 
$5.8m USD) coming from international donor agencies.65 Canada is a significant donor with 
contributions via the UNDP Trust Fund and the ITF.66  The CMAP in Croatia is also a peace 
building and security initiative and as with the programme in Bosnia and Herzegovina, it 
includes projects covering aspects of mine action in the country.67 This 2.5 year, $2m (CAD)  
 
Table 7. CIDA – Canadian Mine Action Program contributions in Croatia, by Project 
 










  Institutional Support to MACs      
1 Z-020337-001 CMAP/ Support to UN-CROMAC Transition 
Program 
 $ 300,000 UNDP 00.11.06 03.12.31 
2 Z-020337-002 CMAP/ CROMAC National Managers & 
Middle Managers Training & Development  
 $   30,000 UNDP 00.11.06 03.12.31 
3 Z-020337-003 CMAP/ CROMAC Communications, 
Database & Management Coordination  
 $ 185,000 UNDP 00.11.06 03.12.31 
4 Z-020337-004 CMAP/ Support to CROMAC Survey & QA 
Depts. 
 $ 450,000 UNDP 00.11.06 03.12.31 
  Sub-Total “Institutional Support to MACs”  $ 965,000    
       
  Mine Awareness     
5 Z-020337-005 CMAP/ Mine Awareness Program  $  60,000 UNDP 00.11.06 03.12.31 
  Sub-Total “Mine Awareness”   $  60,000    
       
  Victim Assistance      
6 Z-020337-006 CMAP/ Victims Assistance Program  $ 170,000 UNDP 00.11.06 03.12.31 
  Sub-Total “Victim Assistance”   $ 170,000    
       
  Demining     
7 Z-020337-007 CMAP/ CROMAC Survey, Verification Pjcts.   $ 300,000 UNDP 00.11.06 03.12.31 
8 Z-020337-008 CMAP/ Support to NPA’s Demining Progr.   $ 148,000 UNDP 00.11.06 03.12.31 
9 Z-020339-002 Mine Detection Dog Training II   $ 350,000 CIDC 01.03.01 02.05.31 
  Sub-Total “Demining”  $ 798,000    
       
  GRAND TOTAL  $   1,993,000    
 
                                                 
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid 
65 According to the Landmine Monitor Report 2002, these contributions come from the United Kingdom, Germany, 
Canada, and Norway (via the UNDP Trust Fund); the United Nations Associations of the UK and USA, and Adopt-
A-Minefield, for demining; the European Commission (via the ITF); Switzerland; and, the USA (via the ITF), among 
others.   
66 A donor conference “Humanitarian Demining – Support to the National Mine Action Programme in the Republic of 
Croatia” on 24 September 2001 was co-organized by the government, CROMAC, World Bank and UNDP.[48] The 
main reason for the conference was the closure of the World Bank Loan Programme and the need to find new ways 
of financing mine action. Present at the conference were 150 people from 34 countries. Donations (USD) were 
announced by the United Kingdom ($250,000), Austria ($80,000), Norway ($504,000), Japan ($317,311) and INA 
oil industry (an office building for CROMAC). 
67 Canada’s development assistance to Croatia is also broader and concentrates on economic and institutional 
transition with several areas of emphasis including; health, policing, human rights, government administration and 
the development of NGOs. 
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programme is a significant contribution and places Canada as one of the key donor countries 
in this area (see Table 7).  CMAP’s contribution aims at strengthening CROMAC institutional 
capabilities through funding in the areas of training and development, equipment and the 
support of technical surveys for area reduction. Mine victim assistance and mine awareness 
programmes are also supported along with equipment acquisition (mini-flail, protective suits, 
marking and fencing equipment). In addition, CMAP has also provided support for the 
establishment of a Croatian MDD training facility implemented by CIDC. 
As noted previously, the CMAP in Croatia is a fairly new programme. It was initiated in 2000 
as a result of the state elections and the advent of a more moderate and cooperative regime in 
Zagreb. It is therefore early to assess the progress made in some of the projects, particularly 
at the outcome and long-term sustainability levels.  
 
 
Institutional/MAC Support Projects  
 
The Government of Croatia established CROMAC in 1998 to be responsible for managing all 
mine action programmes in Croatia. Prior to that, mine action coordination was carried out by 
a UNMACC established in 1996. With the creation of CROMAC, the UNMACC “changed its 
name to the UN Mine Action Assistance Programme (UNMAAP), and until December 2001 
when it was dissolved,68 it supported the CROMAC in a capacity-building role”69.   
 
Of the total CMAP funding in Croatia, $1.7m 
(CAD) was allocated to improve the capacity of 
CROMAC through multi-year institutional support 
projects managed by the UNDP. The 
implementation of five projects that began in 
November 2000 involved contributions ranging 
from $30,000 to $450,000 (CAD) for a two year 
period including; the UN/CROMAC transition 
programme ($300,000); development and 
delivery of training to managers ($30,000); 
automation and office equipment ($185,000); 
support to Survey/QA Departments ($450,000); 
and survey and verification projects ($300,000). 
 
 
Institutional Support Results - Consistency with 
Goals 
 
The recent CMAP evaluation field mission clearly confirmed that the CROMAC institutional 
support projects are consistent with the goals of “improving indigenous demining and 
institutional capacity”. While some of the projects are in the early stages and final results are 
yet to be reported,70 a great deal of progress has been made in the development of CROMAC. 
Indeed, a recent evaluation of the UNDP project that supported the development of the 
                                                 
68 During 2001 its functions included: assistance in interpreting and introducing IMAS into the Croatian mine action 
system, assistance in planning and prioritization including socio-economic impact factors, and liaising with the 
international community in raising funds for mine action. 
69 Landmine Monitor Report 2002.  
70 These include Z-020337-001  ($ 300,000 Support to UN/CROMAC Transition Programme), Z-020337-002 
(CROMAC National Managers Training and Development) and Z-020337-007 ($300,000 CROMAC Survey, 
Verification Projects). 
Figure 12. MV-3 Donated to CROMAC by 
Canada (CIDA file photo) 
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CROMAC concluded, “CROMAC has now developed into one of the most – and possibly the 
most – successful national mine action coordination centres anywhere in the world.”71 In this 
context, the Canadian contributions to the institutional support of CROMAC are significant. In 
fact, some of the projects have served to directly address some of the institutional shortfalls 
identified in the above noted evaluation report. For example, the evaluation cited the need for 
improvements to general assessments and technical surveys with emphasis on area 
reduction, and this was directly addressed by Z-020337-004 & 007, support to CROMAC 
survey and verification. Also detailed was the need to develop and apply international 
standards and improve county, regional and national planning processes. These requirements 
were addressed by Z-020337-002 & 003, support to the development and training of national 
mine action managers and improved automation and office equipment, including the provision 
of equipment for a Decision Support System (DSS) for enhancing communications and 
database coordination.72  Also, the support to CROMAC’s Survey and QA Department included 
the purchase of a mini-flail (MV-3), protective equipment for deminers, marking and fencing 
supplies, and MDDs. These contributions greatly improved the technical survey and area 
reduction capacity of CROMAC. The mini-flail has proven useful for verification and area 
reduction work. It has been used extensively to support the construction of a highway to the 
coast that is important to the tourist industry and commercial traffic from Zagreb to Zadar. As 
well, tangible results have been achieved through the development of the DSS including the 
development of sound mine action priorities based on the definition of social, political, 
economic, safety, legislative and environmental parameters to drive operational planning. This 
system has also been used to accelerate the reduction of suspected areas thereby greatly 
increasing transparency and cost-effectiveness of clearance operations. 
 
Overall, the projects have been highly successful in achieving their primary aim of developing 
a sustainable indigenous mine action capacity and their secondary aim of reducing the threat 
that mines/UXO pose to the country. Only one project has experienced difficulty and it 
involved the provision of protective equipment for deminers –embarrassing delays were 
experienced in the replacement of helmets furnished by Med-Eng of Ottawa. In any case, 
CROMAC is now at a point where it is mostly self-sufficient and sustainable. In broad terms, 
the capacity building efforts have: increased the competence of the Croatian staff in the 
technical aspects of mine action; increased the competence of the Croatian staff in general 
management and administration; and developed a sustainable national system to address the 
mine action issue within Croatia.73      
 
 
Mine Clearance Projects  
 
Support for mine clearance has been provided by the CMAP in Croatia through the 
implementation of a MDD training project. The goal is “enhanced personal safety for deminers, 
residents and visitors in the area”. The MDD project was partly funded by Belgium and Austria 
and is being undertaken by CIDC by building on their experience in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
The purpose of the project was to assist CROMAC in the establishment of a local MDD 
training and evaluation facility, and the development of a national programme. The project 
started in March 2001 and was supposed to be completed in May 2002. Delays have occurred 
based on a number of factors including the unsuitability of the selected Croatian partner 
                                                 
71 Joint Evaluation Mission, Review of the UNDP Project “Support to the Croatian Mine Action Centre”   (Projects 
CRO/00/001 & CRO/00/Q01, Report Dated – 16 October 2001)   
72 This project included training on new database applications. 
73 Joint Evaluation Mission, Review of the UNDP Project “Support to the Croatian Mine Action Centre”   (Projects 
CRO/00/001 & CRO/00/Q01, Report Dated – 16 October 2001)   
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organization, unusually bad weather and poor candidate selection. While a detailed MOU was 
signed that defined the partnership responsibilities, the Croatian company (PHD) would not 
live up to its obligations and CIDC had to make up the shortfall by creating a training facility 
and recruiting candidates. The project should be completed by early 2003.   
 
 
Mine Clearance Results - Consistency with Goals 
 
While considerable progress has been made, this project has not, to date, achieved the 
intended results. A suitable MDD training facility has, however, been established including 
good kennels, support infrastructure and equipment as well as the necessary training sites 
(boxes). The facility is in the area of Skabrnja, near the city of Zadar. There are currently 10 
MDD with handlers undergoing training and graduation/certification is tentatively scheduled for 
the end of February 2003. Except for the MDD training and testing facilities, there obviously 
has been no capacity added to the resources of CROMAC  and consequently, no 
“enhancement to the personal safety of deminers, residents and visitors to the area.”   
 
However, the project will deliver up to 10 MDD teams early in 2003 and the training facilities 
will be available to support the refresher training and accreditation requirements of CROMAC 
MDD teams.74 What remains to be seen is whether the Croatian government and CROMAC 
will honour their commitment to take over the programme and if they are capable of building a 
sustainable national MDD programme. This must be considered in light of the fact that the 
project does not, at this point, include a ‘train-the-trainer’ component due to the termination of 
the Croatian partner’s involvement. Other complicating factors include the forthcoming 
creation of a regional canine/MDD training facility in Bosnia, variations in training 
methodology, the question of state or donor funding, and the future of CIDC in the region. In 
fact, it is too early to tell if the intended objectives will be achieved and whether this project will 
result in a sustainable indigenous MDD training capacity.     
 
 
Mine Awareness Projects 
 
A CMAP project was used to fund a needs assessment survey for communities living in mine 
suspected areas and to prepare a Croatian mine awareness needs assessment report. The 
Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) undertook this UNDP 
project at a modest cost of $80,000 (CAD). The final report was completed in May 2002 and 
was subsequently translated and distributed to all key stakeholders in the Croatian mine 
awareness sector.75 The project funding also permitted the production of some mine 
awareness materials as well as the funding of a small mine awareness project in the form of a 
play that will be performed in schools by a local theatrical group.  
 
                                                 
74 Croatian infrastructure for Mine Detection Dog training include: the initial construction of training facilities and 
kennels near Novigrad, Croatia, relocated (in Dec. 2001) to Skabrnja-Zadar and Pridraga respectively, with training 
areas that comprise 81 training and testing boxes occupying 8,100 square metres with an overall area of 11,000 
square metres, seeded with 100 AP mines, 12 AT mines and 5 pieces of UXOs; the establishment of a Croatian 
office with a national administrative assistant, and communications tools;  and  procurement of project vehicles.  
75 An Assessment of Mine Risk Education Needs in Croatia, GICHD, Geneva, May 2002. 
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Mine Awareness Results - Consistency with Goals 
 
There is every indication that the results of this mine awareness project will meet or exceed 
expectations in terms of, “reducing the number of preventable mine incidents and improving 
long-term donor enrolment.” 
 
In fact, the project is well on its way to achieving its expected results and will no doubt have a 
significant and lasting impact. The "Mine Awareness Needs Assessment Report" is already 
being used as a strategic planning tool to coordinate scarce mine awareness resources, for 
the development of programmes and to guide programme delivery. Improved collaboration 
has already been realized between the key stakeholders, the Croatian Red Cross76, the 
Ministry of Education and CROMAC.  The long-term focus of the report is to encourage and 
enable a new array of planning, priority setting and implementation strategies. These will in 
turn contribute to a higher level of programme concentration with a view to maximizing impact 
and donor cognition. The report will no doubt be used as a strategic planning tool for years to 
come, which underlines the positive capacity building and sustainability achieved by this 
project.  
 
This project is a good example of achieving results that are both relevant and cost effective. It 
was a relatively low-cost undertaking that will have a disproportionate impact and useful 
complementary projects were achieved with the remaining funds. This needs assessment will 
enhance the overall performance of mine awareness programmes in Croatia and will no doubt 
precipitate more donor funding. Obviously, it is an important contribution to saving lives and 
preventing the loss of limbs in Croatia.   
 
 
Victim Assistance Projects  
 
The CMAP mine victim assistance project in Croatia funded a comprehensive victims survey 
and the completion of a “Mine Victim Needs Assessment 
Report.” The Centre for Disaster Management and the 
Croatian Association of Mine Victims (CAMV) undertook 
these important projects. The survey was also expanded by 
CROMAC and CAMV into a complete database of mine 
victims that provides information about the current status of 
individual. The funding also provided for the conduct of 
physical and psychosocial workshops for mine victims, one 
for children and one for adults. These were held at a seaside 
hospital complex known as the Rovinj Centre where the wing 
of a building was renovated to accommodate the workshops. 
The workshop’s curriculum has been refined and plans have 
been made to conduct four children’s workshops in 2003, 
each of three-weeks duration and involving 20 candidates.  
 
Madame Plestina, the wife of the Prime Minister and a 
Special Mine Action Advisor to the Minister of Foreign Affairs 
is currently the force behind this project. She has apparently 
                                                 
76 The Croatian Red Cross is the principal implementer of mine awareness in Croatia. 
 
Figure 13. Mine Victim (Credit: 
John Rodsted) 
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leveraged additional funds (USA) and plans are being made to expand this project into a year-
round, regional and perhaps, international, mine victims/PWDs rehabilitation centre. 
 
 
Victim Assistance Results - Consistency with Goals 
 
The “Mine Victims Needs Assessment Report” and the victim’s database will serve as 
important strategic planning and decision-making tools for all issues, programming needs and 
support related to the rehabilitation, care and reintegration of mine victims. It will also assist in 
raising public and government awareness of the needs and rights of the disabled, particularly 
in the areas of employment and accessibility. The survey, report and mine victim database are 
sustainable results, as they will serve the long-term needs of the disabled population and 
continue to have a positive impact for years to come.  
 
The Rovinj rehabilitation workshops offer many tangible benefits to participating children and 
adults. Although only twenty-four landmine victims have benefited from these workshops to 
date, the potential exists to expand this initiative. The participants are furnished an opportunity 
to overcome trauma, and to gain confidence and self-esteem through music and sports. These 
results are consistent with the project goals of “advances in mine victim’s quality of life and 
raised expectations of future economic opportunities,” and of  “increased level and quality of 
care for Croatian mine victims”. 
 
In addition, the project also serves the secondary goals of “long-term management by the 
Croatian health system and the Union of Institutions for Disabled Persons,”  “informed 
decision-making as concerns Croatian mine victims” and “representational advocacy on behalf 
of Croatian mine victims.” This has been facilitated to a large degree by the involvement of 
Madame Plestina who has embraced the cause and is raising both funds and awareness. 
Unfortunately, the large-scale expansion of the project into a year-round regional centre for 
mine victims does not appear to be well thought out or sustainable. While capital funding can 
likely be secured, no sponsor or implementing agency (government/NGO) has been identified, 
professional staff requirements have not been addressed, and no source of long-term 
operations and maintenance funding has been secured. As well, the need has not been 
quantified nationally, regionally or from further afield. On the other hand, the current workshop 
initiative would benefit from a limited expansion in order to serve more victims and their 
families. This would provide relevant and cost-effective results in a sustainable programme 
framework. The large expansion envisaged, however, seems overly ambitious and is not likely 
to be sustainable without significant donor support or government intervention.   
 
 
FINDINGS – PROJECT DESIGN, IMPLEMENTATION AND REPORTING  
 
The CMAP in Croatia is modest by comparison with Bosnia or Kosovo. This reflects the 
relatively late start of the programme for the reasons noted above as well as the fact that the 
Croatian government has demonstrated an impressive degree of ownership of its mine 
problem. State funding makes up the majority of mine action spending in Croatia: CMAP 
funding was focused on addressing deficiencies identified in the UNDP institutional capacity 
development project, “Support to the Croatian Mine Action Centre.” 
 
 




In terms of design, the projects funded by the CMAP in Croatia were consistent with the 
programme’s balanced approach and together they represented a complementary package 
addressing all areas of mine action. Once again, the UNDP was a valuable partner in the area 
of institution building, suggesting projects with maximum impact, sustainability and cost-
effectiveness. Project design was easily facilitated and the positive results are reflected in the 
glowing assessment of the CROMAC in the UNDP project evaluation.77 The capabilities of 
national managers have been enhanced and a broad range of other tools and equipment has 
been introduced to significantly improve the planning, management effectiveness and 
operational capabilities of the CROMAC. The mine awareness and the victim’s needs surveys 
and reports, are valuable strategic tools that will guide policy development, agency 
coordination and programme delivery for years to come. The victim assistance project 
generated valuable visibility and coordination through the Croatian mine victims association, 
and the physical/psycho-social workshops produced good results but the current plans for 
large-scale expansion are not supportable. Finally, the CROMAC MDD Training Centre project 
being implemented by CIDC should have been able to simply build on the experience gained 
in Bosnia. The inability to identify a suitable Croatian partner, output delays and the lack of 
identified, follow-on funding support raise serious questions about the design and 
sustainability of this project. As well, the project was undertaken in spite of the ongoing efforts 
of the mine action community including CROMAC to regionalize activities such as MDD 
training. 
 
Finding 34.  Once again, the selection of strong, established partners and executing agencies 
was a key ingredient in project success. The UNDP has proven to be a valuable 
and reliable partner in institutional capacity building, particularly in the selection 
and design of high impact, priority projects. 
 
Finding 35.  Professional analyses such as a mine awareness needs assessment, the mine 
victim needs assessment and socio-economic impact surveys and socio-
economic impact surveys have great value in guiding policy and programme 
development, coordinating resources and increasing mine action programme 
effectiveness. Their value far outweighs their cost and they should be undertaken 
in the early stages of any mine action programme. 
 
Finding 36.  Limited expansion of the physical/psycho-social rehabilitation project in Rovinj is 
justified but the large expansion project outlined during the evaluation field 
mission by Madame Plestina should be viewed with considerable caution.  
 
Finding 37.  Due to the intransigence of the Croatian partner, the CIDC project to develop a 
MDD training programme in Croatia experienced difficulties from the outset. The 
partner was ultimately deemed unsuitable and while considerable progress has 
been made, follow-on staffing and funding support have not been identified. As 
well, the project is threatened by a regional canine training facility that is planned 
for development in 2003. 
                                                 
77 Ibid. 
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Project Implementation  
 
As for project design, the UNDP has proven to be a reliable and effective partner in guiding 
the implementation of CMAP-funded institutional capacity building projects in support of 
CROMAC. These projects all benefited from useful CROMAC input and positive involvement 
in their execution. The Canadian support was well-acknowledged by CROMAC during the 
recent field mission and good project visibility has been afforded by Canadian/CIDA flags and 
logos on donated equipment, in particular, the MV-3 mechanical clearance system. Only one 
project suffered difficulties and it involved lengthy delays in the supply and delivery of 
replacement helmets for the deminer protective ensemble (supplied by Med-Eng). The mine 
victim physical/psycho-social rehabilitation project in Rovinj enjoyed considerable success and 
a modest expansion of this project planned for 2003 is worthy of support. On the other hand, 
the proposed major expansion of the programme that includes significant capital costs does 
not appear to be well thought through or supportable. In addition, it was felt that the Canadian 
contribution in this area in particular and mine action in general, was not well known or 
recognized and that better CMAP communication planning and effort are required. 
 
Finally, the CIDC project to develop a CROMAC MDD training programme has suffered 
significant implementation problems and delays. Key factors in the delay included poor 
handler and MDD candidate selection and the unsuitability of the proposed Croatian partner 
organization. Consequently, the programmed 10 MDD teams will not be accredited until the 
end of February 2003, approximately one-year late. As well, sustainability is in question and a 
competing regional canine training centre is being developed in Bosnia. On the plus side, the 
training facility seems to be very good and the MDD teams will add a valuable resource for 
CROMAC’s 2003 demining programme. This project fell short in the key areas of cost-
effectiveness, partnerships, appropriate use of resources, and informed and timely action.    
 
Finding 38.  Close and active collaboration between CIDA, UNDP and CROMAC was the key 
to the successful selection and implementation of high-impact, well targeted, 
projects to build the sustainable national institutional mine action capacity needed 
by CROMAC.  
 
Finding 39.  The involvement of a high-profile personage such a Madame Plestina had a 
beneficial impact on the mine victim project in terms of its visibility, impact and 
obvious success, and her involvement leveraged valuable resources and 
facilities. On the other hand, her enthusiasm may result in an overly ambitious 
and unsustainable expansion that must be viewed with caution.  
 
Finding 40.  CIDC experienced considerable difficulty in terms of achieving established project 
timelines. Accordingly, CIDA should carefully review the timelines and 
deliverables of any future CIDC proposals. 
 
Finding 41. Major programmes such as the Balkans CMAP must include a communication 
strategy and plan to better exploit success and respond to any identified media 
queries resulting from project implementation issues or problems. 
 
 




In general terms, UNDP’s project monitoring and reporting was viewed as inadequate. This 
was discussed during the field evaluation mission and it was noted that due to staffing 
reductions, the UNDP Croatian office lacked the resources to conduct extensive monitoring 
and reporting. Possibly this situation could be helped to some degree by the use of a more 
abbreviated reporting format. 
 
CIDC’s project reports were consistently of poor quality, lacking in substance, incomplete and 
often late. Serious problems and project delays were not communicated to the programme 
officer in a timely fashion and these difficulties were often revealed by other sources. Until 
recently, similar problems were experienced with the CIDC project in BiH. 
 
Finding 42.  Abbreviated report formats or additional funding should be considered for 
organizations lacking the required staff capacity to complete full reports. 
 
Finding 43.  Funding increments in the form of progress payments or holdbacks may be a 
suitable approach for organizations that fail to produce satisfactory and timely 
deliverables such as annual reports. This approach has shown good results in 
recent dealings with CIDC  
 




FINAL CONSIDERATIONS - CROATIA CMAP 
 
The design of the CMAP in Croatia benefited from the experience of the UNDP in 
orchestrating the CROMAC transition project as well as the active involvement of the 
CROMAC staff. Of note is the fact that the institutional support projects were selected for their 
capacity building value prior to the termination of UNMAAP. As a consequence of the 
UNDP/UNMAAP institutional support project, the CROMAC has matured into an effective 
national institution with competent and professional staff. It now has the tools such as the 
DSS, needs assessments and physical assets to coordinate an effective mine action strategy. 
Area reduction surveys, marking and clearance efforts will be prioritized based on multi-criteria 
analysis. There is also the likelihood of a socio-economic study to further assist planning and 
the establishment of priorities. Canada has made a major contribution to this success through 
the Balkans CMAP and the tailored project funding that was provided. The only questionable 
project has been the CROMAC MDD training programme undertaken by CIDC. Poor 
partnership selection, significant delays and sustainability questions indicate poor design and 
poor implementation, not to mention consistently poor reporting. The victim assistance project 
produced good results and deserves continued support, however, any large-scale expansion 
will require a comprehensive plan that includes a Croatian government ministry or equivalent 
sponsor/implementing organization. In summary, the CMAP in Croatia was well contrived, 
cost-effective and highly productive from the perspective of sustainable capacity building. 
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From a development perspective, mines/UXO are first and foremost, a humanitarian concern 
and must be addressed from this perspective. Accordingly, priority in mine action must be 
afforded to those who are most vulnerable and to reducing the immediate threat to the well 
being of mine affected communities. Mines/UXO also constitute a major impediment to 
rehabilitation and sustainable socio-economic development. Therefore, in order to be effective, 
mine action programmes in countries recovering from violent conflicts should be integrated 
into comprehensive strategies designed to support humanitarian action, peace building, 
reconstruction and development. 
 
In countries where the scale of contamination is widespread and severe, and a broad range of 
support is required, the international community is usually called upon to assist in the 
development of a national mine action programme. Where mines/UXO present an immediate 
threat to local populations or an obstacle to socio-economic development, emergency mine 
surveys, marking and clearance as well as mine awareness should be the principal 
requirements of the central mine action effort. These are essential to prevent loss of life or 
injury and allow the beginnings of socio-economic development. An efficient response to the 
landmine threat also requires government, international organizations, NGOs and civil society 
to cooperate closely and this dictates the priority development of a strong and technically 
competent mine action coordination institution. Mine victims also need to be accounted for and 
supported, and the state of the local health system will define the nature and extent of 
development assistance required in this area. 
 
 
BALKANS CMAP – CONSISTENCY WITH PROGRAMME GOALS 
 
Mine action is primarily concerned with assisting people and communities that are exposed to 
the dangers of mines/UXO. The purpose of mine action is to recreate a safe environment 
conducive to normal life and development. To this end, the overall objectives of CIDA’s 
Balkans CMAP were to:  reduce the threat of injury and death posed by mines/UXO; remove a 
key impediment to the return of refugees; enable rebuilding to take place; and support the 
capacity development of indigenous institutions and expertise. To accomplish these goals, the 
Balkans CMAP was designed to include the key mine action activities geared towards 
addressing the problems faced by populations as a result of mine/UXO contamination. The 
programme encompassed four complementary components: mine awareness; mine clearance 
including survey, mapping and marking; victim assistance; and institution building.  
 
As noted previously, the Balkans CMAP was developed in three distinct phases by country; 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Croatia. This programme development process was in 
response to local and regional situations/events, however, the overall programme goals 
remained consistent and were reflected in the selection and design of individual projects. Most 
of the projects met or exceeded the results expected and in a few areas, CIDA funding 
produced significant and long-term impacts. This was particularly true in the vital area of 
institutional support and capacity building. In Bosnia and Croatia, Canada’s support was a 
major factor in the progressive development of self-reliant and competent national mine action 
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coordination institutions. In Kosovo, CIDA’s institutional support projects were described as 
critical to the success of the UNMACC. CMAP mine awareness and clearance projects 
protected significant numbers, facilitated returns, and enabled reconstruction and development 
to take place. And, mine victim assistance projects in all three countries provided vital physical 
rehabilitation and psychosocial support to victims as well as sustainable capacity in the health 
and education sectors. 
 
 
BALKANS CMAP – CONSISTENCY WITH CEE OBJECTIVES AND CIDA PRIORITIES 
 
The Balkans CMAP was designed in the larger context of CIDA/CEE’s development 
assistance strategy which has been constructed along three main axes as a means of 
securing peace and prosperity in the region: peace building and security (governance); 
economic cooperation and reconstruction (economic well-being); and social sustainability 
(social development).  As noted above, in seriously mine-affected countries, mine action must 
be an integral part of humanitarian action, peace building, reconstruction and socio-economic 
development. In this regard, the Balkans CMAP was designed to support CEEs assistance 
strategy, and the overall goals of the programme are consistent with CIDA’s development 
priorities and crosscutting themes. This notion is graphically depicted in the diagram at Figure 
14. This diagram effectively illustrates how the key components of a mine action plan are 
related to the components of the development assistance strategy. As discussed above, in 
countries suffering from severe and widespread contamination, mine action programmes must 
be undertaken to facilitate humanitarian action, peace building, reconstruction and socio-
economic development. The diagram shows how the mine action outputs and their impact 
results facilitate development assistance and progress in the key areas of the development 
assistance strategy. The goals and achievements of the Balkans CMAP are reflected in the 
CMAP activities diagram. The diagram also illustrates how the crosscutting themes of gender 
and the environment are recognized and served by the CMAP. This is an important dimension 
and it should be noted that mine/UXO clearance of itself is an important environmental 
remediation activity. Also, women (and children) make up a significant proportion of mine 
victims, refugees and displaced populations that are directly targeted by the key areas of mine 
action, particularly mine awareness, mine clearance and victim assistance. Mine/UXO 
clearance priorities are also driven by the needs of special groups and moreover, a number of 




BALKANS CMAP AND CIDA’s  “CANADA-IN-THE-WORLD” POLICY  
 
The CMAP in the Balkans developed in 1998 respects many of the principles and 
programming approaches outlined in CIDA’s new policy statement on strengthening aid 
effectiveness, “Canada: Making a Difference in the World” (September 2002). Indeed, this 
consistency may be one of the underlying reasons why the Balkans CMAP has been 
successful and effective. For example, the Balkans CMAP has consistently focused on the 
encouragement of local ownership and the building of indigenous capacity in the four key 
areas of mine action. The successful development of capable and self-sufficient local national 
mine action institutions, indigenous demining capacity and local health/support services to 
victims of landmines have all been hallmarks of the Balkans CMAP. Consistent support in 
these areas has resulted in substantial progress towards ensuring the local ownership, 
capacity and sustainability of individual country mine action programmes. In the area of 
improved donor coordination, the Balkans CMAP included significant effort and considerable 
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success in the coordination of key projects with like-minded donors thereby reducing risk, 
avoiding duplication and greatly increasing the overall impact of the Canadian programme. 
Country focus is another principle that applies to the Balkans CMAP. Although the programme 
does not include any of the nine identified CIDA focus countries, the Balkans CMAP has 
followed the principle of geographic concentration. The programme was concentrated in only 
three of the seven Balkans countries/provinces, and in future it will have a single country of 
focus, Bosnia and Herzegovina. From the outset, the programme also adhered to the principle 
of untied aid. During all phases of programme design and implementation, partnering with 
multilateral, international or foreign organizations was readily undertaken if it was assessed 
that project effectiveness and results would be improved. In terms of results based 
management, the Balkans CMAP included regular and thorough of monitoring throughout its 
implementation as well as prompt and detailed evaluations of specific projects when the need 
was identified. Finally, with respect to CIDA’s six priority development sectors (health, 
HIV/AIDS, education, child protection, agriculture, and private sector development), the 
Balkans CMAP either directly or indirectly addressed four of these areas. These were: health, 
through its landmine victim assistance projects and overall savings to the health care system 
through prevention of injury etc; child protection, through the provision of a safe and secure 
post-conflict environment for children; agriculture, by restoring agricultural land to production; 
private sector development, through the rehabilitation of public and private sector 




FINDINGS – PROGRAMME DESIGN, IMPLEMENTATION AND REPORTING 
 
As noted previously, Canada and CIDA’s involvement in mine action in the Balkans predates 
the Ottawa Convention and the advent of the CLF. A CIDA contribution was made to a World 
Bank mine awareness programme in 1996 as part of a regional economic revitalization 
project. The linkages between development and security issues were becoming more 
apparent and it was clear that for the region to develop, the landmines issue needed to be 
addressed.78 
 
The Ottawa Convention was signed in 1997 and the resulting CLF apportioned $10m (CAD) 
for mine action in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This resulted in a BiH MAP assessment mission 
followed by a design mission consisting of staff from DFAIT, DND and CIDA in June 1998. 
After extensive consultations with other donors and with several organizations operating on 
the ground (including the UNDP, NPA, SFOR, Care Canada, HI and the Mines Advisory 
Groups/UK)79, the Canadian team produced a conceptual design for a programme.  
The product was a responsive programme based on an integrated approach which 
emphasized mine clearance operations heavily, while assuring some resources for institutional 
support, mine awareness and victim assistance, also perceived to be important 
complementary elements of the programme. It was a front-end loaded, five-year programme 
with the disbursement of 60% of the funds in the first and second year of operations, and it 
included immediate support for mine clearance. 
                                                 
78 According to Stephen Wallace, former Director of the Balkans Programme in CIDA-CEEB, the creation of the 
Peace Building Fund was based on the same principles. 
79 Some of these organizations formed the international coalition (6 NGOs) that allied with the Government of 
Canada to push the Ottawa Convention forward. 





Key Agency Development Result: 
Economic Well –Being 
“Equitable economic growth and improved standards of 
living for the poor” 
Key Agency Development Result: 
Governance 
“Improved governance structures and 
institutional capacity in partner countries; 
strengthened civil society; and enhanced 
respect for rights and democratic principles” 
Key Agency Development Result: 
Social Development 
“Improved quality of life of the poor through enhanced 
social services; management of the social impact of 
reform; and progress toward gender equality [a 
crosscutting theme of all development results]” 
 Mine Action Area:  
 Institutional Support   
 for Mine Action  
 Coordination Centres 
 (MACs) 
 
Mine Action Area: 
Victim Assistance 
Mine Action Areas: 
Mine Awareness 
Demining 
Output/Outcome Results:  
-  Key social and economic 
infrastructure cleared of 
danger 
- Locals and returnees 
educated about mines/UXO 
Impact Results:  
-  Vulnerable populations can 
safely return home, rebuild 
lives 
-  Economic and social 
infrastructures can be rebuilt 







-  Needs assessments and surveys 
conducted National MAC centres 
set up and equipped 
-  Legislation for mine coordination 
established Indigenous staff 
trained 
 
Impact Results:  
-  Indigenous capacity 




Outcome/Output Results:  
- Provide medical and 
psychological support to 
mine victims  
-  Improve understanding of 
disability issues among 
government, education/ 
health professionals and 
general population  
-  Increase services for PWDs 
Impact 
Results:  
-  Mine victims 
reintegrated into 






- Mothers/ women mine 
victim’s lead/attend 
workshops/training 
Gender/ Environment Cross 
Cutting Results: 
- Environmental contamination 
(mines/UXOs) removed 
-  Women trained/hired in 
demining orgs at many levels 
 
 
   
Gender Crosscutting 
Results: 
-  Women hired at 
MACs 
-  MACs identify mine 
action needs of 
vulnerable people, 
including women and 
children 
Figure 14. CMAP Results Relationship to 
CIDA Development Objectives 
and Priorities 
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The success of this initial phase of the Balkans CMAP was due in large measure to the strong 
partner organizations that greatly assisted in project selection and design. The UNDP guided 
the key institutional/MAC support projects and CARE Canada was instrumental in the 
selection of good projects and strong partners in the area of victim assistance.80 The 
collaborative relationship between Canada and Norway led to mutual cooperation, and the use 
of NPA as a valuable partner and executing agency in mine/UXO clearance of high-value 
areas in the Sarajevo Canton.81 HI was also a strong partner in the development of APM as a 
local demining NGO. Unfortunately, the CIDC projects did not include a strong and 
experienced in-country partner. This is believed to be a major factor in terms of the delays and 
difficulties that were encountered with the MDD training projects. Finally, the SFOR EAF 
demining project has produced good results over time but has suffered problems due to SFOR 
military staff turnover. The subsequent phases of CMAP design included the emergency 
response requirement in Kosovo in 1999 in response to UN appeals and the more deliberate 
design of a programme for Croatia in 2000. 
 
Finding 45. The CMAP in the Balkans was consistent with most of the programming principles 
defined in CIDA’s recent policy statement on strengthening aid effectiveness, 
“Canada: Making a Difference in the World” (September 2002). 
 
Finding 46. The design of the initial phase of the Balkans CMAP (BiH) was greatly assisted 
by the CEEB project design mission including DFAIT and DND representation, as 
well as by input from experienced partners such as UNDP.  
 
Finding 47. The formal interaction of DFAIT (Mine Action Team), CIDA (Mine Action Unit) and 
key programme officers, and DND/NDHQ (J-3 Engineer Branch/Mine Information 
Centre) on a routine basis would be useful for sharing resources, information, 
contacts and lessons learned that would aid in programme planning. 
 
The design of the Kosovo programme included a deliberate focus on mine/UXO clearance and 
institutional support. While the institutional support projects were very successful and vital to 
the success of the UNMACC, the Canadian Government’s choice was to contract Canadian 
companies for the provision of emergency mine action response. Due to the crisis situation, 
however, there was little or no time available for proper programming or project design. Also, 
because of the urgency and resulting time constraints, these companies were engaged using 
an abbreviated process, the contracts were vague and inadequate, and the results were 
unsatisfactory. This situation was not helped by a coincident change in the programme officer. 
The mine awareness and victim assistance projects achieved good results and uniquely, they 
were extensions of projects being undertaken by experienced organizations elsewhere in the 
region. The follow-on projects in Kosovo built on successes and included an innovative 
attempt to contract and deploy an integrated Canadian mine/UXO clearance organization that 
achieved noteworthy success while experiencing some key problems. The UNMACC in 
Kosovo proved to be a strong and valuable partner that ultimately used the CMAP mine/UXO 
clearance contribution in 2001 to directly contract vital centralized demining assets that 
achieved outstanding results. In hindsight, it may have been better to provide the money 
directly to the United Nations in 1999 as opposed to sending Canadian teams, however, it was 
a Canadian Government decision to contract and deploy Canadian resources, and the crisis 
nature of the situation obviated a more deliberate programming and project design process. 
 
                                                 
80 Interview with David Mueller, CEE Mine Action Programme Officer 1996-1999. 
81 The subsequent phases. 
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Finding 48. Rather than dismiss the use of Canadian private sector capabilities, CIDA/DFAIT 
should, with input from UNMAS, UNDP and other partners, try to define ‘niche’ 
areas of mine action expertise that could be exploited. It would also be useful to 
review other national models for development funding in the area of mine action 
such as; Norway/NPA, the UK/DFID and the US Department of 
State/Humanitarian Demining Programmes. As well, it must be noted that the 
Canadian contracting process does not easily lend itself to emergency or short-
notice scenarios. 
 
Again, the design of the Croatian component of the CMAP benefited from strong partnerships 
with experienced organizations. The projects concentrated on institutional support and the 
development of sustainable capacity in some key areas, including management, QA and 
survey, database and mapping improvements, and a decision support system. The mine 
victim and mine awareness projects, while modest, were very successful and will have a 
lasting impact. Unfortunately, the MDD programme undertaken by CIDC experienced serious 
difficulties and has questionable sustainability. Additional focus on institution building would 
have been more beneficial and would have respected the ongoing dialogue at the time, which 
was supporting the development of a regional MDD training centre in BiH. 82 
 
Finding 49. From a foreign policy perspective, more utility may have been realized by 
focusing the Balkans CMAP funding on fewer niche areas involving Canadian 
competencies such as reinforcing institutional capacity and with targeted 
initiatives in mine clearance aimed at increasing indigenous capacity such as the 
SFOR/EAF, APM, and NPA projects including key equipment donations. 
 
Overall, the programme design was a significant success and the results achieved are 
impressive. Some problems occurred as a result of changes in the Programme Officer at 
critical points in the five-year programme but were minimized by senior staff continuity and the 
use of a technical expert (consultant). The design of the programme also had to account for 
significant differences in the three programme countries. Kosovo had a permissive 
environment for mine action (UNMIK/KFOR control) but Croatia and Bosnia had various 
constraints that had to be accounted for, such as legislation on demining, restrictions on 
international companies/NGOs and evolving national institutions. Accordingly, taking 
advantage of local experience and strong partnerships was essential. In this regard, regionally 
based organizations such as UNDP, NPA, Care Canada and the like were helpful in 
expanding the Balkans CMAP to Kosovo and Croatia, and could serve a useful purpose in 
developing a more regional approach to programme design and implementation. 
 
Finding 50. The Balkans CMAP would have benefited from a more regional approach 
particularly from the standpoint of programme management and span of control. 
This could be achieved through programming partnerships with strong, regionally 
based organizations. This would reduce the number of individual projects that 
would require direct management by the programme officer. 
 
From the standpoint of implementation and reporting, the Balkans CMAP was overall a 
success. A number of assessment and monitoring missions were conducted as well as two 
project evaluation missions. These provided direct oversight by the programme officer, who 
was able to correct problems, engage partners and executing agencies, assess progress and 
review future programming options. The programme officer made effective use of CIDA post 
                                                 
82 Ibid  
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personnel and senior partners to monitor projects, and aside from a few problems identified in 
previous sections, was able to manage the programme effectively. Project implementation 
innovations were also evident in the use of the ITF to leverage matching mine action 
contributions for the region and the development of partner donor funding to facilitate larger 
projects such as the MDD programme in Croatia. The focus of Canada’s Y2000 Kosovo 
mine/UXO clearance project to provide centralized assets to the UNMACC was also an 
innovative approach that was effectively exploited again by the MAC in 2001 using CIDA 
funding. 
 
Finding 51. The high level of monitoring, assessment and detailed project evaluations greatly 
assisted the programme team to respond effectively, adapt lessons learned and 
manage the CMAP efficiently. This level of hands-on familiarity is indispensable 
for effective programme design and implementation. 
 
 
CMAP – FRAMEWORK OF RESULTS AND KEY SUCCESS FACTORS 
 
Achievement of Results 
The “Key Results Tables” provided in the foregoing country reviews provide a concise 
illustration of results achieved for each of the CMAP projects. These tables resulted from a 
wide variety of inputs including a file review, APPR’s, mission reports, interviews and 
questionnaires. For the most part, the results achieved are either acceptable or they exceeded 
expected results based on accepted norms. A few projects failed to achieve expected results 
but in some of these cases the results were simply achieved later than agreed upon. In the 
above discussion, the CMAP was related to CIDA’s development strategy and priorities 
indicating the relationship of the results achieved. The CMAP projects have left a powerful 
legacy of indigenous capacity in all areas of mine action and the results are highly sustainable, 
particularly in the areas of institution building.  The measurement of results in most areas of 
mine action, however, is difficult. Institution building for example, is an area where the 
measurement of results is necessarily subjective. Improvements in management, planning, 
administration, reporting and operational effectiveness can be observed but are difficult to 
measure. There is no question, however, regarding the dramatic improvements in the 
CROMAC and BHMAC over the past three years. They have both matured into very 
professional and effective institutions that are now purely national organizations. The 
UNMACC in Kosovo proved its worth by completing its mine action programme on time in 
2001. Mine awareness can be measured in numbers trained and materials produced, 
however, it is only one of many factors that contribute to a reduction in victims. Again, mine 
victim assistance results depend on the programme and what is being measured; number of 
prosthetics, number counseled, advocacy results etc. Finally, mine clearance is easily 
quantified but again, one must be careful with regards to what is being measured and 
compared. Area cleared (m2) and unit cost ($/m2) are the most common measurements used, 
but these also include certain limitations. 
 
 
Cost-Effectiveness of Results 
 
The CMAP was a large programme with many disparate projects that made cost accounting 
and detailed monitoring difficult. Nonetheless, very few variances occurred and which largely 
due to the aggressive monitoring by the programme officer and the partner agencies. In the 
vast majority of the projects, the relationship between costs and results was favourable. In 
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fact, in a few cases, the planned projects cost less than anticipated and the surplus money 
went to funding supplementary projects (e.g. mine awareness needs assessment – Croatia). 
In the case of the Kosovo 1999 demining projects, the results were definitely unsatisfactory 
from the standpoint of the late deployment and limited demining outputs in relation to the 
costs. In most other demining projects, however, the results were quite favourable in 
comparison with other organizations. Finally, a few organizations, such as CIDC, experienced 
delays and cost overruns, however, in most cases there was shared responsibility or the 
executing agency was forced to make up the shortfall from other sources. While the ITF victim 
assistance project was relatively minor in terms of cost, it was not very effective from the 
standpoint local sustainability or capacity building. 
 
 
Relevance and Sustainability 
 
Regardless of the results achieved, every CMAP project must be viewed as relevant since 
they were based on the key areas of mine action and addressed an identified need. The 
projects usually focused concentration on threat reduction and the development of capable 
mine action institutions. As noted above, these CMAP initiatives were tied to CEE Branch 
objectives and CIDA's development priorities as enabling or complementary activities, and 
were consistent with the needs and priorities of local stakeholders and partner organizations. 
As well, one of the key hallmarks of the Balkans CMAP has been its high degree of 
sustainability. The national mine action institutions that required so much assistance at the 
start, have emerged as strong, largely self-sustaining indigenous institutions. This is less so in 
Kosovo, but the KPC/DCP is gradually improving with the help of HI. Substantial indigenous 
mine/UXO clearance capacity has been nurtured by CIDA’s contributions. The SFOR/EAF and 
APM are two good examples and the CIDC MDD project has enhanced both these 
organizations as well as the Civil Protection Organization (CPO). Finally, the victim assistance 
projects in BiH, Kosovo and Croatia have generated substantial physical and psychosocial 
rehabilitation capacity within the health and education sectors respectively, and the number of 
direct beneficiaries continues to grow. 
 
In terms of CIDA’s cross cutting development themes, all the CMAP mine clearance projects 
contributed to the welfare of women by providing safe areas for communities to live, manage 
their households and raise their children. All victim assistance projects contributed to social 
welfare by promoting the health of the victims, and teaching proper care and rehabilitation to 
avoid further injury. A significant proportion of the beneficiaries were women and children. 
And, the SFOR/EAF project built non-combative employment skills for military personnel, 
which is a major contributor to peace and stability that will directly benefit women, children and 
the environment.83 In terms of the environment, it is particularly noteworthy that the guidelines 
developed from the environmental assessment of the Canadian Y2000 mine/UXO clearance 
project in Kosovo were adopted by UNMAS and will be included in the IMAS as a technical 





As noted throughout this report, effective partnerships have been the foundation of success for 
the Balkans CMAP. With a few minor exceptions, those projects that involved a partnership 
                                                 
83 CMAP Evaluation Questionnaire Response: DFAIT Mine Action Team, Alison Clement, Programme Coordinator, 
et al, DFAIT–MAECI. 
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with a strong and experienced international agency already established in the country 
achieved the expected results and generated few problems in the areas of implementation and 
reporting. As well, most of the CMAP projects included the active participation of local 
partners, recipients, employees and beneficiaries in many areas of the project design and 
implementation. This is particularly so in the case of institution building where locals, including 
women, are trained in management and operations, in order to gradually take over completely. 
The same applies to the victim assistance programmes, demining and mine awareness. The 
Canadian companies contracted for mine/UXO clearance in Kosovo were exceptions; like 
most other operators, locals were only involved as deminers, MDD handlers or in a support 
capacity. CIDC on the other hand, has evolved to an organization comprised fully of locals, 
except for one Canadian as the Chief Instructor. It is also noteworthy that CIDC trained 
several women as MDD handlers. Partnership innovations included shared funding of projects 
with other donors and key agencies such as UNDP, other countries and UNICEF, as well as 
leveraged funding opportunities through the ITF. 
 
 
Appropriateness of Design and Resource Utilization 
 
As discussed earlier, the programme design approach used for the Balkans CMAP was based 
heavily on needs assessments and project selection input from key partners and agencies 
with extensive experience in the local area. Each project involved a risk assessment and 
mitigation analysis, and ongoing monitoring was accomplished through field visits, post 
personnel and regular reporting requirements. The Balkans CMAP evolved through three 
distinct phases, with different degrees of urgency and only limited opportunity to extend 
existing successful projects on a regional basis. This is an approach that deserves further 
consideration in future programme design, however, since the span of control/number of 
projects could conceivably be greatly reduced. Interesting opportunities were presented during 
these programme expansions to try innovative approaches to project design and 
implementation. A case in point was the evolution of the Kosovo mine/UXO clearance projects 
that involved Canadian companies. As discussed in the Kosovo project section, a consultant 
carefully evaluated the 1999 emergency contracts and a more deliberate contracting effort 
was undertaken for 2000 using a comprehensive RFP. The 2000 project was also subject to a 
detailed evaluation, resulting in a new approach for 2001 that was highly successful. The 
major lesson from the Kosovo experience is that normal Canadian contracting processes are 
not well suited to emergency requirements and CIDA is not well equipped for contracting 
Canadian resources during crisis situations. Mechanisms such as Standing Offer Agreements 
or a government-supported agency/NGO may be a useful approach to address this 
requirement.   
 
The CMAP record with regard to resource utilization is also excellent. In the area of prudence 
and probity, the programme officer demanded accountability through diligent project financial 
reviews. This approach resulted in a comprehensive audit of the 2000 IDAC demining project 
and a formal investigation of CIDC’s BiH accounts based on a local allegation of fraud that 
was proven to be unfounded. The CMAP has exploited Canadian capabilities and niche 
competencies in many areas, most notably: DND/CF partnerships in the provision of technical 
experts for institution building; ICI and Queen’s University in victim assistance; CIDC MDD 
training; and Med-Eng for mine/UXO clearance equipment. Variable results were achieved by 
the Kosovo mine clearance contracts but this is an area worthy of more investigation. Indeed, 
the 1999 demining contracts were flawed due to an imposed abbreviated process and key 
lessons were learned and applied the following year. Overall, CMAP resource utilization has 
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been very good and is aptly illustrated by the management, utilization and final disposition of 
the CIDA mine clearance equipment from the Kosovo projects valued at over $550,000 (CAD). 
 
 
Informed and Timely Action 
 
The CMAP was created in the context of a need for timely action and was expanded into 
Kosovo on an even tighter timeline. Thorough preparation and knowledgeable partners 
contributed to the success of the programme and minimized any risks involved. Annual 
monitoring and assessment missions, good project oversight and timely evaluation kept the 
programme on track. Several examples have been citied of proactive intervention by the 
programme officer, and CIDA post personnel played a valuable role in day-to-day surveillance 
and timely response. Notwithstanding this effort, some projects were challenging to manage at 
a distance and without a strong local partner. CIDC reporting was persistently poor and 
particularly in the case of the Croatia MDD centre, problems were not reported in a timely 
fashion. The same was true for the Kosovo demining contracts, which also had to be managed 
directly by CIDA. The majority of projects within the Balkans CMAP, however, were managed 
without difficulty, and good mechanisms existed to mitigate risk and ensure timely response to 
problems, needs or opportunities.  
 
 
Figure 15.  Mine Awareness – Saving Lives and Limbs 
CIDA/CEE Canadian Mine Action Programme in the Balkans Evaluation Report 1998-2003 74 




LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
The following lessons learned and recommendations derive from the list of findings in Part II 
as well as from experience with the CMAP and other similar programmes (related findings 
are shown in brackets): 
 
· Lesson Learned 1. Programme Officers (3, 24, 28, 44) 
 
Successful programme/project selection, design and implementation demand that 
the responsible programme officer be thoroughly familiar with the development area, 
the local issues, and the potential partners and executing agencies. A timely field 
visit or programme/project design mission is indispensable. Expert technical input is 
advisable as well as DFAIT and DND involvement as applicable. Programme officers 
should also maintain an annual contingency amount that can be used to provide 
flexibility, respond to key opportunities, reinforce success or address problems. 
 
Recommendation.  Programme officers must be afforded an early opportunity to 
become familiar with their development area of responsibility and undertake a 
programme/project design mission for defined CMAP initiatives (with 
technical/DFAIT/DND support as applicable). The programme officer should retain 
an annual programme contingency amount, however, it should be committed early 
enough to achieve effective results.  
 
 
· Lesson Learned 2. Programme Design (2, 6, 28, 34, 39, 40 45) 
 
Strong partners and executing agencies with extensive experience and a functioning 
organization in the development area can provide valuable assistance in project 
selection and programme design. This is aptly demonstrated by CIDA’s successful 
CMAP working relationship with UNDP, HI, NPA, SFOR, ITF, HELP, DSL, Mine Tech 
and the Kosovo UNMACC. 
 
Recommendation.  CMAP project selection, design and implementation should take 
full advantage of strong partner relationships to provide advice, local management, 
project monitoring and roll-up reporting. 
 
 
· Lesson Learned 3. Programme Planning Principles (1) 
 
Mine action is a specialized development area and the process of project selection, 
design, planning and implementation would no doubt benefit from a detailed 
programming framework or set of basic planning principles for programme officer 
guidance. These tools would be particularly useful in short-notice development 
scenarios such as Kosovo. 
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Recommendation.  The mine action programming principles are provided later in 
this report and should be refined to provide the basis for the development of a 
framework for mine action programming, in accordance with CIDA’s “Guide for 
Developing Programming Frameworks.” 
 
 
· Lesson Learned 4. Monitoring (28, 51) 
 
Regular field visits by the programme officer to monitor and evaluate projects, 
assess needs, and coordinate with post personnel and partners, was instrumental in 
the effective management of the Balkans CMAP. This was critical to smoothing the 
transition for new and replacement (temporary) personnel. Hands-on familiarity and 
monitoring are indispensable for effective programme design, implementation and 
day-to-day management. 
 
Recommendation.  The programme officer must be afforded the opportunity for 
regular monitoring and assessment field visits.  
 
 
· Lessons Learned 5. Stability of Key Personnel (27) 
 
Changing of key CIDA programme management personnel should be avoided during 
periods of heightened activity or emergency response. If unavoidable, MAP planning 
principles/guidelines, technical support and key resource/contact lists are essential. 
 
Recommendation.  Avoid changing key programme management personnel during 
critical activity or transition periods, such as the Kosovo emergency phase and 
ensure guidelines, technical expertise and key resource/contact lists are available. 
 
 
· Lessons Learned 6. Interdepartmental Cooperation (7, 45, 46) 
 
The Balkans CMAP benefited by successful collaboration between CIDA and DFAIT 
programme officers in all stages of its development, and by the support of DND in 
assessment missions and the provision of technical experts. This relationship should 
be formalized to facilitate better mine action coordination, and the sharing of 
information, resources and lessons learned. 
 
Recommendation.  An inter-departmental mine action committee should be 
established to include: DFAIT/ILX (Mine Action Team); CIDA/MAU and 
branch/geographic mine action programme officers; and DND (NDHQ/J-3 Engineer 
Branch). This committee should meet semi-annually or as needed to review ongoing 
mine action programmes, share lessons and learned, facilitate the exchange of 
information, and share resources and contacts. 
 
 
· Lessons Learned 7. DND Mine Information Centre (46, 47) 
 
A Mine Information Centre (MIC) is located in DND, NDHQ, J-3 Engineer Branch. 
This is a little known ‘local’ resource that can provide useful mine situation 
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summaries, briefings, background information and research on mine contamination 
and mine action programmes throughout the world.  
 
Recommendation.  All mine action programme officers should be aware of and 
make use of this valuable resource. Personnel departing on deployment to mine 
contaminated areas would also benefit from an up-to-date assessment. 
 
 
· Lesson Learned 8. Institutional Support (2, 4, 5, 20, 34, 49) 
 
The critical first step for any mine action programme is the establishment of an 
effective mine action coordination institution (MAC) capable of national planning, 
donor coordination, enforcement of standards, database development and priority 
setting. The Balkans CMAP has excelled in the area of institutional building utilizing a 
close, collaborative approach with UNDP (Croatia, BiH) and UNMAS (Kosovo) to 
select and fund projects critical to the development of national and UN mine action 
coordination structures.  While not as visible as mine/UXO clearance or victim 
assistance, institutional support builds local capacity and will undoubtedly have a 
more valuable and far-reaching impact in ridding a county of mines/UXO. This is an 
area where Canadian management, technical, and mine action expertise and 
experience can make a real difference. 
 
Recommendation.  Canadian mine action interventions should focus initially on 
ensuring the development of strong, capable national or UN mine action coordination 
institutions. This will greatly enhance the effectiveness of the overall mine action 
programme and thus the utility of Canadian investments in other areas of mine 
action. The Balkans CMAP experience also demonstrates the value of institutional 
support in terms of achieving local sustainability. 
 
 
· Lesson Learned 9. Canadian Capacity for Institutional Support (6, 7, 8, 20) 
 
A wealth of technical expertise, and MAP management skills and experience are 
available in Canada within the DND/CF and the private sector. CF technical experts 
have made an extremely valuable and cost-effective contribution to MAC institutional 
capacity building in the Balkans. Private sector expertise includes individuals 
possessing extensive experience in UN/international mine action operations as well 
as companies that specialize in geographic information systems, database 
development and mapping. These resources should be surveyed and considered for 
inclusion as in-kind contributions in the area of MAC institutional support and 
capacity building in future CMAPs.  
 
Recommendation.  The CIDA/MAU should take the lead for all mine action in CIDA 
and should be the focal point for liaison with DFAIT and DND, coordination of 
support for geographic units, consolidation and distribution of lessons learned, and 
the scheduling of joint coordination meetings. It should maintain an up-to-date list of 
MAC institutional support and capacity building resources within the DND/CF and the 
private sector. These resources should be considered during the design and 
development of future mine action programmes. 
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· Lessons Learned 10. Institutional Support – Surveys/Assessments (35) 
 
Early professional surveys and assessments by recognized professional 
organizations such as HI, NPA or GICHD have a valuable impact on institutional 
capacity to focus and coordinate mine action programmes. These include a socio-
economic impact survey, mine awareness and mine victim needs assessments and 
technical surveys for area reduction. Despite their valuable long-term impact and 
relatively low cost, these surveys and assessments are usually generated quite late 
in the evolution of country mine action programmes. 
 
Recommendation.  Canada should focus early support on these valuable mine 
action institution support tools to generate general efficiency and cost-effectiveness 
in mine action programme planning, priority setting and clearance operations. 
Particular attention should be given to an early socio-economic impact analysis and 
the provision of technical survey for rapid area reduction. 
 
 
· Lesson Learned 11.  Partnerships (2, 4, 7, 12, 17, 18, 33, 34, 37) 
 
As noted in Lesson Learned 2, strong partnerships are invaluable for project 
selection and design. This is also true for project implementation, management, 
reporting and timely response, and good partnerships can effectively reduce the 
span of control for programme officers. As a note of caution, however, a strong 
partner organization in the Balkans, such as the UNDP, may not have the same 
responsibilities or capacity in other mine-affected areas of the world.  
 
Recommendation. Strong partner organizations should be selected to reduce span 
of control, ensure timely response, and assist project management, monitoring and 




· Lesson Learned 12.  Mine Clearance (8, 9,10, 11, 48) 
 
For best development assistance value, mine clearance projects should be aimed at 
building indigenous capacity as well as reducing the threat posed by mines/UXO. 
The SFOR/EAF, NPA and APM projects are all good examples of direct support 
providing valuable clearance outputs while increasing vital indigenous mine 
clearance expertise. 
 
Recommendation. For best value in terms of development assistance funding, mine 
clearance projects should have a strong indigenous capacity building component. 
 
 
· Lesson Learned 13.  Mine Clearance – Outputs (8, 10, 11, 19, 22, 23, 24) 
 
Where rapid and effective mine/UXO clearance is a high priority for refugee returns, 
vulnerable populations or critical rehabilitation/reconstruction, then proven NGO 
organizations such as HI, HELP and NPA, or capable contractors like DSL and Mine 
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Tech, produce the most reliable results. CIDA should not attempt to contract 
Canadian mine/UXO clearance companies for emergency response requirements. 
 
Recommendation.  Where urgent mine clearance is required, proven organizations 




· Lessons Learned 14. Mine Clearance – MAC’s (9, 11, 25, 49) 
 
Direct funding of MACs for centralized assets or mine clearance by in-theatre 
contracts worked well for the UNMACC in Kosovo. This may not be transferable to 
other operational areas based on the capability of the MAC to let and manage 
contracts, availability of suitable resources, local laws and the like. This approach 
should not be used for national MACs such as CROMAC or the BHMAC due to 
questionable contracting procedures, uncertain reliability and inability to monitor 
performance and outputs. 
 
Recommendation.  Direct funding of UNMACC’s for centralized assets or in-theatre 
mine clearance contracts has great potential benefit but must be weighed on a case-
by-case basis. National MACs should not be directly funded for contracting local 
mine/UXO clearance organizations. 
 
 
· Lesson Learned 15. Mine Clearance – National Organizations (11) 
 
Supporting the humanitarian demining capacity of national military organizations can 
be tricky from philosophical, security and practical standpoints. There is a traditional 
international reluctance in this area. Under certain circumstances, however, it can 
serve foreign policy and development goals such as the democratization of armed 
forces, providing alternative skills for former combatants, peace building, and 
confidence and security building. The overriding requirement is the ability to exert 
some measure of control over the military organizations involved, as is the case with 
SFOR and the EAF, and KFOR and the KPC.  
 
Recommendation.  Under the right circumstances, support to national military 
organizations to develop humanitarian demining capabilities should be pursued. 
 
 
· Lesson Learned 16. Mine Clearance – Canadian Capabilities (8, 9, 12, 21, 22, 
23, 24, 30, 37, 40, 48) 
 
Canadian-based mine clearance organizations will invariably experience difficulties 
establishing complex projects in remote locations. Nonetheless, some unique 
Canadian private sector mine/UXO clearance and other mine action capabilities do 
exist and should be exploited. Careful planning, including a well-defined scope, clear 
outputs/deliverables and detailed reporting requirements are needed. User agency 
design input is also required (UNMAS, UNDP, UNOPs, MAC) and contracting using 
the RFP process normally required a minimum of six months. Significant Canadian 
‘niche’ capabilities exist in the area of mine action and these should be exploited. 
The Kosovo Y2000 Cdn mine clearance RFP could be used as a model for larger 
CIDA/CEE Canadian Mine Action Programme in the Balkans Evaluation Report 1998-2003 79 
projects, or portions of it for smaller contracted undertakings. As well, consideration 
should be given to the use of ‘standing offer agreements’ to acquire Canadian ‘niche’ 
mine action capabilities particularly in rapid response situations. Finally, any 
Canadian contracted organization should be tied to a partner organization such as 
the UNDP or UNMACC for local reporting and oversight. 
 
Recommendation.  The engagement of Canadian mine action 
resources/capabilities should be considered as part of mine action programme 
planning. A minimum of six-months lead-time should be allowed for normal 
contracting and standing offer agreements should be investigated to facilitate 
acquiring niche capabilities in emergency situations. This needs to be supported by a 
comprehensive, countrywide survey of current Canadian private sector and 
institutional mine action capability. 
 
 
· Lesson Learned 17.  Mine Clearance – CIDC (12, 37) 
 
The CIDC MDD project has experienced ongoing problems and the extension of the 
project to develop a MDD programme for CROMAC encountered difficulties the 
outset. Also, the pending US Department of State–funded creation of a BiH regional 
canine/MDD training centre, significantly jeopardizes the viability of the CIDC project. 
Ironically, the operation in Trebinje is beginning to show definite signs of 
improvement. Management and reporting are better, outputs have increased, 
revenues are being realized and the CIDC BHMAC MDD accreditations are amongst 
the highest of all organizations. On the other hand, the SFOR EAF ability to utilize 
and maintain their MDD teams has been questioned and CROMAC has no plan for 
sustaining the 10 MDD teams that it will receive in the near future. 
 
Recommendation.  While this project has developed significant specialized 
indigenous mine clearance capacity, its sustainability is in serious doubt. The 
existing MDD teams will continue to need refresher training and re-accreditation 
support; however, this may not be a sufficient level of effort to sustain the operation.  
The impact of the new BiH regional MDD facility should be followed closely, CIDC 
should seek additional revenue opportunities such as contracting out to the SFOR 




· Lesson Learned 18. Mine Awareness (13, 14, 15, 26, 35) 
 
Mine awareness is a vital component in the early stages of a mine action programme 
to protect vulnerable populations, mine affected communities and returning refugees. 
To be effective, however, it must be centrally coordinated, targeted, and consistent 
and employ the right delivery mechanisms. A mine awareness needs assessment is 
an invaluable tool if professionally done (e.g. GICHD Croatian assessment) and an 
organization such as UNICEF is best equipped to help coordinate a national 
programme. Finally, local mine awareness is an integral component of most 
demining operations and should be tracked as an output in CMAP funded mine 
clearance projects. 
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Recommendation.  The selection and design of CMAP funded mine awareness 
interventions should be informed by advice from UNDP/UNMAS, UNICEF and the 
responsible MAC as appropriate. For local coordination, QA and oversight, mine 
awareness funding contributions should be through a senior partner such as 
UNICEF. And, mine awareness undertaken by demining projects should be reported 
as a separate output, including the number of recipients.  
 
 
· Lesson Learned 19. Mine Victim Assistance (16, 26, 35, 39) 
 
Victim assistance appears to be an area where Canada can make a valuable 
contribution. The ICI and Queen’s ICACBR projects have developed strong local 
networks; sustainable capability, advocacy and good reach in terms of beneficiaries. 
The ITF project, on the other hand, had few beneficiaries and achieved no 
sustainable capacity. The Rovinj mine victim project in Croatia has achieved good 
visibility for mine victims because of the patron but it likewise has had limited impact 
in terms of beneficiaries. The current plan for its significant expansion doesn’t appear 
to be sustainable and should be viewed with caution. ICRC is the leading 
international agency in the area of mine victim assistance and any future CMAP 
projects in this area should be informed by ICRC advice and partnership, and include 
local national disabled persons’ associations. 
 
Recommendation.  CIDA should continue to monitor the results of the ICI and 
Queen’s CBR projects with a view to including them as a component in future CMAP 
planning. ICRC input and/or partnership as well as local national disabled persons’ 
associations should routinely be included in the design and implementation of mine 
victim assistance projects. 
 
 
· Lesson Learned 20. CMAP – Regional Approach (26, 44, 49, 50) 
 
The Balkans CMAP would have benefited from a more regional approach particularly 
from the standpoint of programme management and span of control. This could have 
been achieved through programming partnerships with strong regional organizations. 
This would serve to reduce the number of individual projects that must than be 
directly managed by the programme officer (e.g. UNDP sub-projects in support of 
CROMAC). This would also facilitate any need for a rapid regional expansion of the 
programme, as in the case of the Kosovo emergency phase. This approach could 
also work in other areas such as Africa where there are mine-affected countries 
bordering each other, straddled by the same international agencies and NGOs. 
 
Recommendation.  Planning for future mine action programmes should include a 
review of opportunities for employing a regional approach to reduce the span of 
control and simplify project management. This approach could be extended to 
contracting mine action resources to provide services on a regional basis. 
 
· Lesson Learned 21. Reporting (19, 33, 42, 43) 
 
Inadequate project reporting was a recurring theme from the CIDA perspective and a 
source of frustration for many of the partners and executing agencies. Some of the 
reporting needs were also not satisfied in terms of key statistics such as outputs 
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(number of mines/UXO, area cleared, beneficiaries), which were usually not 
disaggregated to show gender impact and the like. Some of the Canadian 
organizations experienced problems with the reporting requirements so it is 
understandable that local organizations found it difficult. 
 
Recommendation.  Reporting requirements should be reviewed and simplified 
where feasible. As well, specific requirements, such as output statistics, must be 
expressed in precise terms and quantified where possible. 
 
 
· Lesson Learned 22. ITF – Leveraged Funding (17, 18) 
 
The use of the ITF to channel CMAP project funding triggered matching funds that 
increased the overall mine action effort and in some cases complemented the 
Canadian initiative. The results for the ITF landmine victim project in Slovenia were 
less satisfactory but, for the most part, this was a successful partnership approach 
that accomplished the aim of increasing donor support. 
 
Recommendation.  Future leveraged funding mechanisms such as the ITF, should 
be utilized to the extent possible as long as it meshes with or complements CMAP 
priorities and key partner relationships.   
 
 
· Lesson Learned 23. Foreign Policy Perspective (45, 47, 49) 
 
From a foreign policy perspective, the utility of the CMAP may have been enhanced 
by concentrating on niche areas of Canadian competency, particularly institutional 
capacity building. This should have been combined with specific, targeted initiatives 
in mine /UXO clearance aimed at building indigenous capacity such as the 
SFOR/EAF projects, support of HI/APM and NPA, and the provision of UNMACC 
centralized assets and key equipment donations. 
 
Recommendation.  CMAP planning must be informed by foreign policy goals, as 
well as CIDA development objectives and priorities. These parameters must guide 
how the programme is to be tailored and how the outputs will be achieved. 
 
 
· Lesson Learned 24. Project Planning – Milestones and Exit Strategy (10, 39, 40, 
43, 44, 51) 
 
CMAP contracts and funding agreements should clearly define key milestones, 
outputs/deliverables and reporting requirements. Funding contributions should be 
tied to deliverables in the form of progress payments or holdbacks and a defined exit 
strategy should be included for all projects. This would have motivated Med-Eng in 
the replacement of equipment and CIDC in terms of appropriate planning, reporting 
and achievement of outputs. 
 
Recommendation.  CMAP funding agreements and contracts should include key 
milestones, deliverables and reporting requirements as well as a holdback 
mechanism for payments and a defined exit strategy. The exit strategy should be 
geared to terminate unsuccessful projects and to the achievement of output 
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· Lesson Learned 25. Multi-Year Funding Reliability (5, 6, 31, 38) 
 
Funding predictability, consistency and the lack of strings or caveats were described 
as the hallmarks of CMAP funding contributions. In a few cases, however (Queen’s 
CBR II, NPA), delays in the notification of funding jeopardized project 
implementation. To the extent possible, projects should be designed with funding 
commitments over a two to three-year period to enable projects to mature and the 
results to be achieved, including sustainability. This commitment should be tempered 
by the need to achieve defined deliverables, and satisfy reporting and accountability 
requirements as outlined above. 
 
Recommendation.  CMAP project funding should be designated in annual 
increments in advance to, allow longer-term projects to mature and achieve results 
subject to the achievement of defined deliverables. 
 
 
· Lesson Learned 26. Communication (39, 41) 
 
Major development initiatives such as the CMAP should include a comprehensive 
communication strategy and plan. This plan should provide guidance for responding 
to incidents and other queries, and it should define proactive mechanisms for raising 
awareness of the programme and CLF. 
 
Recommendation.  Comprehensive mine action programmes should include a well-
defined communication strategy and a plan for reactive and proactive media and 
public relations communication.  
 
 
· Lesson Learned 27. The Mine Action Approach of Canadian Allies (31, 48) 
 
Canadian allies such as Norway, the USA and the UK have all developed unique 
mechanisms or approaches to provide support for international mine action needs. 
These range from Norway with a government sponsored NGO to various funding, 
contracting and in-kind donations sponsored by the UK (DFID) and the US 
Department of State, Office of Humanitarian Demining Programmes. It would be 
instructive to review these different approaches to determine if it would be beneficial 
to adapt successful mechanisms for Canadian use. 
 
Recommendation.  CIDA should undertake a review of different national 
approaches to mine action programming and funding to determine if there are 
successful mechanisms that can be adapted for Canadian use.  
 
 




The evaluation of the Balkans CMAP was focused on the key results achieved and lessons 
learned, with particular emphasis on validating the design, implementation and effectiveness 
of the numerous projects that comprised the programme. The lessons derived from the 
evaluation are intended to improve programme development, and project selection, design 
and implementation. To this end, the evaluation has defined a number of principles’ that can 
be used as the basis for the development of a formal programming framework. The purpose 
of this framework would be to provide strategic orientation and design guidance for future 
CIDA MAP initiatives in the Balkans or in other mine affected regions of the world. 
 
Overall, the evaluation has shown that the CIDA Balkans CMAP must be viewed as a 
significant success. The programme began in response to a push of funding furnished by 
the CLF in 1998. It was initially confined to Bosnia and Herzegovina and was designed to 
support or complement ongoing CIDA development assistance initiatives in the country. 
From a few initial projects, the programme was quickly expanded a year later in response to 
the cessation of hostilities in Kosovo and again in 2000 with the change of regime in Croatia. 
It therefore evolved over a very short period into a significant regional programme, totaling 
some $20m (CAD) and included a large number and variety of projects covering all of the 
key areas of mine action. 
 
While it was a difficult programme to manage, it did represent successful collaboration 
between CIDA and DFAIT in all its stages. As well, it involved beneficial support by the 
DND/CF and included innovative use of Canadian expertise and capabilities in institutional 
support, mine clearance, victim assistance and MDD training. The programme was 
responsive to political and local developments, and was consistent with the Canadian 
foreign policy goal in the Balkans to promote regional stability after years of strife. The 
CMAP raised Canada’s profile and credibility in Europe, promoted Canadian values and 
reinforced the Ottawa Convention by linkage to Canada’s aggressive support of mine action 
in the Balkans. 
 
The CMAP was also supportive of CIDA’s development assistance strategy to secure peace 
and prosperity in the region, as well as its related development priorities and crosscutting 
themes. The mine action initiatives were undertaken to protect vulnerable populations and 
communities, and to facilitate humanitarian action, peace building, reconstruction and socio-
economic development. The programme achieved particular success in the area of 
institution building and in the development of sustainable, indigenous mine/UXO clearance 
capacity. The CMAP mine awareness and victim assistance projects achieved varied results 
although the ICI and Queen’s CBR projects standout for their success in terms of reach and 
sustainability. The programme’s innovative attempts to employ Canadian demining and 
MDD training capabilities also received mixed reviews. Nonetheless, the Balkans CMAP 
was widely applauded for its focus, reliability and achievements. The review of the 
programme results and key success factors was also very favourable and a number of 
important lessons have been derived from this evaluation that will greatly assist in the 
design of future programmes of its type. 
 
The design of future CMAPs must first and foremost be informed by a clear understanding 
of Canadian foreign policy goals and development assistance strategy in the region 
concerned. The value-added dimension is also an important consideration and in most 
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cases this will lead to a focus on institution building. The creation of an effective mine action 
coordination centre is vital to the development and coordination of a successful and 
sustainable national mine action programme. This is an area where Canada has achieved a 
particular impact and has much to offer. Next in importance is the building of sustainable 
indigenous mine/UXO clearance capacity. The use of international NGOs or contractors 
should not subordinate the goal of sustainability unless there are emergency requirements 
for which are the best suited. Mine awareness and victim assistance initiatives should be 
considered but should always be coordinated with lead agencies such as UNICEF and the 
ICRC, and must be consistent with MAC priorities, themes and standards as applicable. 
 
There are many lessons learned from this evaluation that bear repeating. Mine action 
programming in general benefits from close collaboration and sharing of programme 
information between CIDA, DFAIT and DND. Any new CIDA programme initiatives must 
include input from DFAIT (foreign policy) and DND/MIC (mine situation assessments) as 
well as key international organizations such as UNMAS, UNDP, UNICEF, ICRC, engaged 
NGOs such as NPA, and UN or national MACs. Project selection, design and 
implementation must include reliable local partners, and programmes must be regionalized 
to the extent possible to reduce the span of control and ease the task of programme 
management. Project design and contracts/donor agreements must include precise 
milestones, deliverables (outputs) and reporting requirements with tied funding in the form of 
progress payments and holdbacks. As well, every project must have a well-defined exit 
strategy. Finally, programmes with the magnitude and impact of the Balkans CMAP must 
include a clearly defined communication strategy, with a plan that provides guidance for 
both reactive and proactive communication. This would greatly assist mangers in 
responding to incidents or queries, and facilitate international and domestic awareness of 









As discussed in the evaluation, there are many factors that must be considered in designing 
an effective mine action programme. Most important, it must be remembered that there is no 
mine action template available that will suit all situations or be easily adapted from one 
contaminated country to another because the variables are too diverse. This was aptly 
demonstrated by the differences between individual Balkan states in what amounts to a 
relatively small regional footprint. These differences are magnified when one looks at other 
mine-affected countries such as Angola, Ethiopia, Cambodia or Afghanistan. Nonetheless, 
there are some fundamental considerations that can serve to guide future mine action 
programme development. A number of these have been derived from the lessons learned 
and recommendations above and are presented below as proposed ‘principles’ for the 
development of Canadian mine action programmes. These principles can also form the 
basis for the development of a mine action-programming framework. As recommended 
above, it may be desirable to review the approach some of our allies use (NOR, UK, USA) 
for developing and implementing development assistance initiatives in the area of 
humanitarian mine action.  
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The principles are necessarily general, as they may need to be applied in a broad range of 
circumstances. Many mine-affected countries in the world have some degree of international 
and local intervention initiatives already underway. At the same time, mine/UXO 
contamination continues in areas of strife and some countries have only recently emerged 
from years of conflict. The maturity of mine action in a given area will greatly influence the 





1. The development of mine action programmes must be: guided by Canada’s 
foreign policy goals, consistent with CIDA’s development assistance strategy and 
objectives, and informed by a realistic mine situation analysis and needs 
assessment. This implies a collaborative effort between CIDA, DFAIT and DND 
including use of the CF/MIC and other expert technical support as required. 
 
2. Input and guidance should be obtained from key international organizations and 
lead agencies including UNMAS, UNDP, UNOPS, UNICEF, GICHD, ICRC, UN 
or coalition military, and engaged international NGOs. 
 
3. Mine action programme officers must make themselves thoroughly familiar with 
the proposed programme area, the mine action structure in place, the principal 
international organizations engaged in mine action, the status of the mine action 
programme, the key issues and the identified areas of greatest need. A field visit 
is indispensable and should include DFAIT and DND representation, and 
technical support as required. When a programme is first initiated, especially in 
short- notice planning situations, strong consideration should be given, if feasible, 
to the use of established, experienced and competent in-place partner 
organizations to assist in project definition, design and implementation. As well, 
programme officers should not be changed at critical junctures during the design 
and implementation of significant mine action programmes. 
 
4. In highly technical areas such as mine action, it is highly desirable that the CIDA 
programme management team be provided with the services of a technical 
expert/advisor. 
 
5. Experience has shown that strong partner organizations with extensive 
experience in the area should be engaged to assist in project selection and 
design as well as implementation and monitoring. Every attempt should be made 
to reduce the span of control and where applicable, to develop programmes on a 
regional basis. 
 
6. Canadian mine action programming should always focus on the ‘value-added’ 
dimension; the most benefit for the development assistance investment. In most 
cases, Canada should concentrate on institutional capacity building as a first 
priority. It is a proven area for Canadian intervention that achieves far reaching, 
and highly cost-effective results and impact. This support could involve CF and/or 
Canadian private sector technical experts as in-kind contributions, and should 
include management and technical expertise, the provision of database and 
mapping support including training and equipment, technical survey and area 
reduction support, QA, standards, vital needs assessments and support for a 
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socio-economic impact survey. Mine/UXO clearance support should be focused 
on the development of sustainable indigenous capacity and could include the 
provision of specialized equipment, vehicles and other assets. Mine victim 
assistance and mine awareness projects must be carefully considered in terms of 
value and impact, and should be approached through multi-lateral channels such 
as the ICRC and UNICEF to ensure adequate coordination. The use of Canadian 
organizations such as ICI and Queen’s ICACBR and the proper selection and 
training of local executing agencies should also be vetted by these lead agencies 
to ensure coordination and best value.  
 
7. Canadian mine action capabilities should not be dismissed out-of-hand; a 
successful operation will provide enhanced visibility, develop Canada’s unique 
private sector capabilities and contribute to the economy. To this end, CIDA 
should develop and maintain a list of related Canadian mine action capabilities 
including CF technical experts, private sector organizations, public institutions, 
NGOs and qualified individuals/consultants. 
 
8. Crisis situations require a timely response to unpredictable events. This can be 
facilitated by the development of mechanisms to quickly fund critical resources to 
meet the most important needs in response to the inevitable pressures that will 
be brought to bear. Such mechanisms could include up-to-date inventories of 
Canadian mine action resources, emergency contracting provisions, Standing 
Offer Agreements and government supported agencies with standby 
agreements. 
 
9. Any plan to contract Canadian capabilities will require care in the development of 
a suitable RFP/Request for Expressions of Interest. Ample time should be 
allocated for the contract process – a minimum of six months lead-time to the 
desired contract award date. The use of a standing offer agreement should be 
investigated to facilitate the timely engagement of Canadian resources/niche 
capabilities in rapid response situations.  
 
10. The Y2000 Kosovo Mine Clearance RFP or portions of it could be used as a 
model for future mine action contracting initiatives. 
 
11. Any mine action contract or project contribution agreement should include 
definite milestones, clearly defined deliverables (outputs), and simplified but 
precise reporting requirements (with explicit guidance on statistics such as 
amount and type of area cleared, ordnance destroyed, number of beneficiaries 
including age and gender information, and environmental impact). Grants should 
also be considered on a case-by-case basis, particularly for clearly defined 
requirements with a reliable partner where timeliness and simplicity are 
paramount considerations. 
 
12. Every mine action project should have a clearly defined exit strategy included as 
part of the contract or contribution agreement to avoid funding dependency. This 
demands the definition of an objective output such as the completion of a report, 
acquisition of equipment, training completion or the attainment of 
sustainability/self-sufficiently. 
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13. In addition to an exit strategy, mine action projects should have progress 
payments and holdback amounts tied to key milestones, deliverables and 
satisfactory project reporting. This is common practice in industry and would 
encourage better performance. 
 
14. Projects should be designed to ensure predictable and secure funding 
commitments of reasonable amounts and duration to permit projects to mature 
and achieve the expected results without lapses in funding that could jeopardize 
the initiative as a whole. 
 
15. Projects should be designed with sufficient built-in flexibility to respond to 
changing circumstances, exploit opportunities in a timely way, reinforce success 
or ’terminate for cause’. 
 
16. A contingency amount based on the size of the programme should be retained in 
the budget for discretionary spending (nominally 10 percent). This contingency 
should be included in the approval process and final commitment decisions 
should be made within four months of year-end or the funds should be re-
allocated. This contingency would offer flexibility to the programme officer to 
exploit opportunities, reinforce success or address problem areas. A back up list 
of project with short execution times should be available for easy re-allocation of 
funds. 
 
17. A significant mine action programme should include a clearly defined 
communication strategy and detailed plan to guide both reactive and proactive 
communication requirements. This would encourage and facilitate better 
exploitation of Canada’s mine action successes and allow a controlled, positive 
and timely response to media inquiries and incidents. 
 
18. A significant CMAP should include sufficient financial resources to permit regular 
monitoring and assessment missions (minimum of once per year) by the 
programme officer as well as specific evaluations as required. These are 
essential to understand the local environment, build a working relationship with 
post personnel and key partners, monitor progress and facilitate timely 

























- Meeting with David Rushton 














- Meeting with Alison Clement, Program Coordinator, Mine Action Team, DFAIT/ILX 














CIDC, MDD Training Facility, Skabrnja 
- Meeting and site tour with Sid Murray, CIDC Chief Instructor plus CROMAC Liaison Officer 
 
CROMAC, Project Site, Zadar Highway 





CROMAC Headquarters, Sisak 
- Meeting with Oto Jungwirth, Head of CROMAC; Miltenko Vahtaric, Head of Finance; Nikola 
Pankovic, A/Director Planning, Analysis and R&D; Mirko Invanusic,  A/Director International 
Relations; Ljiljana Zalic-Amiric, Mine Awareness and Mine Victim Assistance Adviser; and 
Harald Wie, UNDP Senior Technical Advisor 
 
ITF for Demining and Mine Victim Assistance  
- Meeting with Goran Gacnik, Deputy Director; and Eva Veble, Head of international Relations  
 
UNHCR, Zagreb 
- Meeting with Gunther Scheske, Chief of Mission and Field Coordinator; Mario Paulovic, 






Croatian Association of Mine Victims (CAMV) / Rovinj Project 
- Meeting with Madame Plestina, Prime Minister’s wife and Special Advisor for Mine Action to 





Croatian Red Cross, Zagreb 
- Meeting with Vijorka Roseg, MD, Program Manager for Mine-Risk Education. 
 
UNDP, Zagreb 
- Meeting with Tanja Rzehak, National Program Officer; and Davor Brkic, incoming National 
Program Officer 
 
Norwegian Embassy, Zagreb 
- Meeting with Knut Toraasen, Ambassador; and Henrick Malvaerk, Political Officer 
 
European Commission, Zagreb 
- Meeting with Alfons Peeters, Project Manager 
 
Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), Zagreb 
- Meeting with Paul Collinson, NPA Program Manager 
 
Canadian Embassy 

















Canadian Embassy, Sarajevo 
- Meeting with Emil Baran, Counselor/ Head of Technical Cooperation; Almir Tanovic, Program 
Officer; and Elma Sarajlic, Assistant  
 
BiH Demining Commission, Sarajevo 
- Meeting with Darko Vidovic, Commissioner; and Dragis a Stankovic, Commissioner 
 
APM Demining Operation, Sarajevo Canton 
- Visit to demining project completion ceremony with Mayor of Sarajevo 
 
BHMAC, Sarajevo 
- Meeting with Dusan Gauran, Director 
- Meeting with David Rowe, UNDP Chief Technical Advisor 
 
Embassy of USA, Sarajevo 





UN Office of the High Representative (OHR) 
- Meeting with Rear Admiral Hugh Edleston, Military Representative to the High Representative; 
and Major Robert Strazisar, Staff Officer  
 
SFOR Engineer Branch 
- Meeting with Lieutenant Colonel Jim Greaves, Chief of SFOR/EAF Demining Program; and 









Housing Verification and Monitoring Unit 















CIDC MDD Program, Trebinje 





CIDC MDD Program, Trebinje 
- Meeting with Oliver Mitreuski, Operations Manager 
 
SFOR EAF Demining, Republica Srpska 
- Site tour of EAF demining operation west of Trebinje 
 





Queen’s University, ICA CBR, Sarajevo 
- Meeting with Malcom Peat, Executive Director, ICACBR; Sanela Sadikovic, Education 
Coordinator and Nazif Bogdanic, Goradze Peer Support Group Leader  
 
Handicap International (HI), Sarajevo 
- Meeting with Emmanuel Sauvage, Director; and Almedina kovic, National Operations 
Coordinator 
  
BiH Government, Ministry of European Integration 
- Meeting with Nedeljko Maslesa, Assistant Minister 
 
NPA, Sarajevo 





International Children’s’ Institute (ICI) 
- Meeting with Dr. Mirsad Muftic, Rehabilitation Specialist/Program Director, Mevlida Ovuka, 
Prof., Program Coordinator; and Samra Tozo, Program Officer 
 
HELP/EC Civil Protection Organization (CPO) 






- Meeting with Henrick Kolstrup, UNDP Resident Representative; and Seid Turkovic, Portfolio 
Manager Institutional Capacity Building 
- Meeting with David Rowe, UNDP Chief Technical Advisor to BHMAC 
 
HI/Akcija Protiv Mina (APM), Sarajevo 






















UNMIK / Directorate for Civil Protection (DCP) 
- Meeting with Mr. Steve Saunders, UNMIK, EOD Management Operations Officer 
HI UNMIK Mine Assistance Team  
- Meeting with Aidan Thornton, Program Manager 






- Meeting with Drito Ukmata, Director of Kosovo operations, HI 
 
Canadian Mission 
- Meeting with Tamara Sorger, Head of Technical Cooperation; and Iliriana Gashi, CIDA 






Depart Pristina to London, UK 
 
December 5 – 7 
 
 













CIDA / CEEB 







- Meeting with Evaluation Team continued 






Depart Ottawa to Vancouver 
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A D V I S O R 
 
Canadian Mine Action Program in the Balkans  
(Bosnia & Herzegovina, Kosovo and Croatia) 





1.0  REFERENCE 
 
 The RZE/CEE Branch Mine Action Advisor for the Balkans' overall Terms of Reference for 
the duration of the contract period are described in full detail in the Advisor's Contract 
Appendix B - Statement of Services and are valid and in effect (QM/ Z020326).   
 
 
2.0  FOURTH MAJOR ASSIGNMENT - EVALUATION of the CANADIAN MINE ACTION 
PROGRAM in the BALKANS 1998/99 - 2002/03  
 
 The Advisor is asked to conduct an evaluation of the Canadian Mine Action Program (CMAP) 
in the Balkans 1998/99 - 2002/03, which include integrated country programs in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Kosovo and Croatia.  
 
 
3.0  PURPOSE OF THE ASSIGNMENT 
 
 The main purpose of the evaluation is to assess the performance of the CMAP in the Balkans 
(both in terms of development and operations) and to identify lessons learned challenges and 
opportunities for future programming. The work will focus on the assessment of the program 
as a whole. 
 
  3.1 Overview  
 
The evaluation of the CMAP in the Balkans will focus on the key results achieved and 
lessons learned. The emphasis is on validating the design, implementation and effectiveness 
of the numerous projects that comprise the program. The lessons derived from the evaluation 
will be focused on improving program development, and project selection and design for 
similar MAP initiatives in the future. The aim is to produce programming principles that will 
provide strategic orientation for future mine action decisions, including the definition of 
preferred areas for Canadian intervention, i.e. Canada’s mine action ‘niche’.    
 
 
4.0  METHODOLOGY / DESCRIPTION OF SERVICES 
 
The evaluation is to be conducted using CIDA’s Evaluation Guide, 2000, and the Framework 
of Results and Key Success Factors, as tools for the assessment of the results. The work will 
be structured to include two distinct parts.   
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4.1 CMAP Balkans Project Performance Review:  
 
The first part of this evaluation is to review of the projects and their progress towards results 
consisting of a brief analysis of the 36 projects (45 sub-projects), grouped by country and 
thematic area of programming. The evaluation will include review of CIDA documentation as 
well as direct consultation with CIDA HQ and post personnel, beneficiaries, local authorities, 
executing agency personnel and other stakeholders. This review will take into consideration 
the following:  
 
a. consistency with CEE’s program objectives and with cross-cutting themes;  
b. consistency with CIDA’s priorities of individual security, economic and social 
development, and sustainability; and 
c. what worked and what didn’t work in terms of project design, planning, implementation 
and reporting (management factors and design factors), along with an assessment of the 
capacity of the executing agencies, the synergies and partnerships. 
 
 4.2 CMAP Balkans Program Performance Review:  
 
The second part of this evaluation is to conduct an assessment of the overall program 
performance consisting of a review of the program implemented in each country with 
comparisons among the types of programs across the target countries. The program review 
will focus on: 
 
a. development results (focusing on the achievement of results, cost-effectiveness, 
relevance and the degree of sustainability achieved) and the success factors (including 
appropriateness of design, resource utilization, and informed and timely action); 
b. strengths and weaknesses, focusing on what worked and what didn’t work in terms of 
program design, planning, implementation, management and reporting; and, 
c. challenges and lessons learned, focusing on programme-level development and 
implementation with a view to recommending a framework for future programming.  
 
     
5.0  EVALUATION TEAM - ROLES & RESPONSIBILITY  
 
The evaluation team is comprised of the Evaluation Manager, Lisanne Garceau-Bednar, 
Senior Program Officer, Peace and Security, Eastern Adriatic Division, Central and Eastern 
Europe Branch; Evaluator/Technical Advisor, Roger St. John from St. John & Associates 
Projects Inc; Performance Review Advisor, Claudia Marcondes; plus a Research Assistant, 
Jeff Naylor.  
 
The CEE-RZE Demining Technical Expert-Advisor, Mr. Roger St. John, is the lead evaluator. 
As such, he has the lead responsibility for the production of the CMAP Balkans Evaluation 
Report.  Detailed responsibilities of each team members are as follows: 
 
a. Lisanne Garceau-Bednar, CIDA Evaluation Manager, has overall responsibility and 
accountability for the evaluation. She is responsible for overseeing and controlling the 
evaluation process, providing guidance and direction throughout all phases of execution 
and approving all deliverables. She will conduct a field evaluation mission to the Balkans 
to collect information (Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina).  
 
b. Roger St. John, CIDA Demining Technical Advisor, is responsible for conducting the 
evaluation, including the day-to-day management of operations, review of program 
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documentation, development of the workplan, regular progress reporting to CIDA's 
evaluation manager, and the preparation of the evaluation report. As well, he will 
participate in the field evaluation mission to the Balkans to collect information and provide 
evaluation technical support (Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo). He will 
elaborate a workplan on the broad parameters initially set out in the evaluation, by adding 
precision, scope and refinements to the operational planning.   
 
c. Claudia Marcondes, Performance Review Advisor, is responsible for providing expert 
program evaluation advice to the team in the areas of results measurement and 
professional evaluation methodologies. She will review relevant program documentation 
to extract key elements such as expectations, results, issues and lessons learned. She 
also will provide input to the evaluation workplan and is responsible for the development 
of a comprehensive evaluation questionnaire for key project partners in the Balkans, in 
order to confirm project results and obtain critical follow up information regarding the 
impact of the program on the defined beneficiary population.  
 
d. Jeff Naylor, Research Assistant, is responsible for assisting in the review of all 
documentation related to projects that comprised the Balkans CMAP, with a view to 
providing a comprehensive summary including key project parameters, results achieved, 
issues and lessons learned. This review will be reflected in a set of key results tables that 
will provide a comprehensive summary of results by country and thematic mine action 










FIELD MISSION - LIST OF CONTACTS 
 
 
CROATIA Canadian Embassy, Zagreb, Croatia Tel:  385-1-488-1235 
 Vanja Sikirica Fax: 385-1-488-1230 
 CIDA, Technical Cooperation Consultant e-mail: vanja.sikirica@dfait-maeci.gc.ca 
   
 Croatian Mine Action Center Tel: + 385 44/554-110 
 Oto Jungwirth Fax: + 385 44/554-111 
 Head of CROMAC e-mail: oto.jungwirth@hcr.hr 
   
 Mine Action Centre Tel: ++ 385-44-554-109 
 Miljenko Vahtaric Fax: ++ 385 44/554-138 
 Head of Financial Department e-mail:  mvahtaric@hcr.hr 
   
 Croatian Mine Action Centre Tel: +385-44-554-103 
 Mirko Ivanušic Fax: +385-44-554-142 
 Assistant Director for International Relations  e-mail: mirko.ivanusic@hch.hr 
   
 Croatian Mine Action Centre Tel: ++ 385 44/544-144 
 Ljiljana Calic-Žmiric Fax:  ++ 385 44/544-142 
 Mine Awareness & Mine Victims Assis tance Adviser  
   
 United Nations Development Program  Tel: 385 44/530-791 
 Harald Wie Fax: 385 44/534-773 
 Senior Technical Advisor/CROMAC e-mail: haraldw@unopsmail.org 
   
 United Nations Development Program  
Representative Office Croatia 
Tel: 385 1 3712 681 
 Tanja Ržehak Fax: 385 1 3712 634 
 National Program Officer e-mail: tanja.rzechak@undp.org 
   
 International Trust Fund  
for Demining and Mine Victims Assistance 
Tel:  +386 1 479 65 86 
 Eva Veble Fax:  +386 1 479 65 90 
 Head of Department for International Relations  e-mial: veble@itf-fund.si 
   
 International Trust Fund  
for Demining and Mine Victims Assistance 
Tel:  +386 1 4796 580 
 Goran Gacnik Fax:  +386 1 4796 590 
 Deputy Director e-mail: gacnik@itf-fund.si 
   
 European Union Tel:  +385 1 4895 581 
 Alfons Peeters  Fax:  +385 1 4896 555 
 Project Manager e-mail: alfons.peeters@cec.eu.int 
   
 Norwegian Embassy Tel:  4922 829 
 Knut Tøraasen  
 Ambassador of Norway  
   
   
 Norwegian People’s Aid  
Mine Action Program  
Tel:  +385 23 68 22 00 
 Paul J. Collinson Fax:  +385 23 68 22 01 
 Program Manager e-mail:  paulcollinson@npaid.hr 
   
 Hrvatska Udruga Žrtava Mina  Tel:  01/3454-304 
 C-2
Croatian Mine Victim Association 
 Martina Beloševic e-mail: martina.belosevic@huzm.hr 
 Tajnica  
   
 Republic of Croatia 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Tel:  +385 1 45 97 708 
 Dijana Plestina, PhD Fax: +385 1 45 69 971 
 Advisor to the Minister for Mine Action  
   
 United Nations High Commissioner 
For Refugees  
 
Tel:  385 1 3713 508 
 Maro Pavlovic Fax:  385 1 3713 442 
 Associate Field Officer e-mail: pavlovic@unhcr.ch 
   
 United Nations High Commissioner 
For Refugees  
Tel:  385 44 523 411 
 Günther Scheske Fax:  385 44 523 684 
 Head of Office & Field Coordinator e-mail: scheske@unhcr.ch 
   
 United Nations  
High Commissioner for Refugees  
Tel:  +385 1 3713 441 
 Lada Blagaic  Fax:  +385 1 3713 484 
 Associate Program Officer e-mail: blagaic@unhcr.ch 
   
 Croaitan Red Cross Tel:  + 385 1 46 55 814 
 Vijorka Roseg, MD Fax: + 385 1 46 55 363 
 Program Manager e-mail: vijorka.roseg@hck.hr 
   
 Canadian Embassy Tel: 3 85 1 488 1214 
 Dražen Focic Fax:  385 1 488 1230 
 Technical Coooperation Program Officer e-mail: drazen.focic@dfait-maeci.gc.ca 
   
BiH Canadian Embassy Tel: +387 33 222-033 
 Emil Baran Fax:  +387 33 222-044 
 Counsellor / Head Technical Cooperation e-mail:  emil.baran@dfait-maeci.gc.ca 
   
 Canadian Embassy Tel:  + 387 33 222-3952 
 Almir Tanovic Fax:  + 387 33 222-044 
 Program Officer e-mail:  almir.tanovic@dfait-maeci.gc.ca 
   
 Headquarters  
Peace Stabilization Force 
Tel:  00387 33 40 ext 5184 
 Major James Gladwin e-mail:  james.gladwin@sfor.nato.int 
 Chief Mines / Intel  
   
 Headquarters Peace Stabilization Force  
 LCol Jim Greaves   
 Chief Countermines/EOD  
   
 Headquarters Stabilization Force Tel:  PTT +387 33 495 191 
Tel: VSAT 941 5191 
 Dijana Trivakovic-Lucic, B.ScM.Eng. Fax: PTT +387 33 495 180 
Fax:  VSAT 941 5180 
 Senior Engineer Consultant e-mail: trivakovicdi@sfor.nato.int 
   
 Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Mine Action Centre 
Tel:  + 387 33 667 310 
 Dušan Gavran Fax:  + 387 33 667 311 
 Director e-mail:  BHMAK@bhmac.org 
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 Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Ministry of Civil Affairs and Communication  
BiH Demining Commission 
Tel:  387 33 456 503 
 Dragiša Stankovic  
 Commissioner  
   
 Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Ministry of Civil Affairs and Communication 
BiH Demining Commission 
Tel:  387 33 281 102: 281 120 
 Darko Vidovic  
 Commissioner  
   
 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees  Tel:  +387 33 290 322 
 Lejla Ridanovic Fax: +387 33 290 565, 470 171 
 Assistant Program Officer e-mail: ridanovi@unhcr.ch 
   
 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees  Tel:  +387 33 290 344 
 John Farvolden Fax: +387 33 290 565, 470 171 
 Assistant Chief of Mission (Operations) e-mail: farvolde@unhcr.ch 
   
 Office of the High Representative Tel: +387 33 752346 
 Rear Admiral Hugh Edleston Fax: +387 33 752354 
 Military Representative to the HR e-mail: hughe@oscebih.org 
   
 Office of the High Representative Tel: +387 33 752344 
 Major Robert Strazisar Fax:  +387 33 752354 
 Staff Officer e-mail:  Roberts@oscebih.org 
   
 Housing Verification and Monitoring Unit Tel: ++387 33 215 510 
 Elizabeth Hughes  Fax: ++387 33 215 550 
 Program Manager e-mail: ehughes@rrtf-hvm.org 
   
 Canine Countermine Tel/Fax: 00387 0 59 261 231 
 Oliver Mitrevski e-mail: mdd@paleol.net 
 Operations Manager e-mail: mdd@spicanet.net 
  e-mail: oliver_m6@hotmail.com  
   
 Handicap International Tel: + 387 33 266 880 
 Emmanuel Sauvage Fax: +387 33 266 881 
 Director e-mail: lis.director@hibosnia.com.ba 
   
   
 Handicap International  Tel: + 387 33 266 880 
 Almedina Komic Fax: + 387 33 266 881 
 National Operations Coordinator e-mail: lis.operations@hibosnia.com.ba 
   
 Queen’s University Tel: 613 533-6881 
 Malcolm Peat, MBE, MCSP, MSc, PhD Fax: 613 533-6882 
 Executive Director peatm@post.queensu.ca 
 International Centre for the Advancement of Community 
Based Rehabilitation (ICACBR) 
 
   
 Norwegian People’s Aid Tel: +387 33 436 530 
 Stephen Bryant Fax: +387 33 436 533 
 Regional Mine Action Manager e-mail: spb@bih.net.ba 
   
 Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Ministry of European Integration 
Tel/Fax:  ++387 0 33 217 882 
 Nedeljko Masleš  e-mail: mei_ups@bih.net.ba 
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 Assistant Minister  
   
 University of Alberta Tel: 780 492-8100 
 Terry Mackey Fax: 780 492-1488 
 Director, International Programs  e-mail: terry.Mackey@ualberta.ca 
   
 International Children’s Institute Tel/Fax: +387 33 20 88 53 
 Samra Tozo e-mail: ici-bih@utic.net.ba 
   
 International Children’s Institute Tel/Fax:  +387 33 20 88 53 
 Mvlida Ovuka e-mail: ici-bih@utic.net.bc  
 Program Coordinator  
   
 Center for Medical Treatment and Rehabilitation M.H.S. Tel:  387 33 65 50 57 
 Prim. Mirsad dr. Muftic Fax: +387 33 65 35 10 
 Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation e-mail: mirsadmuftic@hotmail.com  
   
 European Commission Tel: +387 33 642 512  
 J. Peter Sutcliffe Fax: +387 57 340 264 
 Program Manager e-mail: jpetersutcliffe@hotmail.com  
   
 United Nations Development Program  Tel: +387 33 276 840, 841, 842 
 Henrik Kolstrup Fax: 387 33 665 681 
 UNDP Resident Representative e-mail: hkolstrup@undp.ba 
   
 United Nations Development Program  Tel: +387 33 276 843 
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ANNEX  D 
 
 
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
 
AP (mine) Anti-personnel mine 
 
APM  Akcija Protiv Mina (BiH demining NGO) 
 
APPR Annual Project Performance Review 
 
AT (mine) Anti-tank mine 
 
BHMAC Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action Centre  
 
BiH Bosnia and Herzegovina 
 
CAMV  Croatian Association of Mine Victims 
 
CBR Community Based Rehabilitation 
 
CBU Cluster Bomb Unit 
 
CEE(B) Central and Eastern Europe (Branch) CIDA 
CF Canadian Forces 
 
CIDA Canadian International Development Agency 
 
CIDC Canadian International Demining Corporation 
 
CLF Canadian Landmine Fund 
 
CMAP Canadian Mine Action Program 
 
CPO Civil Protection Organization (BiH) 
 
CROMAC Croatian Mine Action Centre 
 
CTA Chief Technical Advisor 
 
DCP Directorate of Civil Protection (Kosovo/UNMIK) 
 
DCSEP Department for Civil Security and Emergency Protection (Kosovo – 
UNMIK) 
 
DFAIT Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade 
 
DND Department of National Defence 
 
DSL Defence Systems Limited (UK) 
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EAF Entity Armed Forces (BiH) 
 
EC  European Commission 
 
ELS European Landmine Solutions (commercial mine action company) 
 
EMAC Entity Mine Action Centre (BiH) 
 
EOD Explosive Ordnance Disposal 
 
EU European Union 
 
FMAC Federation Mine Action Centre (BiH) 
 
FRY Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
 
GICHD Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining 
 
GIS Geographic Information System 
 
GLS Global Landmine Survey 
 
HALO Hazardous Area Life-Support Organization 
 
HANDIKOS Association of Disabled Persons – Kosovo 
 




ICACBR International Centre for the Advancement of Community based 
Rehabilitation (Queen’s University) 
 
ICBL International Campaign to Ban Landmines 
 
ICI International Children’s Institute 
 
ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross (INGO) 
 
IDAC International Demining Alliance of Canada 
 
IDP  Internally Displaced Persons 
 
IMAS International Mine Action Standard(s)  
 
IMSMA Information Management System for Mine Action 
 
ITF International Trust Fund for Demining and Victim Assistance (also 
known as the Slovenia Trust Fund  
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JNA Yugoslav National Army 
 
KFOR Kosovo Force (NATO) 
 
KLA Kosovo Liberation Army 
 
KPC Kosovo Protection Corps 
 
KVM Kosovo Verification Mission 
 
MAC Mine Action Centre 
 
MACC Mine Action Coordination Centre 
 
MAG Mines Advisory Group (mine action NGO) 
 
MAP Mine Action Program 
 
MDD Mine Detection Dog 
 
MNB Multi-National Brigade  
 
MRE Mine Risk Education 
 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization  
 
NGO Non-Governmental Organization  
 
NPA Norwegian People’s Aid 
 
OA Official Assistance (Canada) 
 
OCHA UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
 
ODA Official Development Assistance  
 
OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
 
PWDs Persons with Disabilities 
 
RBM Results Based Management 
 
RSMAC Republica Srpska Mine Action Centre 
 
SAC Survey Action Centre 
 
SWG Survey Working Group 
 
TA Technical Advisor 
 
UNDP United Nations Development Program 
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UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
 
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund  
 
UNMAS United Nations Mine Action Service  
 
UNMIK United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo 
 
UNOPS United Nations Office for Project Services  
 
UXO Unexploded Ordnance 
 
VJ Yugoslav Army 
 
VTF Voluntary Trust Fund (UN) 
 
VVAF Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation 
 
WFP World Food Program 
 





BALKANS CMAP KEY RESULTS MATRIXES 
 
Prepared by: Jeff Naylor, Research Assistant 
 
 
The following matrixes organized by country and area of mine action provide a summary of key 
results achieved for the principal projects undertaken as part of the balks CMAP from 1998 to 
2003. The information is necessarily brief and was gleaned from a comprehensive review of the 









Dog I & II 
Z-011296, Z-020217, 
Z-020340 Ackja Protiv 
Mina (APM) Demining 
I, II, III 
Z-011298, 
 Z-020341 NPA 
Sarajevo Canton 
















1998 49,362 m2 
1999 114,172 m2 
2000 125,105 m2 
2001 116,216 m2 















demining actions  
 
3. Number and 




734,141 m2  
-33 MDDs in 
BiH trained by 
CIDC  
(of a total of 86) 
- Many important areas 
cleared including 
school access, houses, 
and water sources. 
- Most minefields 
inhibiting refugee 
returns in northwest 
Bosnia are cleared. 
1999- NPA CMAP 
91,890 m2 
2001- NPA CMAP 
73 450 m2, (a slight 
reduction due to 





2000 –  






















reduced to one 
Chief instructor  
- APM has good 
technical capacity to 
conduct mine 
clearance operations 
and its managerial and 
administrative skills to 
be self-sustainable 
have improved. 
- In 1999, the 
project manager 
position was 
passed to a 
Bosnian staff 
member and 
training for Bosnian 




- Bozena mini 
flail units (2 of 




- CIDA funding 
for insurance 





Projects’ Success at 









Failed to Achieve Results:     
Achieved Results: ü  ü   ü  
Exceeded Expected Results:   ü   
General Evaluation of Cost 
Effectiveness, Partnerships 












centre is a 
definite threat 
- APM is competent 
and has recently 
shown willingness to 
become self-sufficient 
-Some discrepancy in 
planned and actual 
activities resulted from 
BHMAC monopoly on 
assigning tasks  
-Lack of steady 






-NPA develops well 
qualified personnel 
and good planning 
-Good indigenous 
capacity building 
- Results were 
met and EAF 
teams show 
good gain in 
productivity 









BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA MAC PROGRAM RESULTS – Institutional Support  
(Z-020519 Support to MACs V / Z-020353 Support to MACs IV / Z-020216 Support to MACs III / Z-011303 



























-Increased capacity of BHMAC to the point where it was able to manage the mine 
action activities in BiH 
- With the 2002 BHMAC restructure the Entity MACs became regional and the   
BHMAC is now the primary mine coordination institution centre in BiH 
- Cdn and international pressure precipitated a state of Law on Dem ining passed in 
Feb 2002 that regulates mine action activities in BiH. 
-BiH government took control of paying the salaries of BHMAC staff, indicating 
increased ownership and control. 
-Local staff sustainable, the number of foreign advisors has decreased from 40 to 1 
and a strategic demining plan to 2010 has been created.  














-Early in the program (2001), a series of 425 threat assessments, 204 completion 
reports, 73 survey reports, 13 incident data, 86 minefield data were produced.  900 
minefield maps were issued.  BH MAC is now sustainable in such operations  
Projects’ Success at 
Achieving Expected Results:  
Failed to Achieve Results:  
Achieved Results:  
Exceeded Expected Results: ü  
General Evaluation of Cost 
Effectiveness, Partnerships 
and Appropriateness of 
Design 
-Short tenure of international advisors reduced their effectiveness 
-The original division of responsibilities among three indigenous MACS (BHMAC 
plus the two entity MACs) reduced efficiency and clarity of responsibilities  
-Overall, the program was cost effective, encouraged partnerships  and was 
extremely well designed. Great improvements have been realized. 
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BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 
VICTIM ASSISTANCE RESULTS 
Z-011464 ICI Support 





Z-020336 Queen’s U 














1. Number of 
people 
participating in 
the program  
150 children who have 
undergone a major 
medical intervention, 
parents, senior and 
front-line hospital and 
education professionals  
12 landmine victims 
medically rehabilitated 
over 10 months  
-10 Peer Counselling 
(PC) groups reached 
approximately 1000 
PWDs 
-151 PWDs referred 







members and / 
or policy makers 
of disability 
issues  







3. Evidence of 
understanding of 
disability issues 








teachers and 11 
parents attended focus 
groups identifying 
issues and needs 
relating to psychosocial 
care of children. 
-Workshops and 
meetings held with 30 
residents from family 
medicine centres, 100 
health professionals, 
and 25 school 
facilitators about 
psychosocial needs  
 - Community and public 
relations initiatives were 
organized and 
implemented by PWDs 
- 12 training sessions 
held for 91 health 
professionals to increase 
knowledge 
- Marketing workshops 
led to awareness, 2 
brochures (2000 copies), 
3 posters (1500 copies), 
60 media contacts  














See above -Professional 
rehabilitation and socio-
economic reintegration 
of victims aided through 
donations from other 
sources  
-PC groups identified 
vulnerable populations  
Projects’ Success at Achieving 
Expected Results: Z-011464 Z-011414 Z-020336 
Failed to Achieve Results:    
Achieved Results: 
 ü   
Exceeded Expected Results: ü   ü  
General Evaluation of Cost 
Effectiveness, Partnerships and 
Appropriateness of Design 
- The project was 
slightly behind 
schedule 
- Good reach and 
sustainability 





- Gender addressed  
- Fully achieved results 
in a cost-effective 
manner.   
- Increased 
collaboration between 
CIDA and ITF 
- PC groups gathered 
funding from other 
sources  
- A 9 month delay in CIDA 
funding between this and 
M-010054 project 
endangered program  
- Leadership by PWDs  
- Good Reach and 
sustainability 
- Inter-entity cooperation 
- Addresses gender 






Actual Results BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA MINE AWARENESS 












1. UNICEF, UNMAC, Red Cross and other 
agencies dealing with mine accidents 
report a decrease in mine-related 
incidents. 
2. Subsequent investments in mine 
awareness in years 1998 and 1999 go 
ahead based on success of 1997 program. 
3. Utilization of PIUs for project 
implementation continues. 
-Delivery of 600 mine awareness education sessions  
-6000 posters, 32,000 booklets, 2000 notebooks, 1,000 
T-shirts distributed in 100 municipalities in the 
Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and in Republica 
Srpska 
-Live reports, video and radio broadcasts were also 
utilized to reach the population 
-40,000 people including 18,000 pupils, 800 teachers 
and 400 refugees were reached 
Projects’ Success at Achieving Expected Results: Z-010437 
Failed to Achieve Results:  
Achieved Results: ü  
Exceeded Expected Results:  
General Evaluation of Cost Effectiveness, Partnerships 
and Appropriateness of Design 
The PIUs performed reasonably well in terms of project 




CROATIA DEMINING RESULTS Z-020339- 02 Mine Detection 
Dog Trng II 
SHARED EXPECTED OUTCOME RESULTS Performance Indicators Actual Results 
1. Strengthened Capacity of CIDC to 
assist PHD in becoming an 
autonomous and sustainable local 
(indigenous) org. in support of 
CROMAC and Croatian mine-action in 
general 
1. Number of Croatian Employees 
trained and retrained on staff relative to 
the number of CIDC’s int’l staff 
employed in Croatia 
2. % increase mine clearance 
efficiency rate, as well as the 
acceleration rate of manual & 
mechanical demining compared to 
teams without mine detection dogs  
- MDD teams have increased to 
10, with 6 MDD teams separately 
funded by Austria and Belgium  
- Croatian handlers selected 
- Testing facilities constructed 
and MDD training occurred 
- CROMAC capacity has not 
been enhanced to date due to 
project delays  
 
2. Enhanced personal safety for 
deminers, residents and visitors in the 
area 
Number of potential and actual 
returnees that benefit from demining 
activities 
Reduction of suspected area/ increase 
in efficiency 
- MDD teams not yet utilized due 
to project delays  
Projects’ Success at Achieving Expected Results: Z-020339-02 
Failed to Achieve Results: ü  
Achieved Results:  
Exceeded Expected Results:  
General Evaluation of Cost 
Effectiveness, Partnerships and 
Appropriateness of Design 
- Serious differences between project partners, due to disagreement over 
the responsibilities and training methodology delayed the beginning of 
training. The project’s results should be achieved by Feb 2003 
- The ability of CROMAC to take over the management of the MDD training 
program has been questioned  
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CROATIA MACC PROGRAM RESULTS 
Z-020337 (001) Suprt UN/ Cromac Transition Program /(002) CROMAC Nat’l Managers Training & Dev’t, /(003) 
Cdn. Mine Action Program CROMAC Automation and Office Equipment, /(004) Cdn Mine Action Program 













Number of Croatian 
Employees trained 
and retrained on 
staff relative to the 
number of int’l staff 
employed in 
CROMAC. 
- Canada provided a mini-flail (mv-3) and protective gear.  The mv-3 was used 
survey and verification work on a future highway route. 161 000 m2 surveyed 
to June 2002. 
- Communications, computer, database, management coordination and office 
equipment was purchased, which will be used to improve database, 
communication and management. 
- A Decision Support System was developed and delivered which helped 
coordinate survey efforts, which reduced suspected areas from 4000 km2 to 
1700 km 2. 
- A technical survey allowed the release of 200 000m2 of agricultural land. 
Projects’ Success at Achieving 
Expected Results:  
Failed to Achieve Results:  
Achieved Results:  
Exceeded Expected Results: ü  
General Evaluation of Cost 
Effectiveness, Partnerships and 
Appropriateness of Design 
- Projects have achieved goals.  A key contributor to success was good project 
planning done in conjunction with the CROMAC. 
- UNDP lacked the resources to conduct sufficient monitoring. 
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Actual Results CROATIA VICTIM 












policy makers  
 - Mine Victims Needs Assessment Report was produced, which will serve as a tool 
for decision-making and strategic planning.   
- Workshops were held for 17 children and 7 adults  















- The adult workshops included computer literacy 
Projects’ Success at 
Achieving Expected Results: Z-020337-006 
Failed to Achieve Results:  
Achieved Results:  
Exceeded Expected Results: ü  
General Evaluation of Cost 
Effectiveness, Partnerships 
and Appropriateness of 
Design 
- Overall, the project is a great success and achieved above expected results  
Actual Results CROATIA MINE AWARENESS 











and of long 
term donor 
enrolment 
1. Number of 
mine-related 
accidents 
2. Number of 
Returnees  
- A “Mine Awareness and Needs Assessment Report” and survey  was completed 
in March 2002 and was translated into Croatian in July 
Projects’ Success at 
Achieving Expected Results: Z-020337-005 
Failed to Achieve Results:  
Achieved Results:  
Exceeded Expected Results: ü  
General Evaluation of Cost 
Effectiveness, Partnerships 
and Appropriateness of 
Design 
- The Mine Awareness Needs Assessment has already, and will continue to, 
provide an excellent resource for maximizing scarce Mine Awareness resources .  It 
will allow for better coordination and collaboration among various organizations  
- The project is well on its way to having a lasting impact and achieving its 

























    
Significant 
Impediment to 














 71 schools, 
 46 homes, 
 7 medical clinics  
 a few TV/ Radio 
transmission 
stations  
 a water pump 
house 
 4 power plants  
- 37 000 m2 cleared 
- Over 1 000 000 
m2 released by 
level I and II 
surveys  








- VJ Minefields: 
 - 4 Completed 
 - 6 Released by  
Survey 
 - 6 Issued with no  
action taken 
 - 6 completed but  
NOT accepted  
 - 6 Suspended 























- Use of Land  
 Cleared: 
  72% 
agricultural 
  17% 
forest 
  6% 
school 
grounds  
  4% forest 
tracks 
Projects’ Success at 
Achieving Expected Results: Z-020013 Z-020027 Z-020200 Z-020350 
Failed to Achieve Results: ü  ü    
Achieved Results: 
  ü   
Exceeded Expected Results: 
   ü  
General Evaluation of Cost 
Effectiveness, Partnerships 

































* CIDA provided funding to MACC with the provision that it invest in an integrated mine clearance team comprising 




KOSOVO MACC RESULTS 
Z-20066 MACC in Kosovo- Data Entry 
Clerks 
Z-020091 Institutional Support to 























- $ 65,000 provided to cover the 
incremental costs of technical experts data 
entry Clerks from the Department of 
National Defense to the MACC in Kosovo. 
- Project connected to Z02035 to 
provide for UNMACC demining core 
capabilities. 
- 101 hectares of land cleared of 768 
mines and 6 items of UXO. 
- MINE-TECH cleared 61 minefields 
and conducted surveys on a further 
76 areas. 
 
- MDD teams deployed as needed to 
support MACC operations. 
- MDD teams conducted training on 
days not deployed. 
- Med evacuation exercises 
conducted monthly. 
 
Projects’ Success at 
Achieving Expected Results: Z-020066 Z-020091 
Failed to Achieve Results:   
Achieved Results: ü   
Exceeded Expected Results: 
 ü  
General Evaluation of Cost 
Effectiveness, Partnerships 
and Appropriateness of 
Design 
No reporting on results is available. Well designed and focused.  The 
project resulted in improved access 
to agricultural land water sources, 
and a reduction in the loss of human 



























- Three five-week educational programs delivered to the Association of Disabled 
People in Kosovo (HANDIKOS). 
- 3 Seminars for rehabilitation professionals from Pristina Hospital were held. 
- 16 classes taught to 100 physiotherapy students. 
- 62 client site visits, 15 seminars with NGO CBR workers (241 participants).  
- 48 case conferences to review challenging cases. 
- Agreement for including staff members with disabilities in the ten CBR centres 
was reached. 
- Meetings and patient home visits with nurses identified needs. 
- ICACBR raised awareness of disability issues through education programs and 
meetings with health professionals, and through advocacy at political and private 
organizations. 
Projects’ Success at 
Achieving Expected Results: M-010054 
Failed to Achieve Results:  
Achieved Results: ü  
Exceeded Expected Results:  
General Evaluation of Cost 
Effectiveness, Partnerships 
and Appropriateness of 
Design 
The project achieved its goal, however, the actual impact of the project on the 
disabled population is difficult to access.  Approximate numbers of beneficiaries 
would be useful and were not provided. Training of locals provided for good 
sustainability. 
Actual Results 
KOSOVO MINE AWARENESS 
RESULTS 












- 400 000 mine/ UXO awareness posters and leaflets distributed through NGOs 
- 3 locally produced TV spots in Albanian and Serbian which were aired by Radio/ 
Television Kosovo 
- UNICEF conducted an assessment of accident victims and group discussions 
with villagers to better understand behavior causing mine/UXO accidents  
 
Projects’ Success at 
Achieving Expected Results: Z-010022 
Failed to Achieve Results:  
Achieved Results:  
Exceeded Expected Results:  
General Evaluation of Cost 
Effectiveness, Partnerships 
and Appropriateness of 
Design 





BALKANS CMAP EVALUATION QUESTIONNAIRE 
SUMMARY OF RESPONSES 
 
Prepared By:  Jeff Naylor, Research Assistant 
 
 
The following tables provide a summary of the responses received from the CMAP Evaluation 
Questionnaire. Also included for information is a copy of the questionnaire. It should be noted that 
the questionnaire was sent to all partners and executing agencies and formed the basis of the 
interviews that were conducted during the evaluation field mission and in most cases, responses 
were oral. The respondents listed below provided written responses that have been included in the 




Respondent(s) and Position(s) Organization CIDA 
Projects(s) 
 
Oliver Mitrevski, Operations Manager CIDC Z-011295 
Z-020339 
 
David Horton, Executive Director CIDC Z-011295 
Z-020339 
 
Dzevad Hadzic, Program Manager APM Z-020217 
 
Stephen Bryant NPA Z-020341 
 
Almedina Komic, Emanuel Sauvage, Landmine Impact 
Survey National Operation Coordinator, Director 
Handicap International  





Lt Col Jim Greaves UK Army, Maj James Gladwin UK 
Army, MsDijan Trivakovic-Lucic, Chief Countermines, 
EOD, Chief Mines, Intel, Senior Engineer Consultant  
 




Malcolm Peat, Project Manager, Executive Director ICACBR and Queen’s University Z-010280 
 
Dennis Snider, Ambassador Canadian Embassy, Zagreb All Croatia 
Projects  
 
Sid Murray, Training Manager  CIDC Z-020339 (02) 
 
David Rowe, Program Manager and Strategic Advisor UNDP MAC projects in 
BiH 
 
Alison Clement, Program Coordinator et al DFAIT/ILX Mine Action Team Entire CMAP 
 
 
*NB: Questionnaire response from DFAIT/ILX, Mine Action Tream applied to overall Balkans CMAP 










CANADIAN EMBASSY, COVERING ALL CMAP 
PROJECTS IN CROATIA 
 
CIDC MDD PROJECT 
Question 2.1 
Project Effectiveness 
- Projects have achieved their primary goals of 
institution building. 
- A key reason for success is good project planning 
in cooperation with the CROMAC. 
- UNDP performed satisfactory administration of 
projects overall but could have invested more in 
monitoring. 
 
- There were problems in 
dealing with CROMAC staff. 
- It is questionable whether 
CROMAC has the capability of 
taking over the CIDC MDD 
program. 
Question 2.2 
Key Issues  
- Issues with projects success include CROMAC’s 
ability to locate funding for managing MDD teams. 
- Management training at the CROMAC was focused 
on technical skills but some higher-level staff may 




Examples of key results 
- CMAP has provided the greatest level of support 
for building the capacity of the CROMAC. 
- CMAP contributions covered approximately 10% of 
total contributions to Victim Assistance. 
- A technical survey allowed the release of 200,000 




Future needs  
- Areas of need include general management 
training. 
- Mine victims assistance and awareness may 




Consistency with local 
needs  
- The Needs Assessment conducted with the 
CROMAC and other mine action agents created a 





- Programs managed and funds used satisfactorily, 
with some delays in the payment of suppliers 





- Program would have benefited from more 
involvement from the Canadian Embassy. The 
UNDP staff is often overextended and it would 





BiH – CMAP DEMINING PARTNER – SUMMARY OF RESPONSES 
 





- Project was successful 
- 33 of 86 MDDs in BiH 
trained by CIDC in 2002 
- High accreditation rate 
- Difficulties of previous 
1.5 years gone in last 5 
months 
- Funding of program 59% 
CIDA, 23% CIDC, 18% 
other donors. Also, 
program now generates 
$140,000 
 





- SFOR distributes CIDA 
donation, but NATO 
contract rules create 
complications. 
- CIDA should consider 
making donations directly 
to the insurance service 
provider. 
Question 2.2: 
Key Issues  
- Staff turnover of 
international instructors 
can create problems. 
- Human resource 
management and poor 
candidate selection are 
key problems. 6 
Canadian instructor 
trainees, 3 local 
instructors and 9 local 




funding. BiH to 
conduct good 
planning. 
HI – No major 
difficulties. 
 
APM – some 
discrepancy in planned 
and actual activities 
resulted from BHMAC 
having monopoly on 
assigning tasks. 
- Time is needed to plan 
spending. Notification of 
funding levels is often 
insufficient. 
- ‘EAF’s’ work is 
unrecognized by the 
government in 
pay/bonuses. 





Examples of key results 
- Succeeded in training 5 
women dog handlers (an 




 HI - rationalize and 
prioritize tasks. 
HI - reinforce mine 
awareness. 
HI - landmine impact 
survey will help set 
needs & priorities 
APM - Few donors. 
 
- CIDA funding is 
necessary for insurance, 
without which 20-25% of 
BiH demining capacity 
would be lost. 
Question 2.4: 
Future needs 
- Maintenance of 
accredited MDD teams. 
- Train local instructors. 
- Renewal of MDDs 
- Build non-mine related 
canine uses. 




needs to provide 
funding to take 
ownership of mine 
action. 
APM - CMAP was 
important for APM 
- Integrated demining is 
most effective but CIDA 
contribution may be best 
spent on c ivil companies 
for mechanical 
preparation and MDD 
work. 
Question3.1: 
Consistency with local 
needs 
- BiH needs CMAP 
activities and results are 
good. 




  - Insurance is essential for 







 HI – CMAP and other 
MAPs can strengthen 
indigenous mine action. 
 
- When SFOR leaves, 





- Program results will 
mostly manifest over the 
next 2 years. 
- Canada/CIDA do not 
gain due recognition 
  - EAF strength in manual 
demining. Also, Bozena 
flails are too small for the 
task. Contracting 
commercial dogs and 





BiH – CMAP MAC and MINE VICTIM ASSISTANCE PARTNERS – SUMMARY OF RESPONSES 





- The project’s aim was to increase BiH’s indigenous MAC 
capabilities. 
- The BiH MAC under UNDP supervision managed it by UNDP, or. 
- The projects were effective. 
- They aided the establishment of a unified, indigenous BH MAC. 
- A state of Law on Demining was passed regulating mine action. 
- The Bosnian government gained ownership of MAC by taking over 
the payment of staff. 
 
- The Project was the continuation of Queen’s 
ICACBR project from 9-1999 to 3-2000. 
- Successful at forming 10 Peer Counseling 
groups. 
- A gap in funding between two initiatives 
existed from June 2000 to March 2001. 
- Each PC group largely managed their 
organization through consensus/discussion. 
- A small business development component 
existed in partnership with SOL WBO and the 
Economic Institute, the University of Sarajevo. 
 
Question 2.2: 
Key Issues  
- The tenure of international advisors w as often too short to make an 
impact. 
- The original division of responsibilities among three MACs 
(BHMAC + 2 entity MACs) and lack of donor confidence from 
delays in adopting the Demining Law placed constraints on 
management. 
- Peer Counseling groups identified vulnerable 
populations, not just mine victims. 
- The two project coordinators were strong 
leaders. 
- The 9-month financing delay caused financial 
and personal difficulties. 
- The relationship with SOL WBO was effective 
professionally but unnecessarily complex.  
 
Question 2.3: 
Examples of key 
results  
- The project increased indigenous capacity, created the State Law 
on Demining, and encouraged the Bosnian authorities to fund 
MAC staff salaries. 
- Field contributions and training increased MACs capability to 
coordinate operations. 
- The 10 PC groups involved approx. 1,000 
PWDs. 
- PWDs organized and implemented community 
and public relations initiatives. 
- Federation and RS groups integrated into a 
single disability initiative and women PWDs 
were involved in a productive small business. 
- PC groups gained funding from new sources. 
- A PC group for mothers of children PWDs 
formed. 
- Coalition of Associations of PWDs 
successfully lobbied for a Law on Building 
(Accessibility). 





- Effective mine action needs to become a highlighted consideration 
at the highest levels of the government. 
- The Demining Commission should be able to influence their 
minister. 
- The Commission should have a support team for special 
administrative and communication functions. 
- -BHMAC requires more capable information and operational 
management systems. 
 
- PC groups are sustainable. They will need 
legal registration as a national PC 
organization, which is complicated by F8iH 
and RS’s legal systems. 
- Enhanced knowledge, attitudes and 
behaviours of the general population towards 
PWDs. 
- International agencies are rarely physically 
accessible or employ PWDs. 
- CIDA should take a leadership role by 
finalizing a disability policy framework. 
- Canada-Japan Queen’s CBR initiative 
identifies peer support, providing opportunities 





- The Canadian program effectively identified needs, was 
compatible with local efforts and contributed directly to the work of 
other organizations. 
 
- CMAP is excellent in that it targets all aspects 




- The CMAPs ability to provide responses tailored to needs is a 
definite strength. 
- CIDA delay in funding was problematic and 





- Canada should encourage BiH government to improve awareness 
and ownership of mine action. 
- Focus on educational and support needs of the Demining 
Commission. 
- Additional investment in the management function of the BHMAC. 
- CIDA could continue to monitor progress in the development of 
BiH mine action capabilities. 
- Longer term funding. 
- No gap in the funding of two project phases. 
- Centralize administration of projects. 
- Landmine survivors should be brought into 
broader disability arena. 
- Good leadership at the grassroots level is key. 
- Decentralization promotes local ownership. 
- Review clause of CIDA contracts on Health 
Protection that may be grounds for 
discrimination against PWDs . 
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The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) is presently conducting an evaluation of its Mine 
Action Program (MAP) in the Balkans. This five-year, $ 20 M (CAD) Program comprised 34 individual 
projects in the areas of: mine/UXO survey, marking and clearance; mine resistance education/awareness 
(MRE); institution and capacity building; and mine victim assistance. The projects were located primarily in 
Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo with some residual programming support undertaken in Slovenia and Albania.  
 
This unique, multi-faceted and responsive program provided for the achievement of many results and a 
number of valuable lessons. The evaluation of the MAP in the Balkans intends to capture these to improve 
future programming, particularly in light of the possible revitalization of Canadian Landmine Fund in 2003 
and in terms of Canada’s assistance to mine-affected countries in Africa.  
 
An important aspect of the MAP evaluation in the Balkans is to carry out consultations to get the opinion of 
key stakeholders on certain elements of the program as well as to collect complementary information about the 
performance of the program.  As such, the consultations aim at gathering input for the purpose of enhancing 
program effectiveness by refining project design parameters, monitoring requirements, reporting protocols and 
the type of results that should be expected.  
 
The consultations will take place through an evaluation questionnaire and interviews to be conducted during 
an evaluation field mission to take place between November 15 and December 03, 2002.  We are enclosing a 
copy of the questionnaire that we would like you to complete. We intend to use this as the basis for our 
discussions and interview with you during our field visit and the completed questionnaires will be included as 
part of the evaluation database.  
 
Please do not hesitate to contact Jeff Naylor, Research Advisor, Canadian International Development Agency 
at phone number (819) 994-3564 or e-mail: JEFF_NAYLOR@acdi-cida.gc.ca if you need any additional 
clarification or assistance in responding to these questions.  
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